LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS

Rethinking Resistance under Neoliberal Governmentality

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The Theories, Concepts and Practices of Democracy

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There are many types of democracies and many types of democrats. Though contemporary Western scholars and practitioners of democracy have tended to repeat a particular set of narratives and discourses, recent research shows us that there are in fact hundreds of different adjectives of democracy. What one theorist, political leader or nation invokes as democracy, others may label as something altogether different. Part of this has to do with the political nature of democracy. As a practice and concept, it is always contested. Yet instead of exploring these differences and ambiguities, many democrats today retreat to the well-worn definitions and practices made popular by Western powers in the twentieth-century.

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To my family and the people I can call my friends.

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This book project was undertaken at the School of Politics and International Studies, Queen Mary University of London, between 2012 and 2016. The main motivation behind the research project was to make sense of the heightened wave of protest activity that was taking over the world in 2012 and 2013. This growing repoliticisation of people has also affected me personally while taking part in Occupy Warwick at the University of Warwick in 2011 and the Slovenian protests during my visit in December 2012. During the four years of the research, the political world around me was changing fast, which also had an inevitable effect on the refinement of my theoretical and political positions. This book is therefore the product of dynamic interplay between my evolving knowledge of political theory and the concrete political events that were taking place at the time.

CONTENTS

Introduction

The beginning of the present decade saw an eruption of significant collective resistance to the way governments were dealing with the 2008 financial crisis and an intensified desire for systemic change. From the Indignados in Spain, to the global Occupy movement, the Syntagma Square anti-austerity protests in Greece, and the people's uprisings in Slovenia, governments around the world were criticised by political movements for their complicity in the continuing neoliberalisation of society and for failing to protect vulnerable people from the negative effects of turbulent market activity. In this book, I will argue that this wave of protest movements points towards a crisis of liberal democracy, which demands that we reconceptualise the relationship between resistance and institutional politics. The crisis takes on different manifestations at different levels of society. The fall in support for the established political parties, especially the social democratic parties on the centre-left and the conservative or liberal parties on the centre-right, coupled with the decline of party membership around Europe and the decimation of their vote share (Van Biezen 2013; Keen 2015); democratic institutions that are seen as unrepresentative by voters; the professionalisation of politics; and the alignment of mainstream political parties around the neoliberal consensus—these are all signs of what may be seen as a growing democratic deficit in liberal democratic institutions. These are also some of the factors that have contributed to the intensification of radical politics outside formal institutions. Different scholars of social and political movements have described this increase in

protest activity as a political response to the depoliticisation of established democratic processes (for instance, Graeber 2013; Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2014; Laclau 2014; della Porta 2015; Mouffe 2013b, 2015). Others, mainly in mainstream political science, have focused on the anti-political sentiments among voters and on the processes that lead to depoliticisation in modern politics (for instance, Burnham 2001; Flinders and Buller 2006; Hay 2007; Flinders and Wood 2015). In political theory, concepts such as post-politics and post-democracy have been used to explain the depoliticised state of liberal democracy (Rancière 1999, 2010; Žižek 1999; Mouffe 2000, 2005; Dean 2009).

The crisis of liberal democracy is not a new subject of scholarly debate (Offe 1974, 1984; Habermas 1976; Held 2006). The late 1960s and the 1970s were times of intense social upheaval across the West as the oil crises hit currency reserves and economic growth in major industrial economies. The challenges coming from the civil rights, ecological, feminist and anti-war movements prompted, especially conservative, scholars to question the ability of democracies to govern. The increase in democratic pressure on the political system, which they believed to be plural and fair, led them to view the governing elites as being overloaded by unrealistic political expectations and demands (Crozier et al. 1975; King 1975; Sartori 1975; Parsons 1982). Progressive sociologists and neo-Marxists challenged the overload thesis and viewed the rise in social movements and protest activity as a legitimate response to the loss of legitimacy of governing elites. The reawakened civil society and the appearance of new social movements challenged the boundaries of institutional politics and prompted a re-evaluation of key precepts in democratic theory (Offe 1974; Macpherson 1973, 1977; Wolfe 1977).

In order to capture the theoretical complexity of the debates in democratic theory, which continue to this day, and how they correspond with the crisis of liberal democracy, one can start by looking at the analytical models that purport to explain the dynamics between the dominant conceptions of politics in liberal democracies. I return to this in more detail in Chap. 2, but for the moment the following brief outline suffices. The dominant analytical model of democracy is the aggregative model, which draws heavily upon the pluralist-elite assumptions about political life. It emphasises the view of liberal democracy as an electoral competition among a plurality of interests, where the nexus of political power lies with the elected politicians, while the citizens take the role of passive spectators (Schumpeter 2010; Sartori 1975). With the rise of new social movements

in the 1970s, this conception of liberal democracy comes under increasing pressure. The deliberative model of democracy is presented as an alternative to the aggregative model by challenging the instrumental economic rationality underlying its main assumptions and shifting the axiom of politics towards solving normative questions through deliberation (Habermas 1987, 1996; Dryzek 2000; Rawls 1971, 2005).

However, both of these models fail to capture the antagonistic aspect of resistance to institutional politics and the resulting crises of liberal democracy: why do social conflicts arise even in well-ordered societies, such as advanced liberal democracies? Can all conflict be institutionalised and dealt with through established democratic procedures? If not, what other analytical model could better account for the inherently conflictual character of social relations and the political divisions among different political groups and rationalities? I will use the agonistic model, proposed by the political theorist Chantal Mouffe (2000, 2005, 2013a), as a partial response to the questions posed. I will not treat her agonistic democratic theory as exhaustive, but in the first instance use it as a starting point for conceptualising an alternative understanding to the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy (Chap. 2), and then build on it by engaging with social movements and new radical left literature. To underline its theoretical merits for my analysis, Mouffe's agonistic democracy provides an account of politics, which puts emphasis on its antagonistic character and underlines the centrality of power in the constitution of political identities and positions. It also explains how liberal rationality moves the axiom of democratic politics away from recognising the antagonistic character of politics. These two important contributions provide a basis for Mouffe's project of theorising a radical democratic politics. Like the other two models, however, it treats the institutions of liberal democracy as a neutral mechanism for the translation of political grievances and demands. All three models of democracy, notwithstanding their qualified differences, take an indulgent approach to understanding liberal democracy, while leaving aside the structural and historical analysis of the changing role of state institutions in the context of global market integration. And, while the agonistic model does identify the depoliticisation of liberal democracy as the source of extra-institutional contestation of formal politics, a systemic analysis of what drives this contestation is missing in the literature.

What would such a systemic analysis entail? As already pointed out above, it would need to explain why there has been a trend of depoliticisation in the politics of liberal democracy over the past few decades. It would

also need to take account of how neoliberalism, as the main governmental rationality in contemporary societies, has influenced the functioning of Western democracies and their inability to respond to the popular democratic demands of citizens. I will avoid using the word globalisation, which is often used in scholarly literature and the media to describe the rise of neoliberalism and the reshaping of governance structures according to market principles. By focusing on the political rationality that has informed Western policy-makers and leaders in reshaping the structural relationship between democracy and the market economy, I want to emphasise that the structural processes we otherwise understand under the term globalisation are the result of political agency and can therefore be reversed through political agency as well. My argument in the book will be that neoliberalism is in fact one of the key drivers of depoliticisation of institutional politics since it reconfigures the governmental rationality of the state towards further marketisation of society. At the same time, the latter process will also be viewed as politicising, even if indirectly, in the sense that it provokes a counter-movement of resistance. The post-2011 wave of protests, I will argue, demonstrates this contradictory effect. Based on this diagnosis, an analysis that would combine the project of theorising the radicalisation of democracy with a critical understanding of the political economic conditions of depoliticisation could, therefore, point the way forward for the radical left politics.

I will suggest that this task can be accomplished by combining the project of theorising radical democratic politics, the starting point for which will be Mouffe's agonistic view of politics, with a political economy analysis, which will offer a structural explanation of the interaction between political and economic processes in liberal democracy. Neoliberalism will be understood as a governmental rationality that manages and conditions the market economy through a complex nexus of political knowledge and institutions, which operate across the political/economic division prevalent in classical political economy. The book will not be so much concerned with providing a detailed description of how neoliberalism was rolled out in the West[1] and its negative consequences for social cohesion, the rise in inequality, and the aggravation of socio-economic injustices—I believe that this has already been extensively covered in the existing literature (see, e.g., Chomsky 1999; Harvey 2005; Crouch 2011; Mirowski 2013; Brown 2015). The analysis in my book will instead concentrate on interrogating how the development of liberalism and its relationship with neoliberalism influenced the political rationality of governing in the West

and the resistance this transformation provoked following the 2008 financial crisis.

The main theoretical problem that presents itself in this book, therefore, is two-fold and interconnected: (1) a structural understanding of the dynamics between liberal democracy and the market economy is needed in order to account for the systemic depoliticisation of democratic politics; and (2) a reconceptualisation of resistance in relation to depoliticised institutional politics, which would address the structural obstacles facing radical left politics in challenging neoliberalism. Both parts of the problem address the specific theoretical gaps in the respective scholarly literature. Political theory will be used as a resource for manoeuvring between critical political economy and democratic theory on one side, where the relationship between politics and economics will be expounded, and the radical new left and social movements literature on the other. This task will also require political theory to elucidate the concepts of crisis and resistance as a link for rethinking the relationship between institutional politics and protest movements. I will now expound on each of these in turn.

The question of the relationship between liberal democracy and the market economy has been identified by many sociologists, political scientists, and thinkers, particularly those with Marxist leanings, as the key for comprehending the depoliticisation of politics in recent years. One way the relationship has been addressed in the literature is by underlining the tension in liberal democracy between liberal institutions and rights on the one hand and democracy or popular sovereignty on the other. Colin Crouch (2004) maintains that there needs to be an equilibrium between a flourishing liberalism (i.e. upholding a plurality of opinions and interests, the freedom of expression and press, the right to association, etc.), and a healthy democracy (i.e. a well-functioning electoral democracy, state party funding, and media access). However, in the present state of what he calls post-democracy, where politics is but a "tightly controlled spectacle", Crouch observes, the balance is being disproportionately shifted in favour of big corporate interests, which decreases the citizens' ability of democratic oversight and their influence over public affairs (Crouch 2004, 4). For Crouch, therefore, the aim is to maintain a perfect balance between the two. Whereas Crouch views the relationship between liberalism and democracy as a compatible and reconcilable one, Mouffe (2000) emphasises the paradoxical character of the tension between the two, and, although she views the relationship as inherently unstable, she believes the institutional arrangement can be a constructive one in her agonistic model

of democracy. In *Undoing the Demos*, Wendy Brown (2015) goes to great lengths to demonstrate the extent to which neoliberalism economises and marketises various spheres of private and social life. However, she disregards the role of liberal democracy in supporting the process of neoliberalisation. All three accounts either treat the spheres of politics and economics as separate domains, where the challenge is to find the right balance between the two, or view liberal democracy as a victim of neoliberalisation and as ideologically and structurally independent from the economic processes.

Another way the relationship between liberal democracy and market economy can be addressed is through the Marxist debate about the relative autonomy of the state in capitalism. The added theoretical value of approaching the relationship from a Marxist perspective is that it provides a dialectical explanation from a historically informed account. Moreover, it shifts the debate away from more pluralist accounts of liberal democracy to one that poses the following analytical questions: can we critically analyse neoliberalism without also addressing the capitalist modes of production, which underpin it? What is the role of liberal democracy in preserving neoliberalism as the dominant hegemony in contemporary Western societies? There are different interpretations of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' stance on democracy and its role in abolishing capitalism, and it is not my intention to get into these debates in this book. To put it very schematically for illustrative reasons, the most influential assertion by Marx and Engels that "the modern state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie" has gained considerable traction in Marxist literature (Marx and Engels 2012, 76). The debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas in the 1970s on the relative autonomy of the state in capitalism presented competing interpretations of this influential assertion by Marx and Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*. The main purpose of the debate was to move away from the economism in the classical Marxist interpretation, which took the political realm as a mere reflection of the economic realm. Despite this shared endeavour, Miliband was accused of providing an instrumentalist theory of the state and a voluntaristic theory of the class struggle (Clarke 1991, 17–8), while Poulantzas' theory was viewed as too deterministic and abstract (Wood 1995, 56). Whereas Miliband viewed liberal democracy as a relatively autonomous state system that existed in the wider social context of capitalism, Poulantzas believed that, despite the state's relative autonomy from the capitalist class, the state functioned to ensure the optimal operation of capitalism.

An alternative interpretation of Marx and Engels' influential assertion is that the liberal notions of citizenship and individual freedom represented nothing more than a "lion's skin" concealing the subjection of workers in capitalist modes of production (Niemi 2011). However, this does not mean that Marx and Engels were opposed to the idea of democracy. As Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995) points out, one also needs to acknowledge that liberal democracy is not just a sham to be left to the ruling classes, but a result of a long class struggle, which in the process of democratisation managed to win over significant benefits and new institutional ways of organising. Despite these efforts towards re-evaluating the relationship between politics and economy, the underlying thesis, that the internal contradictions of capitalism will lead to its self-destruction, is still dominant in the contemporary Marxist literature. This teleological understanding of capital as a transhistorical force, and the centrality of the working class in conceiving radical politics, I will argue, is not helpful for taking forward the project of building resistance to neoliberalism, when contemporary circumstances are considered. The last few decades and the latest financial crisis have clearly demonstrated the persistent survival of capitalism and thus invalidated the teleological trajectory predicted in the Marxist literature for the end of capitalism.

While sharing the same political concern with Marxists on the need for a radical challenge to capitalism, I believe that this radical project would benefit from taking a post-Marxist approach. Such an approach would divorce the notion of resistance from the category of class, making it possible to submit it to a philosophical re-evaluation with respect to the existing political institutions, while at the same time providing a critical political economy understanding of the relation between liberal democracy and neoliberalism. Doing so would better explain the role that institutions and political ideas play in the transformation of the state and its relationship with the market economy under neoliberalism. It would also give greater analytical prominence to the autonomy of politics and ideology with respect to the capitalist mode of production and thus acknowledge the possibility of transforming capitalism in a capitalist society. To this end, in Chap. 3, I construct a political economy approach that addresses the structural and historical conditions for the depoliticisation of contemporary democratic politics and explains the increasing inability of Western liberal democracies to respond to popular democratic demands. This approach will draw upon Michel Foucault's genealogy of liberalism and Karl Polanyi's critical analysis of the dynamics between liberalism and democratic advances.

In taking up Michel Foucault's genealogy of liberalism, which features in the lectures Foucault gave at the Collège de France between 1977 and 1979 (Foucault 2008, 2009), the concept of governmentality will be of key theoretical value. Foucault's neologism hybridises government and political rationality within a single word and in this way captures "the uniquely modern combination of governance by institutions, knowledges, [and] disciplinary practices" (Brown 2008, 73). Moreover, by combining his earlier work on the microphysics of power with the macro-political question of the state and political economy, Foucault shows "how power relations historically could concentrate in the form of the state – without ever being reducible to it" (Lemke 2002, 41). In contrast with the Marxist critique of political economy, which reproduces the classical economic separation between politics and economics, Foucault's conceptualisation of liberalism as governmentality allows us to bring the two domains together in our analysis. Together with Karl Polanyi's theory about the double movement and the disembedding of market activity from its wider social context (Polanyi 2001), the institutional framework that connects politics and the economy is exposed as contingent and a product of the nexus between a particular political rationality and technologies of power. By underlining the role of (neo)liberal governmentality in reshaping the role of the state in advanced capitalism, the Foucauldian-Polanyian political economy approach offers a prognosis of contemporary extra-institutional challenges to the process of market liberalisation, opening the door for a radical left politics to reconfigure the role of the state and the principles of governmental rationality.

Although my Foucauldian-Polanyian critical political economy approach does not reject the Marxist analysis of capitalism outright, it will put more emphasis on the role of the institutional frameworks and ideas in structuring and enabling the running of the market economy, rather than ascribing the persistence of capitalism to the singular logic of capital. This will allow for a more nuanced understanding of the multiplicity of different ways in which the market economy is organised institutionally. This, in turn, opens up the possibility of an alternative reconstruction of the dominant governmentality through institutional and ideological change. Instead of restricting the possibility of radical change to the Marxist solution of overthrowing capitalism, which has proved an impossible task, or foreclosing it altogether by taking Brown's pessimistic view of the totality of neoliberalisation in contemporary society, my approach emphasises that we are dealing with a political

phenomenon, meaning that it can be tackled, resisted, and reversed through political means.

The critical times we are living in also represent an opportunity for a renewed effort to properly account for extra-institutional resistance to established politics. Resistance remains an under-theorised phenomenon in conventional political science, where it is viewed as an incidental aberration, rather than as a structural part of politics. The focus is still predominantly on the established institutions and procedures of formal politics, whereas social and anti-establishment protest movements are relegated to the sphere of civil society and thus separated from the matters of the state. In this book, I will be particularly concerned with the question of how resistance emerges in the context of further marketisation of society under the dominant neoliberal governmentality. What are the conditions of emergence for resistance? Are these psychological, socio-economical, or an interplay of both? And also, under what circumstances will resistant subjectivities, once they emerge, unite into political movements for radical change? I will propose to think about these questions by using the concept of crisis as a starting point for my analysis into the emergence of resistance. Crisis will, therefore, be used as an analytical framework. At the conceptual level, it will drive the reflection about the necessary conditions or elements, which when aligned can create a favourable context for resistance. At the contextual level, it will be probed both as an enabler of political agency, a driver of repoliticisation, as well as a structural constraint on the emergence of resistant subjectivities. I hope to accomplish this task by suggesting that an alignment of critique, the temporality of crisis, and the trauma resulting from socio-political violence in a crisis presents the right set of circumstances for the emergence of resistance. In this way, the analysis will combine an inquiry into the subjective elements of resistance with an inquiry into the objective structural conditions. The latter will not be viewed as unchangeable and fixed, but as contingent and amenable to discursive/material re-articulation. To this end, I will primarily draw upon the work of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and Judith Butler to distinguish between different qualities of critique; the temporality of crisis will be thought through Derrida's discursive formation of an event and Foucault's archaeological method, which integrates both the linguistic and material qualities of the analysis[2]; and psychoanalysis will be used to account for the trauma of socio-political violence on the emergence of resistant subjectivities.

The political fate of the post-2011 protest movements has demonstrated, however, that the momentum of protesting and congregating in public squares is only temporary. The exhausted bodies and minds of resisting subjects all too often retreat to the normality of the everyday life. In order to overcome the ephemerality of resistance in radical politics, I will argue that it is not enough to be mired in the moments of suspension that crises create. The urgency of crisis demands a quick response from the political forces present. This leads me to the second part of the theoretical problem in this book, which presents the following research questions: if neoliberalism can be challenged through political means, what form does this radical politics need to take? Can neoliberalism be transformed from outside the established political institutions, for instance, through social movements and prefigurative autonomous politics? Or does radical politics need to take an institutional form as well? These theoretical questions, which have important implications for radical left politics, follow from the existing debates in political theory, where one group of scholars advocates for the construction of a counter-hegemonic struggle to neoliberalism through vertical forms of radical politics, that is, by engaging with the existing structures of power and infiltrating them through institutional means (e.g. Laclau 2005; Mouffe 2005, 2013b; Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2014); whereas the others support the autonomous and horizontal forms of radical politics through social movements and prefigurative politics (e.g. Hardt and Negri 2004; Day 2005; Coté et al. 2007; Graeber 2013; Boggs 2012; Sitrin and Azzellini 2014). The autonomist and horizontalist scholars argue that the problem is not only neoliberalism, but the notion of representation in institutional politics itself, which, in their view, can only be truly overcome through enacting a radical politics that prefigures alternative forms of social relations, organisation, and decision-making. To bridge this divide in the literature, I will argue that a reconceptualisation of radical politics is needed in protest movements and scholarly literature—a reconceptualisation which would not view resistance as an extra-institutional and apolitical phenomenon separate from the world of institutional politics. Instead, due to its embeddedness in the matrix of power, it is a structural part of politics itself. This requires a theoretical recognition of power not only as a repressive and coercive force, but also as constitutive and enabling of alternative forms of political conduct and organisation (Foucault 1982, 2009; Arendt 1958; Brown 2008).

To create long-term historical change, I further argue that collective resistance in the form of protest movements must enter the phase of

institutionalisation and engage with the existing institutions of political power. This analytical observation has important political implications for the political strategy of the radical left and challenges the view of the autonomists that social movements should be independent from political parties or any type of hierarchical structures of power. By recognising the shared ontology of power in these seemingly antithetical forces, the move to institutionalisation by social movements should no longer be viewed as problematic when extra-institutional radical politics is also recognised as embedded within the wider matrix of power relations and structures. Bridging the divide between non-institutional resistance and institutional politics dismantles the enigma of radical left politics, which has paralysed the protest movements, such as the alter-globalisation and Occupy movements, from engaging with established power and bringing the struggle to the institutional arena of liberal democracy.

This book will therefore endeavour to provide a more robust conceptualisation of resistance that may respond to the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy. Just as I seek to bring "the political" and "the economic" together in my analysis, I also seek to synthesise our understanding of resistance and institutional politics. Before examining different forms of resistance in radical politics, however, an explanation of the historical and systemic trends that have contributed to the crisis of liberal democracy is in order as well. To achieve these complementary tasks, I will draw upon a variety of approaches and theories and intervene in an interdisciplinary manner into different scholarly fields, from the sociology of social movements, democratic theory, and political science to critical theory, political economy, psychoanalysis, and post-structuralism. My aim is to explore the political implications of the different theoretical approaches and how they can help us explain "the real world" of politics. Political theory will act as the methodological glue in this analytical practice. Exploiting both its explanatory as well as normative functions, I will use it to theorise, critique, and diagnose the practices and political rationalities that direct the organisation of political action in contemporary liberal democracy, while bringing to light the interstices between theoretical and empirical problems of resistance in radical left politics. The intention behind the theoretical endeavours in this book is thus deeply political since all political theory carries political and ideological effects (Ashcraft 1989; Dryzek et al. 2006).

Alongside the introduction and conclusion, the book is structured into five chapters. The structure follows a logical analytical route from examining the reasons for the crisis of liberal democracy, situating the crisis within

the wider historical context of liberal governmentality, to using the notion of crisis as a possibility of resistance to neoliberalism. The first thematic part of the book links depoliticisation of politics to the dominant conceptions of democracy and analyses the relation between politics and liberal democracy through a critique of liberalism as the dominant ideology of Western societies (Chaps. 2 and 3). In the second part of the book, the notion of crisis is explored conceptually as a potential productive site for the emergence of resistant subjectivities and disruption of the dominant neoliberal order (Chap. 4). The third and the final part of the book uses resistance as the starting point for rethinking politics through the concept of power. The protest movements and the new radical left parties that emerged in response to the neoliberal management of the 2008 financial crisis are used as examples to build upon the theoretical observations from previous parts of my book and to analyse the challenges ahead for radical politics (Chaps. 5 and 6).

In Chap. 2, I analyse the current crisis of liberal democracy through the prism of the 1970s debates on the crisis of governability and the different democratic theories and models. After analysing different responses to the crisis of governability in academic scholarship in the 1970s, my analysis centres on the political side of the crisis by first analysing the dominant models of democracy that have influenced the scholarly understanding of contemporary democratic politics. Through a critical analysis of the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy, I argue that the two dominant models are too normatively tainted by liberal rationality to account for the growing tension between liberalism and democracy. While my critical examination of Chantal Mouffe's agonistic model of democracy finds that it can serve as a better framework for understanding the dynamics of contemporary politics, it does not provide an adequate explanatory framework for the post-2011 wave of protests and the rise of populism. Existing democratic theories and models still do not explain why contemporary liberal democracies are unable to respond to the growing popular demands in post-crisis Europe. A heavier theoretical approach is needed that will provide a structural and historical analysis and recognise the role of liberalism, both economic and political, in reshaping the democratic role of the state in the economy and the resulting depoliticisation of democratic politics.

Chapter 3 provides a historical analysis of how liberalism transformed the role of state institutions in accommodating ongoing market expansion. By drawing upon Michel Foucault's genealogy of the liberal

governmentality and Karl Polanyi's study of the dynamics between liberalism and the counter-movement, I attempt to construct a critical political economy approach that will help in understanding the relationship between the liberal state and free market capitalism, which in turn will inform our understanding of the relationship between liberal democracy and neoliberalism. The chapter first lays out Foucault's and Polanyi's contribution to the theoretical approach taken and explains its relevance in relation to Marxism. It then proposes to conceptualise liberalism by employing Foucault's concept of governmentality. By mapping out Foucault's genealogy of liberal governmentality, I demonstrate how liberalism has historically reshaped the role of the state in Western societies. Foucault's approach is, however, found lacking when it comes to explaining the crisis of liberal governmentality in the 1930s. Polanyi's theory of the double movement and his analysis of the social and economic consequences of economic liberalisation in the lead up to the Great Depression provide an added level of analysis that focuses on the role of social forces in driving political change. The last section of the chapter then analyses the key transformations in the role of the state under neoliberal governmentality, which have led to the hollowing out of democracy in the West.

In Chap. 4, I explore the possibility and conditions for resistance to neoliberal governmentality by conceptually unpacking the notion of crisis. I first analyse different conceptions of crisis that can be found in business and management studies, international relations, and Marxism. Due to a lack of theoretical sophistication of the concept in the first two and economic determinism in the third, I propose to proceed with the conceptual analysis of the crisis by examining whether the alignment of critique, the temporality of crisis, and the trauma of socio-political violence can provide sufficient ground for the emergence of resistance. The shared ontology of crisis and critique is examined in the first instance through readings of Hannah Arendt, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault to uncover the transgressive and reflective qualities of critique in times of crisis. The second section of the chapter establishes the discursive formation of crisis as an event. Like any event, a crisis surprises us and disturbs the dominant order of intelligibility. In this sense, it achieves a similar effect to the suspension of old ways of thinking as critique. Yet, as I will demonstrate through Derrida, the very gesture of announcing a crisis—an example of determining the eventuality of the 2008 financial crisis will be given—marks the systemic readiness to master it and tame it, so the dominant order can go back to normality. In the third section of the chapter, I explore the

possibility of a critical and resisting subjectivity arising from traumatic experience in the socio-political violence of the crisis. By politicising the notion of trauma, I hope to demonstrate how its internal effects at the subjective level relate to the socio-political trauma of the crisis.

Chapter 5 responds to the prevailing reluctance in social movements and parts of the radical left to engage with the existing structures of power and to address the question of government. Moving away from a romanticised view of resistance in radical politics, I argue that resistant practices cannot operate outside of the network of power relations since they form a structural part of it. By critically analysing Michel Foucault's and Hannah Arendt's conceptions of politics and power, I problematise the conventional understanding of power as something that is necessarily repressive, reserved for powerful subjects, and exercised over the less powerful ones. The analysis of Hannah Arendt's understanding of politics reveals the empowering and constitutive aspects of power through her emphasis on active participation and deliberation of all citizens in public spaces. Yet this very insistence by Arendt on power as a positive and non-coercive element of politics neglects its structural relation to the notions of rule and governing, which Foucault manages to address through his concept of counter-conduct. In light of the occupation and protest movements erupting in response to the neoliberal managing of the financial crisis, I argue that radical politics should not shy away from their (counter-)conducting power that is a structural part of resistance. This observation has important political and strategic implications for radical politics as it demonstrates the need to overcome the ephemerality of power in protest movements through institutionalisation. I evaluate this thesis through Antonio Gramsci's analysis of political passions and Jacques Rancière's argument that the circularity of rule in radical politics can be displaced. Through Walter Benjamin's and Jacques Derrida's exposition of the violence of law, the final section argues that the aporetic structure of rule (or power) cannot be avoided in radical politics.

On the basis of the theoretical observations and findings from previous chapters, Chap. 6 assesses the challenges that the post-2011 protest movements and the new radical left parties face in resisting neoliberal governmentality. My argument in this chapter insists on the need for radical left politics to engage with structures of power, following my examination of the shared ontology of institutional and non-institutional politics through the notion of power in the previous chapter. It argues that the post-2011

wave of protest movements and the emergence of new radical left parties act as a repoliticisation of the depoliticised democratic structures, while representing the possibility of building an alternative to neoliberal governmentality. The analysis starts by identifying the continuities and discontinuities of the anti-austerity movements with the Global Justice Movement. In break with past practice and thinking, the new radical left realised the limitations of working outside institutional politics and decided to multiply the effectiveness of their struggle by entering electoral politics. I then use the case study of the 2012–2013 Slovenian protests and the emergence of the United Left party to illustrate in more depth how these theoretical observations matured through the practice of the activists on Slovenian radical left. In the last part of the chapter, I identify and analyse two challenges that the new radical left parties face in their resistance to neoliberal governmentality.

The conclusion (Chap. 7) summarises the main theoretical findings of the book and raises analytical questions for future research.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this book, I will understand the West as a political grouping of countries with a shared history in a specific geographical area that includes the United States and Canada, the European Union (EU) plus Great Britain.
2. For an argument on how Foucault's methods of genealogy and archaeology do not privilege the linguistic over the material, but integrate both of these elements in an intimate relationship, see Susan Hekman (2010).

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Understanding the Crisis of Liberal Democracy and Rethinking Democratic Politics

On 15 September 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest investment bank in the United States at the time, went into bankruptcy. The rapid increase in risky financialisation and subprime mortgage lending in the preceding years led to a housing bubble, which after bursting triggered the collapse of key players in the US financial sector and the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The financial crash quickly spread to other financial markets globally, with the biggest impact on the European financial institutions that through leveraging were most exposed to US banking system. The global financial crisis turned into an economic one by hitting the real economy through a fall in consumer demand, investor confidence, decrease in trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), bankruptcy of big and small businesses, and the doubling of unemployment across much of the West. Because of the variegated spread and extent of the impact across different Western economies, as well as the different ways in which Western governments responded to the crisis, the reaction from citizens varied from country to country. In Iceland, the financial crisis involved the collapse of all three major privately owned commercial banks in autumn 2008. Alongside Greece, Iceland saw the emergence of significant political unrest at the outset of the crisis, with protesters demanding the resignation of the right-wing government and new elections. As the protests grew in size and more violent, the mounting popular pressure finally unseated the government in January 2009 and new elections were held in April that year, bringing into power a left-wing

progressive coalition. The largest protests in Icelandic history also paved the way for several referenda, at which citizens rejected to pay the private debt of Icelandic banks to foreign creditors, and the establishment of a constitutional assembly to rewrite the Icelandic constitution. Due to its highly financialised economy, Latvia was also hard hit by the financial crisis, which led to the Riga riot on 13 January 2009 and the toppling of the right-wing government. Britain and Ireland, where economies were badly affected by the financial crisis, however, did not see any major protests in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis of the kind seen in Iceland.

It was not until three years later, in 2011, that the protests were no longer isolated to particular countries but expanded on a global level and turned into protest movements against economic inequality and austerity measures. Unlike Iceland, most EU governments and the United States decided to bailout the private banks with public money, which led to the ballooning of sovereign debt. Under the pressure from financial markets and investors, most Western governments decided to introduce austerity measures and cuts to public funding of social services (such as education, healthcare, welfare, public libraries, and infrastructure) to decrease the public debt. On top of the negative consequences of the economic crisis and the loss of jobs, these measures further aggravated the living standards of the lower and middle classes in most Western democracies. The way most governments went about responding to the crisis by bailing out the banks and imposing punitive measures on the rest of the population was bound to eventually result in public outcry. From the Indignados in Spain and the Indignant Citizens Movement in Greece to the global Occupy movement that started in New York, these post-2011 movements brought their political representatives and decision-makers to account, demanding an end to tight links between politicians and large financial corporations. Not only this, but these protest movements also represented new forms of political participation at a time when scholars had been busy writing books about a general decline in political participation in advanced Western democracies. From the occupation of public squares to the holding of general assemblies and organisation of various working groups to devise political solutions, these movements endeavoured to sow the seeds of alternative, more direct and meaningful forms of democracy. In this way, they wanted to highlight the decreasing legitimacy of the established mechanisms of representative democracy—namely political parties and periodic elections. Moreover, they problematised the conceptualisation of the crisis as only financial in nature, which can only be tackled by

economists and financial specialists, and exposed the intricate relationship between politics and finance that underlined the structure of crisis-stricken economies.

As I will show in this chapter, because of their focus on formal and institutional politics, the dominant models in democratic and political theory struggle to account for this wave of repoliticisation and explain the reasons for its emergence. There has been much discussion about the contemporary rise in anti-political sentiment and the general disenchantment with formal politics in academic scholarship (Putnam 2001; Macedo 2005; Stoker 2006; Hay 2007; Flinders 2012). While political scientists have focussed on the so-called supply side (i.e. political marketing, candidates, political programmes, and policies) and "demand" explanations (i.e. voter preferences and expectations) for voter disaffection from formal politics, they have not gone as far as characterising this conjuncture as signalling a *crisis* of liberal democracy. Perhaps this is due to the reticence among scholars not to over-use the term "crisis" for describing any disruption to or malfunctioning of political institutions. Alternatively, it could also be simply due to the shared view among them that the problems facing liberal democracy are not so serious as to merit the use of this eye-catching category.

In a special issue of the *Democratic Theory* journal, Wolfgang Merkel (2014) notes that the crisis of democracy has been a topic of debate in different circles and in different historical periods. In public discourse and opinion, one can talk about the crisis of trust in political structures and elites (political parties, parliaments, governments, and politicians), which together can be considered as signalling a more fundamental crisis of democracy. In intellectual circles, the debate about democracy and its durability starts from "the ancient writings of Plato, Aristotle, and Polybios" and continues "in the early modern age with Thomas Hobbes, and reaches the beginning of the modern era with writings of Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, and Max Weber" (Merkel 2014, 11–2). In the contemporary period, the debate about the crisis of democracy gains traction in the 1970s, among both the more left-leaning scholars (Offe 1974; Habermas 1976; Macpherson 1977) and conservatives, with the publication of the Trilateral Commission report (Crozier et al. 1975). It then carries into the twenty-first century with the debate on "post-democracy" and "post-politics" (Rancière 1999; Žižek 1999; Mouffe 2000, 2005; Crouch 2004). To speak about a crisis of democracy is, therefore, not new. More recently, with the electoral successes of populists in the United

States and Europe, the debate has taken a new turn. If in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, the concern about the health of Western political systems was mostly limited to scholars studying radical politics and renewed protest movement activity in Europe (see, e.g., Mouffe 2005; Rancière 2010; della Porta 2013, 2015; Horvat and Štiks 2015), it is now at the top of the agenda among mainstream political scientists, politicians, and commentators.

When looking through the prism of the 1970s scholarly exchange on the crisis of governability in advanced Western democracies, the terms of the debate have not changed all that much. The turbulent events of the late 1960s and 1970s in the West arguably provoked a flurry of intellectual debates among pluralist and elite theory scholars 1970s about democratic performance in the West. In light of the publication of the Trilateral Commission report, some scholars viewed the crisis as the overload of democratic demands on Western political systems, triggering a crisis of governability. Sociological and neo-Marxist thinkers, on the other hand, pointed our attention to the crisis-ridden economic system and the conflicting demands between capitalism and democracy. A brief historical overview of these debates, which will focus mostly on the neo-Marxist explanations by Jürgen Habermas and Alan Wolfe, will underline this contradiction in advanced Western democracies as crucial, which can tell us something about why contemporary Western democracies are facing a renewed crisis. I will then consider how the dominant analytical models of democracy, namely the aggregative and deliberative conceptions, can help us understand the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy. This analysis builds on the critique that Chantal Mouffe has developed of the first two models, and then advances my own critical evaluation of Mouffe's agonistic model. It concludes that while the agonistic model is more inclusive and open to the repoliticisation and radicalisation of democracy, it still treats existing liberal democratic institutions as a neutral terrain for the clash of political forces. Furthermore, it fails to explain what drives the resurgence of heightened antagonism (in the form of anti-establishment social movements and populism) in contemporary democratic societies in the West. For such an explanatory account, I will argue, our conceptualisation of democratic politics has to move away from abstract models and engage in "heavier" theory-building that will illuminate the relationship between structural and ideological factors shaping contemporary democracies. Instead of viewing liberal democracy as a set of neutral representative institutions, I will understand it as an ideological-state formation that

is shaped by the dominant political rationality and that is concerned not only with representation, but also with governing.

Democracy's Governability Crisis

Global economic troubles and internal social tensions in the United States and across the world in the 1960s and 1970s paved the way for challenging the legitimacy of the Western democratic model. Stagnating economic growth, high inflation and unemployment across the West, and the political inability to respond to these economic problems opened up the capitalist democratic system to criticism from various angles of civil society. In the United States, the civil rights movement and the opposition to the Vietnam War exposed the illusion of American democracy as a pluralist and fair political system, exposing its lack of proper representation and responsiveness to its citizens' demands. These events in turn shaped the academic debates in the democratic theory literature. Whereas during the post-war economic boom years American democracy enjoyed strong support among democratic theorists, this changed by mid-1970s when there was growing perception that Western democracy was in crisis. The social unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s called were, therefore, the key determinants in revisions of pluralist and liberal schools of thought that dominated democratic theory at the time.

The pluralist scholars pictured the US and Western democracy as an efficient system that reinforces moderation and agreement amongst different segments of society and in this way preserves social peace (Dahl 1956; Lipset 1960; Polsby 1960). Sociologically oriented political scientists challenged the pluralist assumption of evenly dispersed power among a plurality of organised groups and underlined that political power can also be exercised in less readily observable ways that preclude underprivileged groups and individuals from voicing their grievances through established institutional channels (Schattschneider 1960; Bachrach and Baratz 1962). This criticism led pluralists like Charles E. Lindblom (1977, 1982) and Robert A. Dahl to revise some of their key assumptions about the state of Western democracies in the 1970s. Despite pluralism's key focus on associations and interest groups, Lindblom admitted that democratic theory has not adequately accounted for "the privileged position of business" in American society, which thwarted the political impact of ordinary citizens (Lindblom 1977, 5). Dahl observed a similar distortion caused by the centralisation of privately or publicly owned economy, but ruled out

private campaign finance was distorting access to political representation or that the US political system was dominated by a ruling class (Dahl 1982, 171–3). While revisionist pluralists did respond to some of the criticisms from radical sociology of elite theory (Mills 1956; Domhoff 1978; Bachrach 1967, 1975), especially with regards to corporate power and the effect socio-economic (in)equality can have on political participation, they remained ambiguous about the need to make democracy more participatory (Lawrence 1981). Moreover, as John S. Dryzek and Patrick Dunleavy point out, both revisionist pluralists and radical sociologists in democratic theory remained methodologically focussed on showing how power was distributed in the United States, while failing to provide an explanatory theory as to why it had to be distributed that way (Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009, 77).

A more conservative response to the social and political upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s came from democratic elitists. In a report *The Crisis of Democracy*[1] by the so-called Trilateral Commission, Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki investigated the state of democracy in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Taking into account the worldwide context of economic and political instability, the authors came to a conclusion that the crisis of democracy mostly stemmed from "an excess of democracy" and thus necessitated a restoration of authority of governmental structures (Crozier et al. 1975, 113). We must remember that these were the times of radical and often militant movements, such as the Black Panthers, campus wars and anti-Vietnam War protests, and the anti-nuclear movement, all happening in the context of the ideological Cold War rivalry. The authors of the Trilateral Commission report were openly hostile to progressive resistance and activism of "value-oriented" intellectuals, students and the media. They viewed the rise in protest activity as a threat to Western governments, similar to the one posed "by the aristocratic cliques, fascist movements, and communist parties" in the early twentieth century democracies (Crozier et al. 1975, 6–7). In the report, they noted that as the demands on democratic government grow, the capacity of democratic government stagnates, resulting in a crisis of governability. The solution to this crisis, they argued, could only be in "a more equitable relationship between governmental authority and popular control", since "[a]n excess in democracy means a deficit in governability" (Crozier et al. 1975, 173–4). This thesis, which has been popularised as "the overload thesis" (King 1975; Sartori 1975; Simeon 1976; Parsons 1982), was picked up by other conservative groups and New Right thinks

tanks, paving the way for a fundamental revision of liberalism, or what is more commonly known as the neoliberal turn. The crisis of governability debate that ensued concentrated on popular excess and governments' inability to meet unrealistic expectations, rather than on elite failure and unpopular political decisions (Simeon 1976, 545). As Parsons (1982, 431) explains, the overload thesis situated the crisis on both the supply and demand sides: on the supply side, the politicians needed to act more responsibly so as not to promise too much, whereas on the demand side, the citizens needed to show more self-restraint in their expectations. Compared to revisionist pluralists, who in their later works started to acknowledge the imperfection of real existing democracies in the West, democratic elitists continued to see the main problem with the political system in that it is too democratic, which undermines government's authority (Lawrence 1981, 184).[2]

The Tension Between Liberalism and Democracy: The Structural Explanation

In contrast with the scholars in the pluralist and democratic elitist tradition of democratic theory, authors in the neo-Marxist tradition suggested that the crisis ran deeper and stemmed from a fundamental contradiction between market liberalism and repoliticising drives for further democratisation. These authors formulated a more structural and systematic explanation for the crisis of governability in advanced Western democracies. In his famous work *Legitimation Crisis*, Jürgen Habermas (1976) identified the crisis as one of legitimation. According to Habermas, "a legitimation crisis" occurs when a political system is not supported by sufficient "input of mass loyalty" (1976, 46). Habermas situated legitimation crises within the wider framework of advanced capitalism, highlighting how the contradictions within one sub-system (e.g. the economy) can spread to others (e.g. the administrative state). Habermas argued that under advanced capitalism the state acts as the collective capitalist, which means that the state is not merely a "blind organ of the [capital] realization process", as purported by classical liberalism, but actively engaged in the economic system by making "the accumulation of capital the substance of political planning" (Habermas 1976, 46). According to this thesis, when the capital realisation process encounters problems, which translates into an economic crisis, the crisis logic in advanced capitalism is not contained within the economic sphere, but is itself displaced to the administrative system.

When the administrative system cannot maintain or establish effective normative structures that would reconcile and fulfil the imperatives received from the economic system, the rationality crisis in the economic system provokes a withdrawal of legitimation from democratic state institutions (Habermas 1976, 46–7). Habermas explains this failure as a paralysis of the state in advanced capitalism, which I will come back to in Chap. 3: on the one hand, the state needs to secure capital realisation and take over the tasks complementary to the market, acting in effect as a collective capitalist, and on the other, the presumed autonomy of the market forces demands a self-limitation of the state and prohibits it from "planned coordination of the contradictory interests of individual capitalists" (Habermas 1976, 47).

A similar thesis is supported by the US political scientist Alan Wolfe. In the 1970s, he observed the capitalist state as caught up between the imperatives of democratic legitimation and capitalist accumulation (Wolfe 1977, 6–7). For Wolfe, the political expression of this duality of imperatives was symbolised in liberal democracy, which he argued was inherently contradictory: "for liberalism becomes the ideology of and justification for accumulation while democracy upholds the importance of legitimation, of some kind of popular participation and some equality of results" (Wolfe 1977, 7). Wolfe's neo-Marxist analysis avoids taking the simple pluralist view of liberal democracy as "the realization of the good life", nor does Wolfe settle for the opposite view that democracy is just "a 'sham' designed to keep the 'masses' happy" (Wolfe 1977, 9). Instead, Wolfe contended:

> To label a system liberal democratic, in other words, is to indicate that class struggle between the few and the many is taking place, not that it has been resolved. To make sense out of late capitalism, a political analysis must attempt to comprehend these struggles, not pretend that they have already been decided. (Wolfe 1977, 9)

Wolfe's conception of liberal democracy underlines its inherently contradictory nature between liberalism, which depoliticises the class struggle and legitimises capital accumulation, and the repoliticising drive of democracy. Like Habermas, Wolfe argued that this situation left the liberal-capitalist state in a position of paralysis.

There are, however, some key differences between Habermas and Wolfe in their understanding of liberal democracy's governability crisis. While Habermas' systems theory approach led him to ascribe the legitimation

crisis of the political-economic system to the internal contradictions of the system under democratic capitalism, Wolfe's more dynamic historical analysis posited liberal democracy's limits of legitimacy in relation to the continuing tension between the liberal and democratic conceptions of the state. This divergence between the two authors' analytical observations can be explained by Habermas' concentration on the internal dynamic of the system and the ways in which the system internally moderates crisis tendencies (Habermas 1976, 92–3). Wolfe, on the other hand, puts more focus on the need for the repoliticisation of democracy, which can only come from outside the political system. Furthermore, Habermas believed that the tension, which Wolfe identified between democratic legitimation and capitalist accumulation, was already decided. As Habermas explained in his later writings, in the "welfare-state mass democracies class conflict has been institutionalized and thereby pacified" (Habermas 1987, 391–2). For later Habermas, the institutionalisation of class conflict signified the shift from "the old politics" of the labour movement and class conflict to a "new politics" of the new middle class, that is, struggles for equal rights, individual identity, participation, and human rights (Habermas 1987, 392; Edwards 2004, 119). The composition of the new movements, for Habermas, was thus "no longer rooted in class but across social classes and involved in a range of groups drawn from the margins of society" (Edwards 2009, 382). For Wolfe, on the other hand, the class struggle could be subsumed by different arrangements between the state and capitalism, but ultimately the tension would result in its renewed emergence as a result of state paralysis and the resulting legitimacy crisis. Habermas' widening of analytical focus from material to identity politics signalled the wider analytical shift in social movements studies in the 1970s (see Walder 2009), which I will problematise in the last section of the chapter.

For now, it is sufficient to state that, for Habermas, class conflict would only ever resurface, if the welfare state came under threat of being dismantled (Habermas 1987, 63). If this were to happen, Habermas maintained, there would be "a massive reaction from the traditional workers' organizations" (Habermas 1987, 63). Back in the early 1970s, Habermas saw the dismantlement of the welfare state by the governing elites as highly improbable. Yet, by the end of the decade, Wolfe (1977, 343) already identified the first intensified attacks by the "dominant forces" on the welfare state that Habermas believed was beyond challenge. As Wolfe observed, the neoliberal attack on Keynesian economics was well underway in the 1970s, as the general public accepted the necessity of spending

cuts in times of recession. The depoliticised bureaucracies of the liberal democratic states that performed the function of confronting "the irresolvable tensions that one time lay within the province of the entire society" were now being slowly dismantled and decentralised under neoliberalism (Wolfe 1977, 269–70). The governability crisis thus followed from the inability of the bureaucracy to deal with the tensions between the drives for capital accumulation and democracy. This predicament produced what Wolfe viewed as a double-bind situation: the greater the tension between the two drives, the more paralysed the depoliticised bureaucracy, yet at the same time the greater the need for state intervention to keep it in check (Wolfe 1977, 270). This is ultimately what the Trilateral Commission identified as a crisis of governability, yet failed to diagnose the underlying political-economic tendencies for its eruption. As a result of this double-bind situation, the administration of the state underwent an ideological politicisation as it needed to actively attend to the liberalising drives for continuing capital accumulation. At the same time, neoliberal politicisation was accompanied by a process of depoliticisation as the liberal governments failed to address the concerns of the communities who were most affected by these liberalising processes (Wolfe 1977, 344). The cumulative failure of the liberal governments to respond to these concerns ultimately resulted in their alienation from the established political process. The neoliberal depoliticisation of the democratic process left political groups seeking alternative routes "to express their repoliticization" outside the formal political arena (Wolfe 1977, 345).

To summarise, both Habermas and Wolfe identify advanced capitalism as the basis for the intensification of the tension between democratic legitimation and capitalist accumulation. While Habermas, especially in his later writings and with respect to his co-originality thesis (Habermas 2001), dedicates his attention to reconciling the liberal capitalist logic with democratic legitimacy through expounding on "the instrumental-rational procedure of the system" (Edwards 2004, 113), Wolfe emphasises the irresolvable character of this tension. The notable influence of systems theory approach in Habermas' work puts considerable emphasis on studying the ability of the system to adapt and manage the internal contradictions between the administrative and economic sub-systems. Yet this focus on the instrumental rationality of the administrative system precludes Habermas from properly accounting for the dynamics between liberalism and democracy outside the system in the wider socio-political context. As Wolfe argues, the increasing depoliticisation of the (neo)liberal state

alienated voters from the established processes of political participation and most often, those same voters were the ones most affected by the liberalising processes of market expansion. This process in turn propelled into movement repoliticisation from outside the formal political system. While Habermas' thesis supposes that the tension between liberalism and democracy can be reconciled through its institutionalisation, Wolfe maintains that this institutionalisation is untenable as the contradictions between the two drives demonstrated in the 1970s.

Compared to the pluralist and elitist scholars of democracy and the governability crisis in the 1970s, the neo-Marxist counterparts provide a more useful account for making sense of the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy. They invite us to think about the contemporary crisis in terms of the contradiction between market liberalism and democracy. More recently, another scholar of liberal democracy has approached the predicament of contemporary democratic politics by recognising the tension between liberalism and democracy. The post-Marxist political theorist Chantal Mouffe posits that liberalism negates "the ineradicable character of antagonism" in democratic politics (Mouffe 2005, 10). For Mouffe, antagonism is a key dimension in understanding politics and our social reality. It is most intimately tied with the recognition that political divisions and power are ineradicable in the construction of social reality. While Mouffe recognises that there are many different variants of liberal thought, some more progressive and others more conservative, the dominant tendency is geared towards methodological individualism and rationalism. This means that liberalism envisages society as consisting of different perspectives and values, which, when put together, can form a "harmonious and non-conflictual ensemble" (Mouffe 2013c, 3). For this reason, liberalism is unable to properly account for the conflictual and the pluralistic character of our social reality (Mouffe 2013c, 3). Mouffe argues that antagonism and conflict in social relations are inevitable, and a politics that tries to evade this fact by forcing a "universal consensus based on reason" is bound to fail without accounting for the troubles that concern collective identities.

There are two dominant analytical models in democratic theory that Mouffe has in mind: the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy. The aggregative model advocates for a minimalist conception of democracy, based on rational choice theory and democratic elitism. The deliberative model, on the other hand, emerges in critical response to the aggregative model, proposing a rationality based on an ethical approach to

politics through discursive reasoning, rather than on narrow calculating of individual preferences. Both of these models fail to capture the antagonistic character of pluralism in society, as well as the centrality of collective identities and the role that affect plays in their constitution. In response to these limitations, Mouffe proposes an agonistic model of democracy, which recognises the always-present antagonism and political struggle between opposing hegemonic projects. In the following, I will critically analyse these influential models in democratic theory, asking whether they can help us in comprehending the present crisis of liberal democracy.

The Critique of Aggregative and Deliberative Models of Democracy

The rational calculation of interests and moral deliberation constitute the basis for the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy, respectively. Let us first turn to the aggregative model of democracy. Aggregative democracy relies on an instrumentalist understanding of politics, which sees human subjects as rational, enlightened beings, striving for the maximisation of fixed self-interest. The political arena is limited to the competition between different political groups vying for power through periodic elections. Political economist Joseph Schumpeter (2010, 241) was one of the main advocates of aggregative democracy, according to who "the role of the people is to produce a government … which will then in turn decide" on political issues pertaining to the whole of society. His key proposition was to redefine the classical theory of democracy by giving importance to competition for political leadership through the "democratic method" first and making "the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary" (Schumpeter 2010, 241–51). In a similar vein, William H. Riker (1982) challenged the classical view of democracy that electoral institutions simply translate the popular will into public policy. Using social choice theory, he redefined popular participation through voting as a method of aggregating individual preferences and values in democratic societies.

While Schumpeter's account of democracy as a competition for electoral votes between elites fits within an elite theory conception of democracy, Young (2000, 19) makes the case that the aggregative model could also be described as pluralist (also see Lawrence 1981). Namely, empirical method, instrumental rationality, and the presupposition of an equilibrium between different interest groups are also found in pluralist accounts

of democracy (see Macpherson 1973, 78, 1977, 77–8). Robert A. Dahl's early pluralist conception of democracy is an example of aggregative democracy, where "equality in voting" and "effective participation" of voters are the key criteria for a functioning democracy (Dahl 2000, 38). Free, fair, and frequent elections enable the voters to maintain control over the agenda and their elected officials (Dahl 2000, 95–6). In his critique of the aggregative model, Macpherson characterised it as "an empirical theory of democracy", backed by the so-called Schumpeter-Dahl axis (Macpherson 1973, 78). The pluralist elitist model, Macpherson argued, was a realistic portrayal of the state of liberal democracy at the time: "realistic, that is, for a society which is thought incapable of going beyond the oligopolistic economic market, the inequality of classes, and people's vision of themselves as essentially consumers" (Macpherson 1977, 91).

The aim of the aggregative model was, therefore, to extract the normative content, related to questions of the common good, general will and justice, from the democratic theory and replace it with a descriptive and empirical account of democracy which focuses on the self-interested individual rather than on collectivities (see Macpherson 1977, 77–92; Christiano 1996, 133–46). This 'minimalist' approach to democracy narrows down the essence of politics to negotiation and bargaining among political parties on the basis of vote aggregation of individual preferences. As such, it empties democracy of its radical idealism and replaces it with an understanding of democracy as a political marketplace, where voters act as consumers. To analyse the current crisis in advanced democracies, the aggregative model of democracy is of little use. With its narrow focus on the competitive selection of political leaders, it can tell us little about whether a democracy is in crisis and much less what the causes of the crisis might be (Merkel 2014, 13). It pays little attention to political conflict and structures of power in wider society and how this might impact the functioning of the formal political system.

The "realistic" view of democracy as a simple aggregation of individual preferences and competition between organised interests, common to both elitist and pluralist conceptions of democratic politics, prompted a new wave of normative political theory, which has sought to bring democratic theory back to questions of justice and ethics (Mouffe 2013a, 192).[3] This new wave in liberal democratic thought is captured by the *deliberative* model of democratic politics, advocated by political theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas (1996), Seyla Benhabib (1996), John Rawls (1971), and John S. Dryzek (2000). In response to the instrumental rationality of

the aggregative model of democracy and its theoretical impoverishment of the democratic process, deliberative democrats provide a view of democracy that is "anchored in conceptions of accountability and discussion" (Chambers 2003, 308). Preferences are not seen as fixed and mechanisms for the aggregation of those preferences are not fair by default —what deliberative democrats emphasise is the communicative process by which opinions and views are arrived at. The democratic procedures and mechanisms are only legitimate if "*justified* to all those living under its laws" (Chambers 2003, 308). Under these postulates, deliberative democrats hope to encourage a debate that produces "reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion" (Chambers 2003, 309).

More recently, deliberative democrats have moved away from theorising and designing empirical models of deliberation in direct opposition to the realist aggregative conception of democracy and have started to engage with some of the key criticisms of the deliberative theory of democracy. Some deliberative democrats now concede that deliberative democracy can involve the pursuit of self-interest and some forms of negotiation, as long as they are constrained by 'the deliberative democratic ideals of mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justification, the search for fairness, and the absence of coercive power' (Mansbridge et al. 2010, 94). This theoretical pragmatism is also present in the emerging deliberative systems approach that assesses the value of deliberative fora and innovations in relation to non-deliberative forms of action (such as coercion, pressure and strategic payoff) at the micro-level, as well as other institutions within the system at the macro-level of society (see Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012).

In a recent special issue to *Daedalus*, James S. Fishkin and Jane Mansbridge (2017) criticise the aggregative model of competitive democracy for bearing the blame of manufacturing public will through advertising, social media, and manipulation of public opinion. It is in this context that they see the severing of the link of legitimacy between the public and the office holders in contemporary democracies and the rise populism, pointing to the Brexit referendum decision and the victory of Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election. To revive the democratic legitimacy of representative democracy, they suggest greater deliberation among the public and its representatives could provide for more authentic public will formation (Fishkin and Mansbridge 2017, 7). This would be done through the creation of mini-publics, either ad hoc or as a permanent

feature of the existing institutional framework, through which selected citizens would deliberate on a given issue and come to a mutually agreed decision, which would be officially binding or part of the dialogue in the public sphere. As already noted above, these deliberative processes would need to be based on the deliberative democratic ideals of mutual respect, equality, reciprocity, mutual justification, fairness, and the absence of coercive power.

As some of the dissenting voices in the same special issue point out, this deliberative vision of improving existing democratic institutions lacks of realism and could lead to hijacking of the deliberative processes by organised groups with more abundant resources (Shapiro 2017). Even in situations of apparent procedural equality in deliberative settings, the legitimating potential of deliberation is limited by power asymmetries and deep value conflicts (Lupia and Norton 2017). In the edited volume *Democratizing Inequalities*, authors expose how professional public deliberation consultants and their practices provide 'a democratic veneer' for the interests of consultants' clients (Lee et al. 2015). For instance, companies facing problems of legitimacy in their community relations or environmental practices use these deliberative and participatory procedures to improve their corporate image (Walker 2015). In a situation where local government is facing fiscal pressures, deliberative procedures are used to legitimise unpopular decisions by political elites (Martin 2015).

It is also questionable how proceduralist experimentation proposed by deliberative democrats could deal with the growing legitimacy problem in contemporary democracies in the context of heightened partisan polarisation and ideological divisions that we are currently witnessing. Even though some deliberative democrats leave the door open for 'anti-deliberative' forms of political action, such as the radical left or Tea Party protests, as potentially enhancing the deliberative system and remedying the legitimacy gap of current democracy, this admission is conditional upon the way these anti-establishment movements articulate their concerns. To be seen as enhancing the deliberative system, these political movements would need to 'be reasonably understood as giving voice to a minority opinion long ignored in the public sphere' or as 'bringing more and better important information into the public arena' (Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012, 19). Given the strict normative conditions that deliberative democrats bestow upon what is deemed acceptable political action and behaviour, the deliberative model of democracy is found lacking

when confronted with the zealous polarisation and ideological divisions in contemporary politics.

Moving on from the practical limitations of the deliberative model in the context of the current crisis of liberal democracy to a normative critique, as Mouffe has aptly pointed out, what is fundamentally at issue in the deliberative turn to the normative underpinning of democratic theory is "reformulating the democratic principle of popular sovereignty in such a way as to eliminate the danger that it could pose to liberal values" (Mouffe 2013a, 193). The aim is not to oppose pluralist and liberal ideas espoused by aggregative democrats, but to uphold them through reinterpreting the tension between liberalism and democracy. Mouffe exemplifies this by Rawls' ambition to reconcile two diverging traditions in democratic thought: (1) the Lockean tradition, which gives prominence to freedom of thought and conscience, right to property and privacy, and the rule of law; and (2) the Rousseauian tradition, which emphasises popular sovereignty and the value of equal political liberties. Deliberative democrats maintain that a rational consensus can be reached to reconcile this tension, provided there are procedures of deliberation in place which secure "impartiality, equality, openness and lack of coercion" for all deliberating participants involved, "thereby producing legitimate outcomes" (Mouffe 2013a, 196). However, in their attempt to find a final rational resolution to the democratic paradox between liberalism and democracy, deliberative democrats merely replace one rationality, instrumentalism and the promotion of self-interest in the aggregative model with another which is based on "communicative action and free public reason" (Mouffe 2013a, 199).

To summarise, by basing our understanding of democratic politics on economic rationality and market principles, we treat citizens merely as self-interested consumers with fixed preferences. As Christiano (1996, 281) points out, resources are not distributed equally throughout societies which "undermines equality in rational social deliberation" and the attempt at modelling voters' choices. Although the advocates of the aggregative model of democracy purport it to be merely empirical and descriptive in its analytical purpose and character, allegedly showing no normative pretensions, this is exactly what the model achieves—it transverses economic principles and rationality into democratic theory. In doing so, it not merely describes democracy as it is, but also says what democracy ought to be like. As such, it is inherently normative. It strips democracy of its radical political content and removes the analytical concern with unequal power

structures in society. Consequently, conflict and antagonism in society are just an aberration to governing, rather than an expression of social divisions and troubles that need to be taken account of.

On the other hand, where I see the main deficiency of the deliberative model is in its overemphasis on reaching a harmonious agreement and not paying enough attention to disagreement and conflict that are bound to arise in deliberation of political matters. Deliberative democrats presuppose that ideological conflict can be resolved through a rational and inclusive deliberative procedure, which ultimately aims to eliminate it and achieve a rational agreement among a plurality of parties. Even when disagreement and conflict are considered by deliberative democrats (see, e.g., Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 2004; Macedo 1999; Misak 2004), they are still measured against contested standards of impartiality, truth and objectivity, or empty signifiers, such as justice and fairness, while failing to account for the intransigence of ideological differences and structures of power that are present in wider society. With these points considered, we can say the two models encounter the same critique that can be levelled against elite and pluralist conceptions of democracy: they preserve the order of power relations as they are and, as such, they depoliticise the axiom of democratic politics.

Abandoning the Rationalist View of Politics: Antagonism and Hegemony

Compared to the aggregative and deliberative conceptions of democracy, the agonistic model of democratic politics recognises the dynamics of power, or antagonism, as the inherent dimension of the pluralism of values that animate human societies (Mouffe 2013a, 201). Alongside Mouffe, other prominent theorists of agonistic democracy include William E. Connolly (1991, 1995) and Bonnie Honig (1993, 2001, 2009). Connolly premises his agonistic approach on agonistic respect and critical responsiveness (see Connolly 1995, xv–xix; Wenman 2013, 109–14). Compared to Mouffe's much more ambitious project of radicalising democracy at the level of society, Connolly's concern is one with a micropolitics of disruption and innovative agency that emerges within liberal-democratic societies. Honig's approach, on the other hand, focuses on the difference between what she calls the politics of virtue, that is, politics in the juridical and administrative domains, and the politics of *virtù*, the politics of disrupting the established order that "create space of possibility for

a new table of values" (Honig 1993, 4). While the two authors share Mouffe's concern with contestation in politics, their approaches to agonistic democracy fail "to grasp the crucial role of hegemonic articulations" and to attest not only for "challenging what exists but also of constructing new articulations and institutions" (Mouffe 2013c, 11).[4]

Unlike the models of democracy reviewed earlier, Mouffe's conception of agonistic democracy acknowledges and challenges the hegemonic role of liberal rationalism in democratic theory, as well as in practice, head on. Drawing upon Carl Schmitt's critique of liberal thought, Mouffe points out that "every consensus is [necessarily] based on acts of exclusion" which in turn "reveals the impossibility of a fully inclusive 'rational' consensus" (Mouffe 2005, 11). The liberal presupposition held by deliberative democrats that an inclusive rational consensus can be reached on antagonising matters of fundamental political significance is thus misguided from the very start. Mouffe's alternative understanding of the political in democratic politics is illustrated by the adversarial model, which encompasses the antagonistic dimension of politics. Antagonisms, for Mouffe, represent the limits of the social—for this reason, society "never manages fully to be society because everything in it is penetrated by its limits, which prevent it from constituting itself as an objective reality" (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, 127). A key element of antagonistic politics is Schmitt's "friend/enemy" relation, which Mouffe repurposes as a "we/they" relation:

> Since all forms of political identities entail a we/they distinction, this means that the possibility of emergence of antagonism can never be eliminated. It is therefore an illusion to believe in the advent of a society from which antagonism would have been eradicated. Antagonism, as Schmitt says, is an ever present possibility; the political belongs to our ontological condition. (Mouffe 2005, 16)

Following from this, power should not be understood as "an external relation" between two pre-constituted political identities, but as a medium through which the identities themselves are constituted. Politics as an "expression … of a specific pattern of power relations", thus, cannot be understood as a mere representation of the interests of pre-constituted subjects, but as a practice "constituting those identities themselves in a precarious and always vulnerable terrain" (Mouffe 2013a, 202). This tenet comes as a direct challenge to the assumption of rational actors having

fixed preferences in the aggregative model of democracy. It also disturbs the idea of deliberation happening in a neutral and all-inclusive space, demonstrating the role that power plays in the constitution of participating subjects.

Mouffe (2005, 23) also acknowledges that antagonism can be expressed in acts of violence, if there is no other appropriate medium for channelling and articulating dissent. It is here that Mouffe sees one of the key tasks for liberal democratic institutions: they offer a common space for the articulation of conflict and transformation of antagonism into agonism (Mouffe 2005, 20). The main question for agnostic democracy is not how to eliminate power, as in the deliberative understanding of democracy, but "how to constitute forms of power more compatible with democratic values" (Mouffe 2013a, 202). These forms of power are constituted discursively through what Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau call "chains of equivalence" among different democratic demands (Laclau and Mouffe 1985). Imagine different civil initiatives and social movements participating in a demonstration against austerity and cuts to public spending: a student union group, a foodbank organisation, feminists, an LGBT association, a trade union, and a local church support group. All these groups represent various democratic struggles that affect our societies and are concerned with their own particular grievances, yet they gather together in solidarity for a common cause—to express their opposition to austerity.

The next step in the forming of a chain of equivalence between different democratic demands would be for the movements to construct and propose an alternative to the status quo: what exactly are they fighting for, what kind of society do they want to build, and what to call such a society? This would lead towards the construction of a new "hegemony". According to Mouffe, any political order is an expression of a hegemony, which can carry different interpretations of "the common good" and "the ethico-political principles", be it liberal-conservative, social-democratic, neoliberal, or radical-democratic (Mouffe 2013a, 203). These represent different hegemonic articulations competing for a stabilisation of their interpretation of "the common good", for securing the "conflictual consensus", which is a temporary result of a provisional hegemony (Mouffe 2013a, 204). The conflictual consensus, or "organized dissensus" as Lois McNay (2014, 73) puts it alternatively, can only be achieved through some form of "an a priori agreement amongst political subjects to abide by the rules of the agonistic game", however, Mouffe is not clear which

mechanisms are necessary for "the consensual move from antagonism to agonism" (McNay 2014, 74).

Mouffe argues for an agonistic public sphere because that is where she envisions a confrontation between conflicting hegemonic projects can take place (Mouffe 2013b, 231). As opposed to the aggregative and deliberative counterparts, agonistic model presents a better framework in liberal democracies for the constant renegotiation of the uneasy relationship between liberalism and democracy. This renegotiation takes place by way of successfully subsuming antagonism, according to Mouffe, which in turn augments the role of liberal democracy as a platform for the confrontation of different political articulations. However, when looking at how agonistic democracy and her project of radicalising democracy would work in practice, there are two inter-related problems that need to be addressed, especially in the context of the repoliticisations that we have seen in the West after the 2008 financial crisis: the first concerns the way Mouffe understands the transformation of antagonism into agonism; and the second has to do with the purported neutrality of liberal democracy in providing the platform for contemporary anti-establishment movements against (neo)liberal hegemony. I will address the first problem in the rest of this section, and move to the second problem in the next.

Antagonism, when followed through its transformation process into agonism, is not shaped in a neutral manner, but is effectively appropriated and translated into the hegemonic register of meaning, of what counts as reasonable and appropriate for debate, in a formalised institutional setting. In Mouffe's exposition of this process, the main aim is to ensure "order and security against the backdrop of the ever-present possibility of antagonism" (Wenman 2013, 200). As Stanley Fish argues, this ultimately amounts to taming antagonism (Fish 1999, 236). What is problematic with Mouffe's presupposition is the presupposition that all conflict can be moulded into a form that is compatible with liberal democracy. Yet, as Fish explains the point further:

> [C]ontingency is precisely what you can't make room for; contingency is what befalls the best laid plans of mice and men—and that includes plans to take it into account or guard against its eruption. And by the same reasoning "the dimension of conflict … within the political" is not something you can come to terms with. You can only come to terms with something that stays put and remains at a distance from you. (Fish 1999, 237)

For Mouffe, the aim of democratic institutions is to domesticate hostility and try to defuse "the potential antagonism that exists in human relations" (Mouffe 2013a, 203). Yet, it is not clear from Mouffe's account what happens when antagonisms cannot be tamed and are as a result not considered within the established framework of liberal democratic politics.

To illustrate the problem, let us take the example of radical right-wing movements and left-wing populist parties gaining ground in the United States and across Europe. Both of these political actors, although coming from the opposite sides of the political spectrum, provide a challenge to the (neo)liberal hegemony that characterises the political programmes of centre-right and centre-left mainstream political parties. Because Mouffe only treats liberalism on its ethico-political grounds in terms of the critique of its moderate rationalism and individualism, while forgetting to register its wider hegemonic grip on the democratic institutions themselves, she fails to see that liberal democracy is a specific ideological articulation of democratic institutions, which cannot act as a neutral terrain for the ideological clash taking place between (neo)liberalism and these anti-establishment political forces. Antagonistic demands that are ideologically incongruent with liberalism as the dominant ideology will face many institutional obstacles for articulation and expression in the formal political system. This is especially the case when liberal principles in the economic sphere, such as free markets, free trade, and the limited role of the state in the market economy, are challenged by anti-establishment political forces. Ultimately, the problem lies in that Mouffe does not go far enough in her critique of liberalism and extend the application of the concept of hegemony to assume that liberalism might also be complicit in perpetuating the dominance of neoliberal hegemony through liberal democratic institutions.

Challenging the Neutrality of Liberal Democracy

The supposed neutrality of liberal democratic institutions can be approached by turning to the famous Miliband–Poulantzas debate in the 1970s and 1980s on whether the state apparatus is inherently an outgrowth of the capitalist modes of production, or whether the state does in fact have relative autonomy in relation to civil society and capitalism. The instrumentalist side in the debate, represented by Ralph Miliband (1969, 1970, 1973, 1983), claimed that the state is an instrument in the hands of the ruling class. The structuralist side, represented by Nicos Poulantzas

(1973, 1978a, b, 1980), argued that the state is capitalist in the sense that it is part of a wider structure, from which it cannot be extracted.[5] The main issue in the debate that is most relevant for my inquiry is the one concerning the relative autonomy of the state. It is worth pointing out that Miliband's publication of *The State in Capitalist Society* (1969) came as a response to the dominance of the pluralist theory of the state, which maintained that the existence of a ruling, much less a capitalist class, is "empirically meaningless, because corporate power is diffuse and competitive" (Barrow 2002, 15). Miliband argued that the ruling class domination could be determined by "the degree to which members of the capitalist class *control* the state apparatus through interlocking positions in the governmental, administrative, coercive, and other apparatuses" (Barrow 2002, 17). However, by focusing on the interrelationships and social composition of the state elite, Poulantzas maintained, Miliband did not give enough attention to the functional structural relations that determine social class and thus overestimated the relative autonomy of the state in relation to the influence of the capitalist class over politics and economic modes of production (Barrow 2002, 23–9).

Ellen Meiksins Wood (1995) criticises Poulantzas' structuralist approach, however, as too rigidly deterministic and too abstract. She contends that Poulantzas' "structural logic overwhelms historical fact", since his theory of the capitalist state as corresponding to the capitalist modes of production is void of historical specificity (Wood 1995, 56). In Wood's view, liberal democracy "may be the most potent ideological force available to the capitalist class" because "it casts doubt on the very existence of a ruling class" (Wood 1981, 180). To recall, the non-existence of a ruling class is one of the key precepts of the pluralist conception of democracy, which Wood considers a smokescreen for capitalist hegemony. Nonetheless, Wood acknowledges that liberal democracy is "the outcome of long and painful struggles", conferring "genuine benefits on subordinate classes" and giving them "real strengths, new possibilities of organisation and resistance which cannot be abandoned to the enemy as mere sham" (Wood 1981, 181). The counter-hegemonic project to neoliberalism, or in Wood's case capitalist hegemony, would not only require "further extension of popular power" in order to perfect existing liberal democratic institutions, but "a radical transformation of social arrangements in general, in ways that are as yet unknown" (Wood 1981, 181).

The position that liberal democratic institutions maintain autonomy in relation to capitalism can also be found in Mouffe's work. It is evident that

neoliberal forces are the target of her project of radical democracy. Mouffe claims that only with the transformation of liberal democratic institutions into "a vehicle for the expression of the manifold democratic demands which would extend the principle of equality to as many social relations as possible" and agonistic engagement with the institutions can we build an effective counter-hegemonic challenge to neoliberalism (Mouffe 2013c, 75). This means that the democratic state institutions would play an important role in this struggle. Mouffe achieves this by distinguishing political liberalism from economic liberalism and treating political liberalism only in the abstract. But what is missing from her project is a consideration that liberal democratic institutions could be co-opted by the dominant neoliberal hegemony. As Constantine Tsoukalas observes in his analysis of the changing forms of relative autonomy, the key state functions are increasingly "geared toward ensuring the institutional and ideological conditions of the internationally imposed deregulation of economic and labor relations, as well as to contributing to the general acceptance of the alignment of public policies to the norms of international competitiveness" (Tsoukalas 2002, 233). What is missing in Mouffe's theory of radical democracy, where her agonistic model of democracy plays a crucial part in understanding the dynamics of politics, is a structural analysis that would throw light on the interaction between politics and the economy. Mouffe offers little explanation as to why the liberal democratic institutions need transforming in the first place and how they relate to the wider political economic system. This leaves an impression that, for Mouffe, the problem is limited to the moderate rationalism of centrist politics that has dominated Western politics for the past two decades and a half, but that liberal democracy can continue to play the role of a neutral vehicle for the confrontation of different political positions.

In order to take the project of radicalising, or extending, democracy in a new direction and build upon the agonistic model of politics, I argue that we need to go further in our critical analysis of liberalism and investigate its relationship with neoliberalism as the dominant political rationality in contemporary Western societies. Instead of limiting ourselves to parsimonious models, we need to engage in "heavier" theory-building that also includes a historical and structural understanding of this relationship. The lack of this understanding ultimately prevents us from seeing the politicised role that liberal democracy has played in building the present Western political economic regimes. For us to recognise this, we need to reconceptualise our understanding of liberalism as a political rationality

like any other. We also need to abandon the abstract treatment of liberal democracy as a "light" institutional framework of representative institutions that arbitrate between different political rationalities and consider its "harder" institutional aspects. This means we need to treat liberal democracy as an ideological-state formation that is the product of a particular shaping of state structures by the dominant political rationality, and that does not concern itself only with representation, but also with a particular mode of governance. Finally, we need to examine how the particular shaping of state structures by political rationalities in turn affects the relationship between politics and the economy and the wider network of social relations.

The agonistic model of democracy that Mouffe offers for comprehending contemporary politics is useful insofar as it encourages us to consider extra-parliamentary struggles or informal politics that take place outside the framework of formal politics (state institutions and political parties). However, it fails to provide any concrete analysis of the interaction between progressive anti-establishment movements and the existing democratic institutions, as well as of the structural obstacles that progressive political movements face in radicalising democracy. Moreover, it does not consider the role of the state in constructing alternative hegemonic articulations to neoliberalism: what would be the relationship between the state, the people, and the economy? How would they govern differently? What is at stake in the project of radicalising democracy is nothing less than constructing an alternative governmental rationality that would be able to challenge neoliberalism. If the answer to the current crisis of liberal democracy is further democratisation in the project of radical democracy, then we also need be clear as to what principles and political rationality guide this democratisation and what structural changes are needed to support it.

Repoliticisation and Radicalisation of Democracy: Post-2011 Protest Movements and Populism

What can the 1970s debate on the crisis of governability and the agonistic model of democracy then tell us about the present crisis? The protest movements that emerged in the West after the 2008 financial crisis can be seen as the harbingers of the crisis of liberal democracy that was to unravel by the second half of the 2010s. The repoliticisation of democratic politics, which was reflected in the organisation of the global Occupy movement,

the Indignados in Spain and Greece, and the eruption of protests in post-socialist countries, such as Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania, represented the first effort by progressive extra-parliamentary forces to challenge the responses of their respective governments to the Great Recession. Similar to the social movements of the second half of the twentieth century in the West, known in the sociology literature as "the new social movements", the post-2011 movements operated largely in the sphere of extra-institutional politics and did not seek to enter institutional politics and compete electorally, at least not initially. However, unlike the new social movements in the last century, the post-2011 progressive movements focused primarily on issues of material inequality rather than post-material and cultural concerns and mounted a political, in some cases an anti-establishment, challenge to the formal structures of democracy. Such re-orientation in the focus of social movements calls for revisiting one of the key theses among scholars of new social movements who in the past argued that class politics over material redistribution has become obsolete in advanced Western societies.

Here, I turn back to Habermas, who was one of the key advocates behind the popularisation of this thesis (see also Inglehart 1990, 1997; Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Castells 2010). Especially in his later works, Habermas maintained that material reproduction is systemically stabilised and regulated via communicative interaction between the lifeworld and the system (Habermas 1987, 347). For Habermas, the concept of the lifeworld represents processes of socialisation and cultural reproduction through communicative interactions that take place between members of society (see Habermas 1987, 119–41). The concept of the system signifies the instrumental rationalisation of the lifeworld through institutionalisation and emergence of complex social structures, such as the state, media, and economy (see Habermas 1987, 153–97). Within this systemic framework, the welfare state represented the institutional mechanism, which processed the contradictions and anomalies that might arise from the lifeworld/system interaction (Habermas 1976, 37). While in early Habermas we can still find an analysis of the tension between capital accumulation and democratic legitimacy (see Habermas 1976, 37–41, 1987, 345), the later Habermas imposes a stricter distinction between the realm of politics and economy (see, e.g., his understanding of civil society in Habermas (1996, 366–73)). Habermas, thus, shifts focus to a more proceduralist understanding of democratic politics, one that inspired much of the deliberative democratic scholarship critiqued earlier, which ultimately left his

account of democratic legitimation bereft of any critical analysis of capitalism. As David A. Borman observed, this shift in Habermas' analytical focus marked his "retreat from the demand for systematic social transformation" (Borman 2011, 103).

While Habermas' early work underlined the inherent contradictions between capital accumulation and democratic legitimacy behind the governability crisis in the 1970s, the later Habermas believed that these contradictions could be reconciled within the framework of liberal constitutional democracy. This view finds empirical backing in the emergence of the new social movements at the time, which did not seek to transform the overall institutional framework of advanced economies. What the emergence of protest movements in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis showed, however, is that not only material issues were back on the agenda, but also that institutions of representative democracy were unable to respond to the protesters' demands. Rather than being concerned with cultural or identity issues, these protest movements were bringing attention to economic inequality, corruption, and the influence of financial corporations on governments. In Europe, protests, which were mostly concentrated in the southern European states, demanded an end to welfare cuts and austerity measures and defended public services. While previous new social movements sought to address their demands with the framework of existing liberal democratic institutions, the post-2011 protest movements aimed to transform it. It is worth remembering that this wave of repoliticisation was preceded by increasing political disaffection, which peaked at the height of the Great Recession, and declining voter turnout in Western democracies. The lack of trust in the established democratic institutions led the protesters to the occupation of public squares, where they would debate these issues and construct new forms of political engagement.

Donatella della Porta (2015), who studied many of these movements, explains this shift in focus of social movements by locating their emergence in the framework of the neoliberal transformation of Western societies, without which, she argues, we cannot understand the crisis of representative democracy (della Porta 2015, 153). The financial crisis and the crisis of democracy are therefore intimately linked. As I will show in Chap. 3, the unwillingness or incapability of representative democratic institutions to address the protesters' demands stems from the way neoliberal hegemony has transformed the role of the state in Western societies, in turn impacting the effectiveness of democratic institutions. The liberal

economic reforms have led to the retrenchment of the welfare state and increased global market integration, making the task of democratically elected representatives to manoeuvre in the context of heightened competition and instability more difficult. The legitimacy and trust in domestic democratic institutions was as a consequence negatively affected, providing the space for new political actors to repoliticise the existing policy prescriptions and offer an alternative way of governing. So, while the post-2011 protest movements were successful in repoliticising and challenging the dominant economic policies and governance, they failed to construct an alternative hegemonic response that could radicalise democracy and effectively counter neoliberalism.

A second point that I would like to make is that only when parts of these movements redirected their mobilisation efforts towards building new political parties (or transforming existing ones) and competing through the channels of electoral democracy did they manage to mount a more resounding challenge to (neo)liberalism. I argue that populism played a crucial role in the political development of these movements. Not only did populism establish the necessary discursive division in the political field between "us" and "them", the people and the elites, as envisioned by the agonistic model of democracy, but also acted as a carrier for an alternative set of programmatic positions, which challenged those of the incumbent political parties at elections. While the Occupy movement in the United States can be said to have featured these characteristics, with its famous slogan of the 99% versus the 1%, it did not manage to articulate a clear alternative programme. Furthermore, it can be argued that their inability to do so was due to their refusal to engage with the established channels of democratic participation (White 2016). This, however, was not the case in Spain, Greece, and Slovenia, for example, where, as I will show in Chap. 6, parts of the protest movements have led to the establishment of new parties (or the reinvigoration of existing ones) and their contestation of neoliberalism through established democratic institutions. The linking of repoliticisation with populism therefore marks the transitioning of these movements into the next stage of the radicalisation of democracy, where the established ideological-institutional framework itself is challenged and institutional attempts are made to reshape it.

Although in this book I focus on the progressive left-wing populist forces, the radicalisation of democracy through populism can also be conducted through a right-wing articulation of the counter-hegemonic struggle. In contrast with left-wing populism, which focuses on redistributive

and economic issues, right-wing populism puts more emphasis on socio-cultural issues, such as immigration and nativism. We can observe an increase in right-wing populism both in the United States and Europe after the 2008 financial crisis. The Tea Party movement serves as an example of its rise in the United States, and more recently the election of Donald Trump as the next US president. In Europe, the Golden Dawn in Greece and the Hungarian Jobbik party can be singled out as the radical variants of right-wing populism that made headlines for their use of violence and Nazi, anti-Semitic, and xenophobic rhetoric. If we assess the rise of populism in the 2010s through the prism of the tension between liberalism and democracy that also appeared during the 1970s debate on the governability crisis, we can say that this rise comes as democracy's reaction to the rise of neoliberalism in the last three decades. As part of this backlash, therefore, both left-wing and right-wing populisms can be seen as ideological challengers to (neo)liberalism and as drivers for the radicalisation of democracy. That is if by *radicalisation* of democracy we mean its structural extension through the expansion of democratic control over the economy and other social spheres, the (nation) state being the main institutional tool for achieving this, and if by democracy we intend to convey the Rousseauian notion of popular sovereignty. It is, however, on the left side of contemporary populist politics in post-crisis Europe that the intention of challenging neoliberalism has been most clearly pronounced. While right-wing populists also challenge neoliberalism through their economic policies that put greater emphasis on state intervention into the economy, this is mostly a product of pragmatic consideration rather than ideological conviction.

As I have demonstrated in this chapter, the discourse around the crisis of democracy is not a new one. Conservative and liberal scholars have viewed the emergence of new social movements of the late 1960s and the economic troubles of the 1970s as the reason for the crisis of governability and the "overloading" of the Western statist bureaucratic political systems with democratic demands. Sociological and neo-Marxist scholars, on the other hand, argued that the crisis resulted from the irresolvable tension between liberal tendencies of capitalist accumulation and democratic aspirations, producing a repoliticisation of social antagonisms while the social-democratic consensus was crumbling. As it will become clearer in Chap. 3, this explanation is especially telling in the context of the resurgence of liberal hegemony in the late 1970s Western democracies, leading to a renewed liberalisation of economic activity and the uncoupling of

corporate power from the democratic mechanisms of control and supervision.

Both the aggregative and the deliberative conceptions of democracy were demonstrated to be lacking in their explanation of the crisis of democracy. While the aggregative model constrains the political decision-making to the control of the elites, the deliberative model fails to recognise the ineradicably political character of differences in society and thus demonstrates its inability to properly engage with antagonistic relations. The concept of agonistic democracy offers a far more fitting analytical framework for understanding the contestation between different hegemonic articulations in the context of, but also in opposition to, the liberal democratic arrangement. Yet, despite being able to account for disruptive repoliticisation and the relationship between radical politics and institutional democracy, it fails to extend critical analysis to the institutions of liberal democracy themselves. I pointed out to two specific problems with the model of agonistic democracy as conceived by Mouffe: (1) the ability of liberal democracy to tame antagonism into agonism without ideologically reshaping it into political content that is acceptable to the dominant hegemony; and (2) the supposed neutrality of liberal democratic institutions. Moreover, the agonistic model of democracy is limited when it comes to explaining why repoliticisation arises during specific historical periods and how the crisis of democracy comes about. If liberal democracy were simply a neutral vehicle through which we can transform destructive antagonism into democratically legitimate agonistic articulations, then the only task, although no less monumental, for the competing political forces would be to construct an alternative hegemonic articulation in order to compete with the dominant hegemony. However, as such counter-hegemonic endeavours have shown in the past—from SYRIZA's quest to alter the neoliberal consensus of established political parties in Greece to the institutional obstacles encountered by Jeremy Corbyn's leadership of the Labour Party in the United Kingdom when trying to transform politics through the parliamentary channels—it is clear that a more critical scrutiny of liberal democratic institutions is needed.

In Chap. 3, I will show that these institutional obstacles arise because of the ideological relationship between liberalism and neoliberalism and the way (neo)liberalism reshapes the role of the state in society. In democratic theory and wider political science literature, the two philosophies are too often treated as ideologically separate traditions governing two separate spheres of social life: liberalism is relegated to the sphere of

politics, while neoliberalism is limited to the economic sphere. To fully account for the connection between the two, we first need to recognise that liberalism is more than just a set of neutral principles shaping democratic institutions. It is an ideology that is geared towards hegemonising our interpretation and understanding of politics and social life. In a similar vein, neoliberalism is an ideology that does not concern itself only with economic processes, but first and foremost with a theory of the state and social life. This reconceptualisation of liberalism necessitates a theoretical approach that recognises the effect of liberalism not only on shaping politics but also the economy. It is precisely the lack of political economy analysis that marks one of the key omissions from Mouffe's critical engagement with liberal rationalism and democracy. Using Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality and building upon his genealogy of liberalism, I will offer a structural theory for the crisis of liberal democracy. This approach will be combined with Karl Polanyi's theory of the double movement and his thesis on "the great transformation", which together will provide an explanatory framework for the dynamics between neoliberalism and waves of repoliticisation that we have seen in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.

Notes

1. The report has been referenced numerous times in the preceding years and frequently featured as a starting point for further analysis (see, e.g., Lawrence 1981; Cunningham 2002; Hay 2007; Mastropaolo 2012; Pilon 2013).

2. Revisions in pluralist and elite democratic theory were accompanied by a rise in rational choice theory, most closely aligned with the minimalist understanding of democracy, which is associated with Robert Dahl and Joseph Schumpeter. As Colin Hay explains, rational choice theory emerged as a challenge to the welfare state and subsequently entered political science through its attack on the role of the state and politics in shaping society. It was particularly strong across the 1980s and 1990s and played a key legitimising role in the neoliberal shift in policy-making. See Hay 2007, 95–122; Hindmoor 2010.

3. It also prompted criticism from another strand of scholars whose aim, however, is not to provide a better model of democracy that would more adequately correspond with democratic politics as it is, but to reject democracy outright. This strand of mostly libertarian-oriented American scholarship questions the premise of the rational voter in aggregative accounts of democracy and in some accounts argues for 'epistocracy' to replace democracy (see, e.g., Caplan 2007; Brenan 2016).

4. In their more recent work, Honig and Connolly pay more attention to hegemonic articulations in contemporary society, especially with regards to neoliberalism, however, without placing agonistic democracy at the centre of their respective analyses. See Honig (2017) and Connolly (2013).
5. Many scholars have grappled with and written extensively on the Miliband-Poulantzas debate. For further reference see Alford and Friedland (1985); King (1986); Dunleavy and O'Leary (1987); Jessop (1982, 1990, 2007); Carnoy (1984); Barrow (1993) and Schwarzmantel (1995).

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Understanding (Neo)liberalism: The Relationship Between the Liberal State and Free Market Capitalism

In Chap. 2, I have questioned the ability of liberal democracy to respond to the wave of repoliticisation in post-crisis Europe. While the agonistic model of democracy, as developed by Chantal Mouffe, provides us with an analytical framework to account for the relationship between extra-institutional and formal politics, a theory on why repoliticisation arises and why exactly there is a crisis of liberal democracy is still lacking. In order to understand how this crisis comes about, what is needed is a structural analysis of the relationship between politics and the economy and the role of state institutions in accommodating ongoing neoliberalisation of Western societies. Why does the state need to take a *laissez-faire* position in relation to the free market economy? Can the *laissez-faire* direction of the state be simply understood as the removal and shrinking of the state's role in the expansion of neoliberal capitalism? And how does a free market economy emerge in the first place and comes to dictate the terms of state governance? For these questions to be properly addressed, a historical analysis of the capitalist institutional framework is required, which combines a critical understanding of its key principles and processes on the one hand and an account of the institutional setting in accommodating market expansion on the other.

To this purpose, I will develop a critical political economy approach that sits closely with the tradition of old institutional economics. Primarily, it will draw upon Karl Polanyi's *The Great Transformation* and Michel

Foucault's *The Birth of Biopolitics* to demonstrate how liberalism as a governing rationality determines the role of state institutions with regard to the free market economy and the wider society. This analytical task will attempt to achieve the following three things: (1) it will sketch out a historical trajectory of the liberal state, linking economic liberal ideas with the institutional transformations that led to the present day liberal democracy; (2) it will explain the commonalities and the key points of divergence between classical liberalism and neoliberalism; and (3) it will identify the underlying social tendencies in this process that provoke crises of governmentality, opening up the political and ideological space for alternatives to (neo)liberalism.

In order to sketch out the parameters of what will be a heterodox theoretical approach, let me first make a few methodological points that highlight the two authors' distinctiveness in their economic analysis. In his analysis, Foucault rejects the classical Marxist approach for defining capitalism as entailing a single logic of capital, arguing that capital "can only have historical reality within an economic-institutional capitalism" (Foucault 2008, 165). By emphasising the institutional setting of capitalism, Foucault suggests "the historical capitalism we know is not deducible as the only possible and necessary figure of the logic of capital" (Foucault 2008, 165). This alternative approach bears important political implications as it underlines the importance of "the history of capitalism, around the history of the role of the institution of law, of the rule in capitalism" (Foucault 2008, 165), and opens up the possibility of organising the current capitalist order differently. In a similar institutionalist vein, Polanyi criticises the formalism of mainstream economics, underlining that the economy is not determined by "unchanging natural laws but by social norms and conventions that are malleable over time". As Gareth Dale notes, Polanyi's economic analysis "begins with institutions" and is grounded in careful empirical inquiries that draw upon anthropology, statistics and history (Dale 2010, 14). Like Foucault, he stresses the role of ideas and institutions in shaping the variety of capitalism that particular countries have adopted in modern history.

The reason behind my methodological decision to turn to Foucault's and Polanyi's is not to dismiss Marxist approaches, but to provide a novel way for studying the relationship between ideology and the structure of the economy. By turning to Foucault and Polanyi, I will show that we can better account for the role of the state and the relationship between liberalism and democracy in contemporary Western societies. Both authors

directly engage with liberalism in their work and demonstrate how liberal thought is essential in understanding the rise of free market economics and the neoliberal turn in second half of the twentieth century. By better accounting for the role of ideology and political institutions in the persistence of the liberal capitalist order, Foucault and Polanyi point us in a direction which more readily imagines what resistance to neoliberalism would need to entail in the twenty-fist century. The analytical tools for understanding the relationship between liberalism and neoliberalism, the liberal state and market economy, and the dynamics between market expansion and the counter-movements laid out in this chapter will finally contribute to the theoretical groundwork for understanding the emergence of the post-2011 political movements and conceptualising the structural obstacles in their challenge to neoliberal governmentality in Chap. 6.

Constructing a Political Economy Analysis After Marx

In what follows, I will clarify the particularities of my political economy approach, based on Foucault and Polanyi, in relation to Marxism. When analysts approach the subject of political economy from a critical angle, Marxism is the obvious starting point. Why then turn to Foucault and Polanyi, who had a rather ambiguous, and sometimes even dismissive, relationship with the key Marxist tenets? In a world that has observed a series of periodic economic crises in the last three decades, which exposed in full view the contradictions of advanced capitalism, the question of how this self-destructive system managed to maintain its legitimacy despite negative effects for social cohesion and environmental sustainability still remains to be answered. While those following the Marxist line of analysis would insist on the internal and trans-historical logic of capitalism to explain the continuing expansion of capitalism and its contradictions (Harvey 1982, 2005, 2011, 2014; Brown 2015; and others), Foucault and Polanyi point us in a more Gramscian direction,[1] which emphasises the contingency of the political-economic institutional assemblages and the role of ideology in legitimating capitalism.

With regard to Foucault's non-Marxist—or post-Marxist, as some authors would argue (see Poulantzas 1980; Balibar 1992; Lemke 2002; Fontana and Bertani 2003; Jessop 2007)—methodological approach, Bob Jessop follows Étienne Balibar (1992) in saying that:

If there is an irreducible divergence between Foucault and Marx, it does not lie in the contrast between the microphysics and macrophysics of power (local and global) but in the opposition between the Marxian logic of contradiction (in which the power relation is only a strategic moment) and Foucault's logical structure of power relations (in which contradiction is but one possible configuration). (Jessop 2004)

Foucault's methodological approach can be said to be fundamentally at odds with Marxism in that it does not take the contradictory logic of capital accumulation "as the principal aspect of all social formations" and allows for the possibility of alternative principles of societalisation (Jessop 2004). Yet, as Balibar notes, Foucault repeatedly moves from "a *break* to a tactical *alliance*" with Marxism, "the first involving a global critique of Marxism as a 'theory'; the second a partial usage of Marxist tenets or affirmations compatible with Marxism" (Balibar 1992, 53). And as Foucault's analytical focus increasingly turns to questions of "political economy and the historical constitution of the state from the sixteenth to twentieth centuries" (Jessop 2007, 153–4), his analysis becomes more closely aligned with the Marxist critique of capitalism. Without recognising this "increasing interest in complex and contingent problems of political economy and statecraft" in Foucault's work in the mid- to late 1970s (Jessop 2007, 153), Foucault's analysis can indeed seem anti-statist and inadequate for constructing a coherent critique of capitalist economy. Only by acknowledging the significant shift in Foucault's focus, from his earlier writings on "the micro-physics and micro-diversity of power relations" (Jessop 2007, 140) to "their macro-physics and strategic codification through the normalizing, governmentalized state" (Jessop 2007, 140), namely in the posthumously published and translated lectures he gave at the Collège de France between 1978 and 1979, we can properly appreciate Foucault's contribution to understanding the key features of capitalist political economy.

With regard to Polanyi, we can also find many similarities in his approach with Marxist analysis, but it is his understanding of the relationship between economic liberalism and the market system that I find most pertinent for the purpose of this chapter. Unlike Marx, Polanyi saw "economic liberalism and the market system appear as inseparable parts of a single whole" (Maucourant and Plociniczak 2013, 516). Whereas for Marx it is the economic relations of production that give rise to an ideology "as a secondary superstructure", for Polanyi the ideology of economic

liberalism plays a critical role in the construction of the free market economy (Maucourant and Plociniczak 2013, 516). Yet, as some scholars have noted, Polanyi does not manage to completely escape the Marxist framework of thinking, despite his efforts, noting a lingering determinism in Polanyi's belief that Western societies would transition to democratic socialism as he believed that was the only natural outcome to expect from workers in an industrial society (see Holmes 2014; Dale 2014; Selwyn and Miyamura 2014). Marx and Polanyi both ventured into similar areas of critical political economy: the commodification of goods and services, the dependence of production on the natural world, the distinction between capitalism and preceding societies, the objectification of labour, and the rise of consumerist society (Cangiani 2011). Yet, while admitting that Polanyi was writing "in conscious dialogue with both Marxism and the broader socialist tradition", Fred Block argues that there was a theoretical shift in Polanyi's work away from the Marxist tradition (Block 2003, 280). Whereas Polanyi's idea of fictitious commodities can be understood "as a way of deepening Marx's critique of capitalism" (Block 2003, 282), with his concept of embeddedness:

> … Polanyi is challenging a core presumption of both market liberals and Marxists. Both of these traditions are built on the idea that there is an analytically autonomous economy that is subject to its own internal logic. Polanyi's point is that since actually existing market economies are dependent upon the state to manage the supply and demand for the fictitious commodities, there can be no analytically autonomous economy. (Block 2003, 282)

This key insight on the part of Polanyi, which is missing from Marx's work, can be ascribed to Polanyi's "distinct advantage of observing the dramatic increases in the state's role in managing market economies", which drove him to construct theoretical concepts that position "the state's role close to the center of analysis" (Block 2003, 281).

This brings me to the notable shift in Foucault's analytical focus that we can observe in his later work, which became increasingly concerned with the functioning of the state. Foucault's distinct focus delves into the contingency of familiar concepts, such as state, society and people, being particularly attentive to the development of the meaning of these concepts through history. In other words, Foucault constructs genealogies of these concepts, starting by studying particular meanings and practices, and this

way illuminating the contingent and conflicting trajectories that underpin the universal subjects of modernity. Rather than occupying himself with the question which social group will get to fill the space of government, Foucault is more interested in knowing how the political rationality that guides and shapes our conception of the state and society emerges and under what conditions. Foucault captures this relationship between political rationality, or ideology, and governance through the state, under the concept of "governmentality". In Collége de France lectures between 1977 and 1979, he engages in a critical analysis of what he saw as the dominant governmentality (re-)emerging in his time: (neo)liberalism. By combining a political understanding of liberalism (as a governmental rationality) with an analysis of economic liberalism, Foucault's approach offers a new way for understanding its relationship with neoliberalism and the changing nature of the modern state. What is absent in Foucault's genealogy of liberalism, somewhat peculiarly however, is any mention of democracy.

Unlike Foucault, Marx did have something to say about democracy, especially in his earlier work. As Sean Sayers (2007) notes, Marx viewed the liberal concepts of individuality and society "as products and expressions of the social alienation of free market conditions" (Sayers 2007, 84). William L. Niemi (2011) points out that for Marx the liberal notions of citizenship and individual freedom in civil society amounted to nothing but a "lion's skin" concealing the fact that "the majority lived in subjection to new hierarchies created by the industrial revolution" (Niemi 2011, 42). Yet, as Niemi is quick to emphasise, this does not mean that Marx was opposed to political democracy, only that he did not believe political rights carried any true meaning in "the every day lived lives of workers" under capitalist relations of production (Niemi 2011, 49). Turning to Foucault will thus help me in offering an alternative understanding of liberalism and its relationship with the state, which is absent in Marxist analysis. Yet, the emancipatory potential of political, egalitarian democracy, while recognised by early Marx, does not play a major role in Foucault's analysis. This represents a key limitation for my analysis if we are to reconceptualise our understanding of liberal democracy and account for its crises.

Like Foucault, Polanyi puts emphasis on state power and liberal ideas to explain how free market capitalism emerges, whereas in Marx "[t]he state is in the background", since "the most important relationship is between worker and capitalist at the point of production" (Block 2003, 283). In fact, Polanyi's recognition of economic liberal ideas and their

effect on the optimisation of the state in accordance with laissez-faire principles is strikingly similar to Foucault's analysis of liberal governmentality. Where Polanyi's analysis goes a step further and fills in the missing puzzle for our building a historicised understanding of liberal democracy is his theory of "the double movement". According to this theory, the implementation of liberal policies and the establishment of the free market in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries triggered a reaction in the form of a protectionist "counter-movement", which aimed to protect social and natural life from the "deleterious action of the market" (Polanyi 2001, 138). The counter-movement took the form of resistance by peasants and working classes, as well as the form of institutions and law—for example, Polanyi speaks about the role of central banking to manage the monetary system in order to shield productive industries from market volatility. The counter-movement was thus not necessarily anti-capitalist, although, it was non-liberal in its objectives, as I will argue later in the chapter.

Hence, while Foucault's genealogy of liberalism is analytically positioned between the level of ideology and structures, Polanyi's theory of the double movement covers the effects of liberalism for society and thus offers an analytical perspective between the institutional meso-level and social forces. In this way, the two authors' contrasting methodologies will complement each other in helping me construct a macro-theoretical understanding behind the emergence of liberal democracy and its crises. The dialectics between social forces that are captured in Polanyi's theory of the double movement will give the right analytical place to political agency in my approach and will account for structural change that is also found in the Marxist dialectics of the class struggle. There is one notable difference between Polanyi's and Marxist dialectics—Polanyi's is not class determinist in nature. While Polanyi does acknowledge "the essential role played by class interests in social change" (Polanyi 2001, 159), he sees the interests of different social groups determined not only by economic interests, but also social, such as an individual's standing, rank, status, and security in society (Polanyi 2001, 160). As Polanyi explains: "Precisely because not the economic but the social interests of different cross sections of the population were threatened by the market, persons belonging to various economic strata unconsciously joined forces to meet the danger" (Polanyi 2001, 162). Polanyi gives the example of the workers' Chartist movement in mid-nineteenth century England, which had to appeal to the middle classes in their efforts to democratise the British state

(Polanyi 2001, 180–1). But we could also mention alliances between the peasantry and the middle classes after the First World War, which according to Gregory M. Luebbert's comparative historical analysis produced fascist and dictatorial regimes in Europe, and those between the middle classes and the working-class movement, resulting in the establishment of social democracies (Luebbert 1991).

Polanyi's theory of the double movement between different social forces will therefore provide a more concrete basis for understanding the contingency of political actions and a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between structural developments and agency. It will also offer a conceptual vehicle for understanding the rise of populism by explaining the changing nature of class structures and the formation of democratic majorities between different cross sections of the population. As I will demonstrate through my analysis, the crisis of liberal democracy emerges precisely from the clash between (neo)liberalism (and the resulting structural changes to society and the economy) and the protectionist counter-movement (popular democracy).

CONCEPTUALISING LIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY

A history of liberalism is also a history of neoliberalism: we cannot understand the rationality behind the positioning of political institutions in relation to the market in neoliberal governmentality without acknowledging that the seeds for the emergence of neoliberalism were already planted by classical liberal thought and indeed were first implemented under liberal governmentality of the late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century. Liberalism and neoliberalism have been researched by scholars in governmentality studies for more than two decades now, spanning from analyses of the liberal governmental technologies and the problem of the state, production of self-governing individuals and democratic empowerment, and the shift from the Keynesian welfare state to the neoliberal state, to the rise of entrepreneurial modes of conduct in different spheres of social life (Burchell et al. 1991; Rose and Miller 1992; Barry et al. 1996; Ong 2006; Lemke 2007; Flew 2012; Gane 2014; Brännström 2014; Lemm and Vatter 2014; Brown 2015). While there have been many articles and book chapters written on the relationship between Foucault's liberal governmentality and neoliberal expansion (see, e.g., Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 1996; Brown 2003, 2015; Zamora and Behrent 2016), what is lacking in the existing literature is an assessment of the role of

liberal democracy in enabling the expansion of neoliberalism and the concurrent depoliticisation of democratic politics.

Wendy Brown notably comes closest to this endeavour in her book *Undoing the Demos* (2015), however, her failure to acknowledge the irresolvable tension between the liberal and popular democratic traditions in liberal democracy, and her resolve to salvage the legacy of classical political liberalism (i.e. the constitutionalisation of individual rights and freedoms through social contract theory), obstruct her from properly accounting for the significant convergence between economic and political liberal thought (see Brown 2015, 58–9). To suggest so, Brown argues, would neglect "liberalism's more political aspects and drives", especially those pertaining to "liberalism's imbrication with and inflection of a democratic imaginary" (Brown 2015, 59). I argue that Brown's criticism of Foucault for treating political and economic liberalism in the same vein demonstrates her lack of consideration of liberalism's historical antagonism to democratic movements and demands. At numerous points in *The Great Transformation* (2001), Polanyi evidences how liberalism "in its crudest version… reduces itself to an attack on political democracy, as the alleged mainspring of interventionism" into the liberal project of a self-regulating market (Polanyi 2001, 151); how "the liberals of the 1840s" abhorred the idea of popular government, advocated by the Chartist movement (Polanyi 2001, 180); and how militant liberals viewed popular democracy as "a danger to capitalism" (Polanyi 2001, 234). Rather than ascribing the hard-fought democratic rights and freedoms unilaterally to liberalism, I will understand them as a product of complex dialectics between the liberal project on the one hand and the different radical movements for democratisation on the other.

In his College de France lectures between 1977 and 1979, Foucault set out to analyse liberalism as a "governmentality". Let me first clarify what Foucault meant by this term. He coined the term governmentality to establish an alternative reading of government, as opposed to providing another theory of the state, which he saw was best described by the phrase "art of government", or governmentality. This was his methodological attempt to escape falling into what he perceived as the ontological fallacy of considering the universal categories, such as the state, society and people, in social sciences and humanities as given. Instead, he aimed to start his analysis from concrete practices of government to show how these universals were formed. Foucault clarifies the difference between the state and governmentality in the following passage:

The state is at once that which exists, but which does not yet exist enough. *Raison d'État* is precisely a practice, or rather the rationalization of a practice, which places itself between a state presented as given and a state presented as having to be constructed and built. The art of government must therefore fix its rules and rationalize its way of doing things by taking as its objective the bringing into being of what the state should be (Foucault 2008, 4).

Rationalisation here should be understood as a particular political rationality or knowledge that acts as a normative blueprint for the rationalisation of state practice. It entails making the operations of the state more efficient, the dimension, which gains a whole new level of intelligibility once considered in relation to liberalism. Historically, Foucault situates the emergence and the trajectory of *raison d'État* with: (1) the emergence of absolute monarchies (police states, as Foucault would call them) in sixteenth century Europe; (2) the rise in mercantilism as a political-economic strategy of maximising the wealth of nations; and (3) the appearance of modern ideologies, or the blueprints, between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries that would attempt to rationalise state practice. For the purposes of this chapter, I will be interested in the latter understanding of governmentality, which for Foucault, best encapsulates the changing nature of the relationship between the state and society from sixteenth century onwards. My focus will be on the macro-level understanding of governmentality, placing governmentality between the level of political rationality, or ideology, and the structures of the state. This was also Foucault's intention in his analysis of liberal governmentality. He explicitly explains that he wants to move away from "an institutional-centric approach" in his study of liberalism (Foucault 2009, 116) and step behind the state to analyse the rationality that guides governmental practice, procedures and disciplines (Foucault 2009, 118–19).

THE EMERGENCE OF LIBERAL GOVERNMENTALITY: SELF-LIMITATION, POLITICAL ECONOMY AND BIOPOLITICS

What, then, is the political rationality that has guided the art of government in Foucault's times, and as I argue, still does today? Foucault identifies it in broad terms as liberalism. From the eighteenth century onwards, liberalism, "this new type of calculation … consists in saying and telling government: I accept, wish, plan, and calculate that all this should be left

alone" (Foucault 2008, 20). This signifies a key principle of liberal rationality, which is better known as laissez-faire and can also be understood as the self-limitation of government. It is in this sense that the rationalisation or optimisation of governmental reason proceeds in transforming the state from "the point of maximum strength" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries to the point where it is not governing "too much and too little" (Foucault 2008, 19). Rose and Miller (1992, 179) describe this key liberal principle as placing a limit "on the legitimate exercise of power by political authorities": "The scope of political authority was to be limited, and vigilance was to be exercised over it" (ibid.). By adopting "its own internal forms of self-regulation", liberal governmentality abandoned the governmental rationality which sought to totalise a sovereign's exercise of power over a territory (see Rose 1996; Burchell 1991, 1996) and instead worked towards fostering the self-organisation of civil society through the endowment of subjects with a set of civil rights and freedoms, which were not to be interfered with, at least not directly (Rose and Miller 1992, 179). The demarcation of appropriate areas of governmental intervention from the inappropriate ones, namely the civil society, marks the first instance of depoliticisation in liberal governing techniques.

Parallel to the self-limitation of liberal governing reason, Foucault (2008, 17–18) observes the emergence of a "political economy" from the middle of the eighteenth century which marked the gradual establishment of "a reasoned, reflected coherence" between practices that were once conceived as "the exercise of sovereign rights, or feudal rights", such as tax levies, manufacture regulations or regulations of grain prices, and were now managed by "intelligible mechanisms which link together these different practices and their effects, and which consequently allow[s] one to judge all these practices as good or bad" according to a new regime of truth (Foucault 2008, 18). The new regime of truth under the liberal governmentality is the price mechanism of the market. While markets played an important role of exchange in local economies much before, it is only in the eighteenth century that "its mechanisms, its effects, and its principle" (Foucault 2008, 28) become more intensified and refined around the regulative idea of frugality. The organising principle of frugality meant that it was no longer "unlimited regulatory governmentality" that took over the "site of the formation of truth", but it is increasingly recognised that the market needs to "be left to function with the least possible interventions precisely so that it can both formulate its truth and propose it to governmental practice as rule and norm" (Foucault 2008, 30).

As Foucault notes, classical economic theory (i.e. expert knowledge) played a crucial role in the formulation of the market economy as an independent sphere of civil society, which had to be respected by the state under liberal governmentality. Political economy emerges as "a distinctive form of knowledge" on the back of economic and juridical theorists, such as Adam Smith, David Hume, and Adam Ferguson, and replaces "the moralistic and rigid principles" of mercantilism with "the idea of spontaneous self-regulation of the market on the basis of 'natural' prices" (Lemke 2014, 62). The theorists of the free market "assumed that there exists a nature that is peculiar to governmental practices, and that governments have to respect this nature in their operations" (Lemke 2014, 62). According to these theorists, the naturalism of market operations derived from "the internal and intrinsic mechanics of economic processes" (Foucault 2008, 61) and these mechanisms then act as "a standard of truth which enables us to discern which governmental practices are correct and which are erroneous" (Foucault 2008, 32). For example, Foucault refers to Adam Smith's invisible hand, which he describes as "a more or less well thought-out economic optimism" (Foucault 2008, 278). Under the conditions of "the total transparency of the economic world", maximisation of individual self-interest and ignorance towards the collective outcome of private commercial enterprise, Smith's invisible hand would ensure that all the participating economic actors benefit in a market economy, regardless of the impact that economic activity has for the rest of society (Foucault 2008, 279). The role of the government in this view would then be to step aside and not interfere with the interplay of individual economic interests of merchants and entrepreneurs.

The third development that accompanied the emergence of political economy and the self-limiting of governmental practice is what Foucault calls biopolitics. Biopolitics is the mechanism of security to manage the growing urban populations in industrialising societies of the West. Biopolitics represents a paradoxical development in Foucault's genealogy of liberal governmentality, since it implies the need for active state involvement under liberal governmentality to take care of and manage the population, which goes against the key liberal principle of self-limitation. The government in liberal governmentality "must give way to everything due to natural mechanisms in both behaviour and production" (Foucault 2008, 67). The presumed naturality of social processes, such as the price mechanism of the market and the spontaneity of civil society, is of course

a normative construct that justifies the nominal limitation of the state in classical liberal theory. Foucault was very much aware of this when he argued that despite this negative limitation, it was still necessary for the state "to arouse, to facilitate, and to *laisser faire*, in other words to manage and no longer control through rules and regulations" (Foucault 2009, 353). The biopolitical function of liberal governmentality was therefore "to ensure that the necessary and natural regulations work, or even to create regulations that enable natural regulations to work" (Foucault 2009, 353).

To put this development of liberal governmentality in some historical context, the social biopolitical function of the state increased as liberal governments were working hard to realise the liberal idea of self-regulating free markets. Burchell reminds us of the problems that growing urban populations were facing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries— "health, hygiene, birth and death rates, life expectancy" (Burchell 1991, 143). However, the more active role of the liberal state went directly against "the framework of a liberal rationalization of government premised on the rights and necessary initiative of *individuals*" (Burchell 1991, 143). This paradox became starker in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. The adoption of Factory Laws in the second half of the nineteenth century points to the continuing active role of the state under liberal governmentality, which had to respond to the disastrous effects of free market capitalism for human and natural life. Moreover, Foucault refers to the introduction of "basic Welfare measures" in the aftermath of the Great Depression in the 1930s, which enabled the extension of democratic freedoms, but which could only be guaranteed by economic interventionism, a direct antithesis to liberal governmentality (Foucault 2008, 68). Another example could be the introduction of anti-monopoly legislation, which "the market partners experience[d] as excessive interventionism and excessive constraint and control" (Foucault 2008, 68). As Burchell notes, while the performance of liberal governmentality was "rationalized and justified in terms of liberal principles of economic government", it was deemed as "failing completely" when the "high socio-political cost" of this optimum economic performance was taken into account (Burchell 1996, 26). It is in this context that we can understand the paradoxical extension of the biopolitical function of the state while liberal governmentality necessitated the government to refrain from intervening in the natural processes of the market.

This contradictory situation brought forth what Foucault calls "crises of governmentality" (Foucault 2008, 68). While Foucault does not reveal what the cause of these crises were, he suggests there is a link between crises of liberalism and crises of capitalism, the crisis of the 1930s serving as proof (Foucault 2008, 69–70). However, this relationship needs further substantiation and it is at this point that I bring in Karl Polanyi's analysis. The problem of Foucault's genealogy of liberalism, as it currently stands, is that he presents it as a monolithic top-down political force that is able to subsume any contradictions, even as it reaches its breaking point in doing so. With the help of Polanyi below, I will show that such an account fails to recognise the dialectics that the emergence of liberal governmentality and free market capitalism set into motion, producing alternative ideological-political projects that directly challenged liberal governmentality.

THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE SELF-REGULATING MARKET AND THE DOUBLE MOVEMENT

Compared to Foucault's genealogy of liberal governmentality, Polanyi provides us with an economic sociological analysis of the later stages of liberalism from the late eighteenth and up to the mid-twentieth century. Like Foucault, Polanyi recognises there "was nothing natural about laissez-faire; free markets could never have come into being merely by allowing things to take their course" (Polanyi 2001, 145). Only with the help of state mechanisms and protections for domestic industry was the idea of free market capitalism possible to realise in practice. Polanyi gives the example of the successful cotton manufacturers in England, "the leading free trade industry", which was only able to thrive with "the help of protective tariffs, export bounties, and indirect wage subsidies" (Polanyi 2001, 145). Contrary to how classical liberal theory conceptualised the limited role of the state, in practice liberal governmentality necessitated an active state:

> … legislation could do nothing directly, except by repealing harmful restrictions. But that did not mean that *government* could do nothing, especially indirectly. On the contrary, the utilitarian liberal saw in government the great agency for achieving happiness… It was the task of the executive to collect statistics and information, to foster science and experiment, as well as to supply the innumerable instruments of final realization in the field of government. Benthamite liberalism meant the replacing of parliamentary action by action through administrative organs. (Polanyi 2001, 145–6)

Polanyi's observation that the liberal state could do nothing directly so as not to disrupt the optimum performance of the market economy is in line with the self-limitation principle of liberal governmentality that Foucault put forward. Yet, Polanyi's analysis goes further in elaborating the social and political consequences that the materialisation of the liberal idea of self-regulating markets had for society:

> Ultimately, that is why the control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequences to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of economy being embedded in social relations, social relations are embedded in the economy system… For once the economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific motives and conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that system to function according to its own laws. (Polanyi 2001, 60)

Like Foucault, Polanyi characterises the market economy as essentially an economic system which is "controlled, regulated and directed by market prices; order in the production and distribution of goods is entrusted to this self-regulation mechanism" (Polanyi 2001, 71). The state in liberal governmentality is not to interfere with the price- and income-setting mechanisms of the market: "Neither price, nor supply, nor demand must be fixed or regulated; only such policies and measures are in order which help to ensure the self-regulation of the market by creating conditions which make the market the only organizing power in the economic sphere" (Polanyi 2001, 72). In order to materialise, the idea of a self-regulating market also requires "nothing less than the institutional separation of society into an economic and a political sphere" (Polanyi 2001, 74). This novel institutional arrangement, even if based on a fallacy according to Polanyi, meant that all other spheres of social life needed to be subjugated to the demands of the market.

The creation of a market for labour in eighteenth century England is one example that Polanyi provides. As England was at the peak of industrialisation between 1795 and 1834, the system of local safety nets organised around parishes—otherwise known as the Speenhamland system—that was in place was seen as an obstacle to a free labour market by economists and liberal reformers. The 1662 Act of Settlement that restricted the mobility of workers under the rules of the perish serfdom was only loosened in 1795 in order to ease migration to factory towns. At the same time the Speenhamland system was put in place, which subsidised

the wages of many low paid workers in the countryside, while the unemployed were given poor relief in order to provide for minimum subsistence in midst of high grain prices (Polanyi 2001, 92–3). As Phyllis Deane notes, although English labour was considered to be relatively cheap in comparison to other countries, such as the United States, it was not necessarily poorer, crediting the Speenhamland system for better quality of living and higher labour productivity (Deane 1979, 148–51). However, because Speenhamland presented an obstacle to the new capitalist economy and a universal wage system, it was abolished in 1834 after the emerging middle class came to power (Polanyi 2001, 82). It was replaced by the New Poor Law, which centralised the administration of poor relief, cut its costs, and conditioned the receipt of poor relief with forced labour in workhouses.

While this radical overhaul of the poor relief system created a competitive market for wage labour, which benefited the British manufacturing industry during the Industrial Revolution, its social costs far outweighed the economic advantages. With the adoption of free trade and free market economics, British society underwent a stark transformation, a by-product of which was increasing inequality between the rich and the poor. As Polanyi remarks with sarcasm: "Poverty was nature surviving in society; that the limitedness of food and the unlimitedness of men had come to an issue just when the promise of a boundless increase of wealth burst in upon us made the irony only the more bitter" (Polanyi 2001, 88). The social destruction brought for by free market capitalism, which for Polanyi came into being in Britain only after labour was fully liberalised, following the preceding liberalisation of commodities and land, set into motion a counter-movement for the protection of society:

> Regulation of a new type had to be introduced under which labor was again protected, only this time from the working of the market mechanism itself. Though the new protective institutions, such as trade unions and factory laws, were adapted, as far as possible, to the requirements of the economic mechanism, they nevertheless interfered with its self-regulation … (Polanyi 2001, 81)

The counter protectionist movement that is called into existence as a result of the negative effects of a self-limiting state and a self-regulating market is what Polanyi calls "the double movement" (Polanyi 2001, 136). As free market economy expanded across lands and nations, the counter-movement was "checking the expansion in definite directions" (Polanyi

2001, 136). The counter-movement was "more than the usual defensive behavior of a society faced with change; it was a reaction against a dislocation which attacked the fabric of society, and which would have destroyed the very organization of production that the market had called into being" (Polanyi 2001, 136). So, in order to protect the workers from the market dynamics, factory legislation and social protection laws needed to be implemented, and to protect the natural resources, land laws were adopted and national parks created. As Michele Cangiani points out, the intervention of the counter-movement through the state and other social agencies can have two different results: (1) on the one hand, it works to counter the tendency of the market economy to externalise social costs; (2) on the other hand, "the actual function of interventions may also, or principally, be that of regulating economic and social processes in order to avoid major breakdowns and reinforce the hegemony of the (economic) ruling class" (Cangiani 2011, 192). When these two possible effects of the double movement are taken into account, the tension between the two movements appears to be even more irresolvable.

Because the counter-movement interfered with the self-regulation of the market, argues Polanyi, the crisis of free market capitalism ensued, which echoes Foucault's formulation of the crisis of governmentality erupting as a result of the tension between capitalist expansion and demands for social protection. Unlike Foucault, Polanyi explains that what propelled the dialectics between the two movements is "the action of two organizing principles in society, each of them setting itself specific institutional aims, having the support of definite social forces and using its own distinctive methods" (Polanyi 2001, 138). Polanyi describes the first "as the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market" and relying on the support of the trading and business classes, and the second as "the principle of social protection", which aimed at protecting "those most immediately affected by the deleterious action of the market", namely the working and the landed classes (Polanyi 2001, 138). The clash of these two movements, which made "government and business, state and industry, respectively, their strongholds", resulted in "such a perilous deadlock that in the twentieth century the fascist crisis sprang" (Polanyi 2001, 140).

Very briefly, it is also important to go beyond the national level of political dynamics in the nineteenth and early twentieth century Europe and mention what Polanyi had to say about the international dimension of free market capitalism. Polanyi maintained that for laissez-faire to work at the

international level, it needed an equalising mechanism, which would promote the unrestricted flow of goods, labour, and capital among different nations, notwithstanding their differences in industrial development. This equalising mechanism was organised around the international monetary regime, which was premised on the gold standard. The main idea behind pegging national currencies to the gold standard, backed up by the United Kingdom and the United States, was to assure "firms and individuals in one country that the currencies earned by exports and investments abroad would be 'as good as gold'; its effect was to remove obstacles to global market expansion" (Polanyi 2001, 64). The determination of money's purchasing power, that is, the monetary policy, was therefore removed from the influence of national governments and political parties by relying on the idea that the self-regulating mechanism of the gold-standard will eventually eliminate macroeconomic imbalances. As Gareth Dale points out, the "natural" stability of the gold standard was accepted by "right-wing liberal such as Ludwig von Mises" and socialists alike—it was "the faith of the age" (Dale 2010, 65). However, rather than offering a solution to macroeconomic imbalances between free trading nations, the strict monetary and fiscal policy actually exacerbated them: "by precluding currency devaluations in the early 1930s it contributed to the swiftness with which the slump spread internationally" (Dale 2010, 65).

In order for the liberal international order to work, all of its three tenets, the competitive labour market, the automatic gold standard, and international free trade needed to work together to make one whole — "[i]t was everything or nothing" (Polanyi 2001, 144). No matter how bad the financial and socio-economic troubles were, no matter how deadly deflation, "fatal monetary stringency" was maintained in order to preserve the "unshakable belief in the automatic steering mechanism of the gold standard" (Polanyi 2001, 144). After the 1920s "saw the prestige of economic liberalism at its height" (Polanyi 2001, 148), the blind faith in economic liberalism eventually brought to an end the self-regulating market:

> Hundreds of millions of people had been afflicted by the scourge of inflation; whole social classes, whole nations had been expropriated. Stabilization of currencies became the focal point in the political thought of peoples and governments; the restoration of the gold standard became the supreme aim of all organized effort in the economic field. The repayment of foreign loans and the return to stable currencies were recognized as the touchstone of

rationality in politics; and no private suffering, no restriction of sovereignty, was deemed too great a sacrifice for the recovery of monetary integrity. The privations of the unemployed made jobless by deflation; the destitution of public servants dismissed without a pittance; even the relinquishment of national rights and the loss of constitutional liberties were judged a fair price to pay for the fulfilment of the requirement of sound budgets and sound currencies, these a priori of economic liberalism. (Polanyi 2001, 148)

The failure of liberal governmentality brought upon its eventual crisis. However, in contrast with Foucault's genealogy of liberal governmentality and its crises, Polanyi provides us with an account of politicising agency that drove the dialectical dynamics of the double movement. It was the political decisions of the liberally minded elites in the wake of the Great Depression, with the backing of the trading and business classes, that failed to readjust the macroeconomic policies quickly enough in their countries. Furthermore, it was only with the mobilisation of the growing working-class movement, trade unions, socialist, populist, and nationalist political movements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that alternative ideologies and governmentalities started to emerge in opposition to liberal governmentality. This growing popular pressure and resistance precipitated the emergence of mass democracy through the repeal of property, income and literacy requirements and the gradual extension of universal suffrage across Europe. Therefore, many of the political and social reforms adopted by liberal elites in the United States and the United Kingdom before the Great Depression came as a result of their fear of social revolution disrupting their hold on power.

However, Polanyi did not view the emergence of democracy only in terms of increasing popular political representation, but also in the extension of democratic state control over the economy, which was reflected in the growing state bureaucracy and the easing of monetary and fiscal policy. The protectionist counter-movement was not only operating at the level of social and political movements, but also gradually took shape in the institutional sphere. Here, Polanyi mentions a number of institutional and policy mechanisms, which we associate with advanced social democracies of the second half of the twentieth century, such as democratic central banking, the welfare state (unemployment benefits and pensions), public healthcare, and Keynesianism. State governance, therefore, did not become more non-liberal only in non-democratic regimes after the Great Depression, but also in Western democracies. It took nothing less

than a paradigmatic ideological shift to establish a new social contract between popular government and capitalism in the West. Yet, if Polanyi believed that this "great transformation" would ultimately lead to democratic socialism in the West, the decades following the publication of his work in 1944 show that the re-emergence of liberal ideas to the dominant position in policy-making circles in the 1980s revived the idea of self-regulating markets.

The Emergence of Neoliberal Governmentality and the Hollowing Out of Democracy

Neoliberalism marked the point of reinvention of liberal thought in order to first address the limitations of classical liberalism, and second, to respond to what liberal thinkers saw as the grave political economic questions of the time. After the horrors of the Second World War, the question of neoliberalism called for "the re-elaboration of some of the basic elements of liberal doctrine—not so much in the economic theory of liberalism as in liberalism as an art of government, or if you like, as a doctrine of government" (Foucault 2008, 102). If the key organising principle in classical liberal theory has been the self-limitation of the state in relation to what were seen as the natural laws of a self-regulating market, then neoliberal intellectual thought addressed the question of the theory of the state more directly. Pace Foucault, I will understate the differences in the role of the state under neoliberal governmentality when compared to the liberal governmentality of the nineteenth century. While the mechanisms under which depoliticisation of economic governance have become more refined in the democratic context, and could definitely be described as novel, the principles guiding the neoliberal transformation of Western societies could not. In this sense, I will underemphasise the ideological differences between classical liberalism and neoliberalism, which are usually reified by political scientists.

Against the backdrop of emerging anti-statism, or "state-phobia" (Foucault 2008, 78), on the fringes of intellectual currents in the post-war period, coming both from the right (neoconservatism, neoliberalism) and the left (the Frankfurt School, the May 1968 unrest), Foucault summarises the challenge for liberalism in the immediate post-war era as the following: how can liberalism "bring about its real objective, that is to say, a general formalization of the powers of the state and the organization of society on the basis of the market economy" (Foucault 2008, 117)? This state-phobia was pointed directly against the growth of the state, Keynesianism, and

popular democracy. Foucault identifies the emergence of neoliberalism in "two main forms, with different cornerstones and historical contexts": (1) the German form, which developed in response to the crisis of the Weimer Republic, Nazism and post-war reconstruction; and (2) the American form, which defined itself in opposition to the New Deal and all the social and economic programmes organised around the post-war expansion of the federal administration (Foucault 2008, 78–9). Although the two different forms of neoliberalism found inspiration in different economic schools of thought, they developed theoretically in relation to each other through "a series of persons, theories, and books" passing between them (Foucault 2008, 79). Foucault engages with the Freiburg School of ordoliberalism, as well as the American Chicago School, analysing the work of liberal scholars, such as Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Gary Becker. The key difference between the two forms of neoliberalism was in the ambiguity of German ordoliberalism towards framing society in terms of market principles: whereas German ordoliberalism still expressed some moral and sociological reservations towards applying the principle of competition to the whole of society, American neoliberalism had no such concerns and is much more radical in its "generalization of the economic form of the market" (Foucault 2008, 243).

In order to tackle the problem of the growth of the state in the interwar and post-war period in the West, Foucault argues that classical liberalism had to undergo a number of theoretical revisions in order to tackle three identified problems: (1) the problem of monopoly and competition; (2) the problem of permissible and impermissible governmental actions; and (3) the problem of social policy and its "anti-economic" effects. The solutions for this problems that have become part of the common policy repertoire under neoliberal governmentality entailed nothing else than curtailing the democratic mechanisms and institutions that have been put in place as a result of the class struggles of the early twentieth century. First, the neoliberal thinkers uncoupled the functioning of the market economy from the political principle of laissez-faire. By putting forward a theory of free and full competition, in which competition is no longer viewed as a "given of nature, something produced spontaneously which the state must respect precisely inasmuch as it is a natural datum", competition becomes a normative principle for the formalisation of the new relationship between the state and the market economy (Foucault 2008, 120). In this sense, neoliberalism was no longer to follow the classical liberal principle of laissez-faire, but would instead be in a state of "perma-

nent vigilance, activity, and intervention" (Foucault 2008, 132): "One must govern for the market, rather than because of the market" (Foucault 2008, 121). This reformulation, however, is only a theoretical one. The state already played an active role in the establishment of the free markets in goods, services, capital, and labour under liberal governmentality in the nineteenth century, so this neoliberal revision only confirms what historically has already taken place in practice. What the solution to the problem of monopoly entailed under neoliberal governmentality was the repeal or deregulation of all of the constraints on free market activity that were put in place in the aftermath of the Great Depression. It also involved the replacement of a more socially oriented policy paradigm with neoliberal governmentality. Neoliberalism, therefore, marks renewed depoliticisation of state governance in that the market mechanisms are no longer functioning in exteriority to the state economic policy-making, but become infused into the very structure of state governance.

The second problem facing the revival of liberalism was the question of "permissible" and "impermissible" forms of government intervention. Government intervention was deemed welcome by neoliberal thinkers insofar as intervention was needed for the optimal performance of a competitive market economy. In this sense, neoliberal governmentality is no different from the old liberal regime—under the liberal regime, the market performance also determined which intervention is necessary and which is not, which domain the government should intervene into and which should be left untouched. However, according to Foucault, what is different under neoliberal governmentality is that the government is not supposed "to intervene on the mechanisms of the market economy, but on the conditions of the market" (Foucault 2008, 138). In other words, government intervention should be indirect by focusing on its core functions of maintaining the rule of law and a business environment that is amenable to the optimum performance of the market forces. Foucault distinguishes between two types of permissible government intervention: (1) *regulatory* actions and (2) *organising* actions. The objective of regulatory actions is to provide an institutional framework for what Foucault identifies as the three fundamental tendencies of the market:

> These three tendencies are: the tendency to the reduction of costs, the tendency to the reduction of the profit of the enterprise, and finally, the provisional, localized tendency to increased profit, either through a decisive and

massive reduction in prices, or by an improvement in production. (Foucault 2008, 138)

The aim of these regulatory actions then is to eliminate any temporary frictions in the market economy and enable the free play of these market tendencies. The way this is done primarily is through ensuring price stability via controlling the rate of inflation. All other objectives which we would normally attribute to macroeconomic policy-making, such as the maintenance of purchasing power, the pursuit of full employment, and balancing the balance of payments (trade deficit/surplus), become secondary to the objective of ensuring price stability (Foucault 2008, 139).

While the objective of organising actions is also to intervene on the conditions of the market, its function is to act on the "more fundamental, structural, and general conditions of the market" (Foucault 2008, 139). They would entail what we know as structural reforms. Here, Foucault gives the example of the introduction of a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in what was then the European Economic Community and is today the European Union (EU). The key idea behind the CAP was to establish a framework through which European agriculture could function within a market economy. The purpose of the CAP was not to "find the economy system that will be able to take account of the basic facts peculiar to European agriculture", given its state of fragmentation and the structural differences between different member states, but how to modify the given conditions, so that "the market economy can come into play" (Foucault 2008, 141). So while governmental intervention had to be light at the level of economic processes through permissible regulatory actions that I described earlier, it had to be heavy when it came to "this set of technical, scientific, legal, geographic, [let's say] broadly social factors which now increasingly become the object of governmental intervention" (Foucault 2008, 141). The problem of permissible governmental actions is, therefore, resolved through the establishment of specific regulatory actions, which respond to the needs of the market at the level of macroeconomic processes, and the more general structural reforms, the aim of which is to organise society around a competitive market order. Especially the latter have been high on the agenda of European neoliberal governments after the 2008 financial crisis. I will expand on the contemporary relevance of these mechanisms in Chap. 6.

The third problem that the neoliberal thinkers identified was that of social policy. The main purpose of social policy in a welfare economy was

to act as a counter-weight to the negative effects of the market, whether they be labour related (exploitation, redundancy, or injury at work) or due to the lack of equal access in collective enjoyment of consumption (public services, cultural life, etc.). What neoliberalism achieved was a fundamental change in the general perception of social policy. Social policy was no longer presented "as compensation for the effects of economics processes" because if it were, it would negate the very efficiency that gives organisational legitimacy to the market economy (Foucault 2008, 142). For this reason, neoliberals viewed welfare policy as "destructive in relation to economic policy" and thus anti-economic (Foucault 2008, 142–4). This required a major transformation of how social policy is conceptualised and perceived in relation to the market economy. The key objective of the state under neoliberal governmentality was no longer "the socialization of consumption and income", but privatisation and individualisation:

> Society, or rather the economy, will merely be asked to see to it that every individual has sufficient income to be able, either directly and as an individual, or through the collective means of mutual benefit organization, to insure himself against existing risks, or the risks of life, the inevitability of old age and death, on the basis of his own private reserves. (Foucault 2008, 144)

In a neoliberal economy, as opposed to a welfare one, social policy no longer needs to provide a cover for risks that are produced by market competition. Instead, it accords "everyone a sort of economic space within which they can take on and confront risks" (Foucault 2008, 144). With the gradual dismantlement of the welfare state, individualisation of responsibility and privatisation of risks, the social policy under neoliberalism no longer functions as "a compensatory mechanism for absorbing or nullifying the possible destructive effects of economic freedom on society" (Foucault 2008, 160). Instead, an active form of social interventionism is pursued, so that the formal mechanism of competition can regulate the market economy, and increasingly society as a whole. The neoliberal social policy is thus even more "active, multiple, vigilant, and omnipresent" (Foucault 2008, 160), according to Foucault—not in protecting social cohesion and the general well-being of society, but in enabling the idea of a self-regulating market, no matter how destructive its effects.

These three key transformations that formed part of the revisionism of the classical liberal doctrine contributed to the rise of a contemporary

neoliberal society that is premised on two major axes: the formalisation of society on the model of the enterprise and the redefinition of law "on the basis of and in terms of the competitive market economy" (Foucault 2008, 160). At the EU level, continuing Europeanisation following the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) meant an increasing transfer of power to technocratic and non-partisan institutions, in effect institutionalising neoliberal governmentality and reconfiguring the policy scope of national governments (see Mair 2013). The self-limitation of neoliberal governmentality with regards to permissible and impermissible actions towards the market was therefore also reflected in the elimination of the democratic state's role as a moral and social shield against the anti-social effects of competition. As Röpke, a German ordoliberal, pointed out: "Competition is a principle of order in the domain of the market economy, but it is not a principle on which it would be possible to erect the whole society. Morally and sociologically, competition is a principle that dissolves more than it unifies" (Röpke in Foucault 2008, 243).

As Wendy Brown (2015) has already pointed out in her book on the subject, neoliberal governmentality has led to the hollowing out of democracy and political life in Western societies. It has reprogrammed and transformed the role of the democratic state in the economy, which has up until the end of the 1970s had as one of its key objectives maintaining full employment and a decent standard of living for the working classes. On the basis of Foucault's analysis of neoliberal governmentality, Brown spelt out a very sombre picture for resistance against neoliberalism and liberal democracy in the West. As my analysis in this chapter has shown, however, liberal democratic states themselves have played a role in reifying the hegemonic grip of neoliberal governmentality as they moved away from social democracy. Moreover, when inspecting neoliberal governmentality through the prism of Polanyi's theory of the double movement, we can predict and already see that a counter-movement to neoliberal structures is indeed emerging. The same diagnosis that Polanyi gave at the beginning of twentieth century Europe also seems to apply today: "Precisely because not the economic but the social interests of different cross sections of the population were threatened by the market, persons belonging to various economic strata unconsciously joined forces to meet the danger".

Brown's prognosis is lacking because, in a Marxist vein, she is looking for a subject of resistance on the basis of class politics. Yet with the working class fragmented through decades of neoliberal restructuring of

Western societies, we would be disillusioned to expect a politics emerge along class lines at this point in the counter-movement. As the recent rise in the electoral performance of populist movements and parties in Europe testifies, resistance to (neo)liberal elites and structures has come on the back of a coalition of varied social groups, from the unemployed to the traditional working class, and from the middle classes to small business owners. In the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and slow economy recovery under continuing neoliberal governmentality, right-wing populist parties capitalised on the social issues of immigration and refugees, while left-wing populists focused on the issue of growing socio-economic inequality. If it seemed that resistance and critique were becoming futile under neoliberal governmentality according to Brown's analysis, the rise of populism in Europe and the United States after 2015 gives a different impression.

To sum up, the genealogy of liberal governmentality and its crises, as conceptualised by Foucault in his Collège de France lectures, helped us focus our analysis on the structural effects of liberal ideas on society and the economy from the end of eighteenth century onwards. Rather than limiting the study of liberalism to the formal political sphere, by conceptualising liberalism as a governmentality I wanted to show how understanding its social and economic effects through history can help us explain the contemporary crisis that liberalism and liberal democracy are facing in the West. While Foucault's genealogical approach was helpful in mapping out the transformations of modern state governance according to the liberal idea of self-regulating markets, it still could not tell us how crises of liberalism come about. Polanyi's theory of the double movement and his more economic sociological approach, on the other hand, provide more detail on the underlying social forces and the social effects of liberal governmentality in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The key message here is that the great transformation that Western societies have undergone in the twentieth century and the emergence of popular government came as a result of the dialectics between liberal governmentality and the counter-forces at the level of social and political movements. What we today understand as liberal democracy is in fact the minimalised version of the democratic welfare state (and mixed economy) that the democratic backlash against liberalism produced in the aftermath of the Great Depression.

The emergence of neoliberal governmentality in the West has meant the gradual rescinding of the democratic structures that have kept capital and market forces within national bounds. This has entailed the repro-

gramming of the democratic state's role in society and the economy, further weakening its institutional mechanisms in relation to market actors. Yet, while many scholars have proclaimed the demise of the nation state in the age of increasing global integration, historical analysis that I provide in this chapter and the political developments in the West in recent years point to the contrary. The hollowing out of democracy and the state institutions that we have seen in the last few decades has come about as a direct result of political decisions, often by electoral backing, and policies under neoliberal governmentality. As I will show in Chap. 6, if the early 2000s alter-globalisation movement in the West has been directed at the global institutions as the main culprits of neoliberal restructuring and rising socio-economic inequality, the post-2011 protest movements have taken the national elites and governments as their main targets. The rise of populism in the mid-2010s signals a further strengthening of popular sovereignty and a potential repoliticisation of the democratic state against the market forces.

As societies become more fragmented through competition and as responsibility for impoverishment becomes individualised/privatised, the prospect of resistance and construction of an alternative governmentality seem limited. How do political and resisting subjectivities even emerge in a system where most political forces are still wedded to the neoliberal project and protest is viewed as a useless waste of a citizen's time? These questions present profound challenges for the radical politics of social movements and the populist left-wing parties that want to challenge neoliberal governmentality through mechanisms of institutional politics. The question that remains here is what venues are there to construct a radical political project to counter further neoliberalisation of the West. While the structural analysis of liberalism in this chapter demonstrates how the establishment of a self-regulating market had negative effects for social stability and welfare, propelling into action a dynamic counter-movement for the democratisation of economic and political structures and protection of human and natural life, it does not explain the power dynamics of resistance in relation to established power structures under neoliberal governmentality, nor how exactly resistant subjectivities emerge in a crisis. While the question of the dynamics between resistance and institutional politics will be dealt with in Chap. 5, the question of resistance in times of crisis will be undertaken in Chap. 4.

My analysis in Chap. 4 will suggest that collective resistance can emerge through an alignment of a set of specific circumstances, which create a

favourable environment for fostering resistant subjectivities. It will try to understand how resistance can emerge in the context of further marketisation of society under neoliberal governmentality. The concept of crisis will be used as an analytical framework, which will help elucidate both the conceptual conditions for the emergence of resistance, as well as provide the contextual understanding of the structural constraints, which might limit it. The key motivation in the next chapter will be to provide productive venues for thinking the possibility of rupture with the systemic logic of neoliberal governmentality. I will analyse the concept of crisis through three different conceptual routes: crisis as critique, crisis as temporality, and crisis as trauma. In this way, I want to explore the transformative potential of crisis for radical politics.

NOTES

1. Several authors have written on the convergences between Gramsci and Foucault (Kenway 1990; Smart 1999 and 2002; Daldal 2014; Kreps 2015), as well as Gramsci in relation to Polanyi (Birchfield 1999; Burawoy 2003, Burawoy 2014; Bond 2005).

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Crisis: Critique, Temporality, and Trauma

The latest financial and economic crisis created a political opportunity for new strategic openings for resistance against neoliberal governmentality. In the unfolding of the crisis, the field for challenging the dominant political economic order opened up as the neoliberal policies and the blind faith in free markets came under fire. So far, I have shown that crises of governmentality arise as a result of dialectical processes between the depoliticisation of democratic governance and the concurrent liberalisation of market activity on the one hand, and the counter-movement on the other, which through resistance and challenge to the depoliticised and restricted venues for political participation repoliticise issues, spaces, and discourse, putting forward the conditions for a counter-hegemonic narrative. My argument in this chapter will be that this repoliticisation requires a favourable alignment of circumstances in order to allow for "the process [of] disseminating more broadly generative critiques of neoliberalized capitalism" (Brenner et al. 2010, 341). The Global Recession presented one such alignment of conditions, yet, as some authors have pointed out, the emergence of counter-movements came with some delay (Hessel 2010; Žižek 2011; Wilson 2014; della Porta 2015).

This delay in the emergence of mass protests against the elected officials and bailed out banking system can be understood in light of the entrenched depoliticisation of public spaces and democratic politics, which took hold under neoliberal governmentality. As market principles of competition and

entrepreneurship seep through the social fabric of communities and reconfigure the modes of conduct of citizens, the possibility for resistance is gravely restricted, despite the favourable temporality of the crisis. The alienation of the masses from developing a critical sense of the structural constraints on their conduct and their class interests has long been a subject of discussion in Marxian critique of mass society and culture, spanning from the Frankfurt School and critical theory to cultural studies. Critical theorists, such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, argued that popular culture manipulated the masses into political apathy and passivity by cultivating false psychological needs and deflecting "attention from the systemic sources of life problems" (Dunn 2008, 35). In her book *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt talked of the rise of the social in her critique of the modern age, by which she meant that "society expects from each of its members a certain kind of behavior, imposing innumerable and various rules, all of which tend to 'normalize' its members, to make them behave, to exclude spontaneous action or outstanding achievement" (Arendt 1958, 40). This biopolitical process, which Foucault ascribed to the development of (neo)liberal governmentality, led to the fragmentation of social relations, increasing individualism and glorification of private life, transforming the political character of public spaces and citizens into consumers of capitalist goods.

In view of this increasing depoliticisation of subjectivities and interpersonal relations under neoliberal governmentality, the delay in the emergence of mass protest movements against neoliberalism in the wake of the global financial crisis should not come as a surprise. The marketisation of societies and individuals complicates the favourable alignment of circumstances for the generation of general critique and the eruption of resistance in moments of crisis. In this chapter, I will use the notion of crisis as an analytical venue to explore this very alignment of the conditions conducive to resistance and the possibility of rupture with neoliberal governmentality. In particular, I will argue that the alignment of critique, trauma, and temporality in a crisis are the necessary conditions for the emergence of resistant subjectivities.

I will first offer a brief overview of the way scholars in different fields of social sciences conceive of crisis. I will then proceed to probing the conceptual relation between crisis and critique, inspecting whether the moment of crisis represents a favourable ground for the generation and dissemination of critique of hegemonic practices and whether the alignment of these two elements can lead to the emergence of resistance. In the

following section, I will examine how a crisis is discursively constructed as a specific event and managed by the hegemonic logic of neoliberal governmentality. This will explain how the discursive prolongation of the crisis normalised the general material suffering caused by neoliberal governmental responses to the crisis and pacified resistance to it. The last part of the chapter proposes to explore the effects of trauma and socio-political violence experienced by those most affected by the marketisation of society under neoliberal governmentality as a possible third element in the alignment of circumstances for the emergence of resistance.

A Brief Analysis of Conceptions of Crisis

Depending on the scholarly discipline, we can find various levels and degrees of theorisation of crisis. In organisational management and business studies, intra-institutional crises are the focus of much scholarly work, with the emphasis on the identification and assessment of threats and the devising of institutional strategies to cope with organisational crises. Within this wider field, a subfield of crisis communication and risk management studies developed in the 1980s as a result of a series of large-scale crises (Choo and Bontis 2002; Venette 2008; Ulmer et al. 2010; Gilpin and Murphy 2008). The working definition of a crisis that we can find in a recent publication in crisis management studies reads as follows:

> An organizational crisis is a specific, unexpected, and nonroutine event or series of events that create high levels of uncertainty and simultaneously present an organization with both opportunities for and threats to its high-priority goals. (Ulmer et al. 2010, 7)

Characteristics, such as "unexpected", "uncertain", and "non-routine" offer some generic descriptors of what a crisis is, yet the theorisation of the concept does not go much further than this in crisis management and organisational studies. As argued by Robert L. Heath, attempts to understand crises by scholars in this field are more driven by the managerial logic "to avoid, mitigate, and respond in ways that best protect capital and human resources" (Heath 2012, 1). The key concerns animating the mainstream of the literature are problems such as preserving the public image and reputation of corporations, and maintaining a good level of risk management and damage mitigation. Besides using a fairly descriptive understanding of crisis, crisis management studies rely heavily on various

rational choice models of decision-making, which are based on a schematic and simplified view of reality (Gilpin and Murphy 2008, 91). In these models, there is an underlying assumption that individuals "possess sufficient information and imagination to evaluate every alternative course of action in every conceivable combination of circumstances" (Congleton 2004, 184–5). Furthermore, the neglect of ignorance and surprise is still prevalent in mainstream economics, which limits the scope of rational choice-based analysis in crisis management studies (Congleton 2011). Given the shortcomings of widely accepted economic rationalist assumptions in crisis management studies, namely about rationality, linearity, and factual certainties (Gilpin and Murphy 2008, 97), such an approach to understanding the concept of crisis does not offer much theoretical and conceptual insight into its very ontology for the purposes of my inquiry in this chapter.

Another area of studies which deals with the notion of crisis are international relations, where crisis is viewed as a situation which needs to be averted, managed, and solved in order to secure the normal functioning of structures and processes in place (Wolff and Yakinthou 2012). Crisis is seen as a conflict between two or more parties which needs to be resolved or at least managed in a way that will guarantee an institutional arrangement of countering potential violence. This conflict resolution approach also looks at politico-institutional processes and solutions, based on principles such as power-sharing, rule of law and socio-economic stability. As the name of this area of research indicates, conflict management mostly focuses on conflict-ridden situations or post-conflict societies. It does not, however, attempt to explore the wider systemic implications and reasons for the crisis. The aim of these studies is to manoeuvre a society in crisis in such a way so that it will fit back into the existing order of power relations.

The concept of "resilience" in human security studies serves a similar goal. Instead of promoting the conventional liberal internationalist tactic of intervening into a crisis from the outside, the resilience paradigm purports to put "the agency of those most in need of assistance at the centre, stressing a programme of empowerment and capacity-building" (Chandler 2012, 216). David Chandler ascribes the success of the resilience approach to "rescuing the credibility of military campaigns through evading and ameliorating the problems of legal accountability, moral legitimacy and political responsibility" (Chandler 2012, 225). Because of this guiding rationality, I group the resilience approach together with the wider field of

conflict management where the main aim stays the same: maintaining the existing order of power interests and structures by building "resilience", "risk aversion", and "capacities" to reinforce it. Conveniently conflated with the concept of resistance, the goal of resilience is not to empower endangered groups of people with autonomous agency, but to subject them to "the barest levels of meaning" (Evans and Reid 2014, 6). Resilience strategies, currently advocated by international agencies (e.g. see UNISDR 2015), are not about making "a political claim that demands any form of affirmative thinking; it is a purely reactionary impulse premised upon some survivability instinct that deems the nature of the political itself to be already settled" (Evans and Reid 2014, 6). The approach to crisis in international studies and in the resilience literature is still overly managerial and strategic, foreclosing a more conceptual analysis of the notion.

Alongside the above orthodox institutional understandings of crisis, a more theoretically complex and heterodox conception can be found in Marxist economics. Whereas mainstream economics explain crises as contingent phenomena, which only arise as a result of external events and temporary disturbances of the equilibrium between supply and demand, Marxists see economic crises as "a normal part of the developmental tendencies of the capitalist mode of production" (Clarke 1994, 4). In Volume III of *Capital*, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels explain:

> The ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption of the masses as opposed to the drive of capitalist production to develop the productive forces as though only the absolute consuming power of society constituted their limit. (Marx and Engels 1959, 484)

Although the theory of crisis plays a central political and ideological role in the Marxist tradition, "nowhere in his own work does Marx present a systematic and thoroughly worked-out exposition of a theory of crisis" (Clarke 1994, 5). The above quotation and the theoretical observations on the "tendency of the rate of profit to fall, tendencies of overproduction, underconsumption, disproportionality and over-accumulation with respect to labour" in the work of Marx and Engels provide references to what could be understood as a Marxist theory of crisis, but there is no consistently developed theory of crisis in Marx and Engels' work (Clarke 1994, 5).

A conceptual historian, Reinhart Koselleck (2002, 242) describes classical economic models of crisis as "based on the equilibrium metaphorics of the eighteenth century", which he says we can never empirically confirm. These metaphorics include the conventional economic categories, such as supply and demand, production and consumption, circulation of money and circulation of goods, the balance between which, if disturbed, will lead to a manifestation of perturbations within the system. He sees the paradox of this doctrine in its progress-driven tendency: "a balance can only be preserved or regained when productivity increases steadily" (Koselleck 2002, 243):

> As Molinari, an economic theorist of the nineteenth century, said: "Every small or large progress possesses its crisis." That crises are the generators of progress seems to me to be a semantic model that has been confirmed up until now only in the spheres of economics, natural sciences, technology, and industry. … Proceeding from the semantic option, the question must be posed as to whether "progress" is the guiding concept for "crisis" or whether the iterative periodising concept of "crisis" is the true guiding concept under which "progress" is also subsumed. (Koselleck 2002, 243)

Relating this quotation to the political and ideological underpinnings of Marxism, the distinctiveness of the Marxist approach to a theory of crisis, compared to mainstream economics, is that the contradictory foundations of capitalism can only be resolved through intense class struggle, not reform (Clarke 1994, 7). But as Koselleck's quotation above points out, Marxist understandings of crisis are still based on the general equilibrium theory and the idea of progress, which can only be achieved by the complete overhaul of these contradictions and the transition to socialism. Polanyi's concluding observations in *The Great Transformation* were beleaguered by a similar teleological reasoning when he argued that "[s]ocialism is, essentially, the tendency inherent in an industrial civilization to transcend the self-regulating market by consciously subordinating it to a democratic society" (Polanyi 2001, 242). As I have shown in Chap. 3, contrary to Polanyi's optimistic prognosis, economic liberalism and free market economics did return to dominate economic governance even in advanced industrial democracies, through the electoral support of the working class amongst others.

A key assumption underlying the Marxist teleological reasoning behind the inevitable progressive transition to socialism is that the contradictory

and crisis-driven nature of capitalist production leads to capitalism's inevitable self-destruction. In his book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Joseph Schumpeter famously challenged Marx's predication of capitalism's eventual breakdown through internal crises. He argued that the capitalist order instead "incessantly revolutionizes the economic structure *from within*, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one" (Schumpeter 2010, 73). This is because a crisis, according to the capitalist rationality, is not only an unnecessary disturbance to the normal functioning of the system, but also an opportunity to improve itself by exploring new areas of life where profit accumulation can be extended further. As Marx and Engels themselves observed in the defeat of the revolutionary movements of 1848, the return of prosperity after a period of crisis eroded the conditions for the emergence of the proletariat as an independent political force in that historical period (Clarke 1994, 96).

When we look at the 2008 financial crisis, "[c]an we indeed speak of a crisis of capitalism as such at this point" (Lebowitz 2009, 132)? Lebowitz quotes Marx and Engels (1959, 249) when they speak about the contradiction of capitalist production: "The crises are always but momentary and forcible solutions of the existing contradictions. They are violent eruptions which for a time restore the disturbed equilibrium." When we compare the latest financial crisis with this description, it does not seem to fit the "momentary" temporal element that a crisis is said to have. Yet, we can observe a familiarity in the point that it erupted unexpectedly and violently and that it managed to restore "the disturbed equilibrium", or at least a semblance of it. Are we therefore talking about just another crisis in capitalism or a crisis of capitalism, and more importantly, does it even matter? Regardless of whether we take the orthodox Marxist view on general cataclysmic crises or "the permanently contradictory and crisis ridden character of capitalist accumulation" (Clarke 1994, 285–6) as our basis for a Marxist theory of crisis, the last few decades and the latest financial crisis have shown the persistent survival of capitalism and thus undermined the teleological trajectory envisioned by Marxist accounts of the imminent implosion of capitalism as a result of its internal contradictions.

As I have argued in Chap. 3, there is no such thing as a single logic of capital and its accumulation as the main "determinant in the history of capitalism" (Foucault 2008, 164). By understanding the emergence of neoliberal governmentality as a product of "institutional and consequently economic transformations", we still have "a capitalism with its singularity"

historically and analytically speaking, yet the emphasis is on the role of institutions and ideas shaping capitalism. Coupled with Polanyi's theory of the double movement, we can anticipate that the emerging counter-movements against the renewed extension of marketisation might provoke another crisis of governmentality, opening up a field of possibilities for resistance, but it is not exactly clear what the link between crisis and the possibility of resistance is at the subjective level. What provokes subjectivities to resist in times of crisis? Is there anything particular to the crisis as an extraordinary temporal opening in continuous normality of things that instigates a critical attitude and resistance in subjects? Is the traumatic experience coming from socio-political violence of the crisis enabling or disabling towards the emergence of resistance in traumatised subjectivities? And what role does the discursive construction of the crisis by the systemic logic of neoliberal governmentality play in impeding the mobilisation of resistance against the power structures responsible for the crisis?

For the rest of the chapter, I will focus more specifically on the conceptual relationship between a crisis and political resistance at the subject level. By offering an alternative reflection on the concept of crisis through the exploratory routes of the relationship between crisis and critique, crisis as eventuality and trauma in a crisis, I will demonstrate how under the alignment of specific conditions a crisis can lead to the politicisation of subjectivities against neoliberal governmentality. Drawing upon political theory, discourse analysis, and psychoanalysis, I will offer an alternative inter-disciplinary approach to thinking crisis and resistance, compared to the approaches reviewed earlier. Instead of conceptualising crisis in a way that aims to manage and control it, in what follows, the three lines of analysis will demonstrate how a crisis can radically challenge the dominant order.

CRISIS AND CRITIQUE

In her essay "The Crisis in Education" first published in 1958, Arendt (2006, 171) describes crisis as "the opportunity … to explore and inquire into whatever has been laid bare of the essence of the matter". This very opportunity presents itself in the tearing away of façades and obliterating the prejudices. The time of crisis is the time for questions—we are forced to ask questions and provide "new or old answers, but in any case direct judgements" (Arendt 2006, 171). If and when crisis turns into a disaster, Arendt continues, it is when we do not pause and think about our

past practices and ways of thinking, but continue (re)acting with "pre-formed judgements" (Arendt 2006, 171). By asking new questions, the construction of critique starts by the laying bare of essence and the tearing away of the façades of the conventional. This exercise marks the moment of suspension of the old and of the taken-for-granted, and it is in this state of suspension that crisis and the effect of critique reveal significant conceptual commonality. As Janet Roitman explains, crisis and critique share the same etymological root in the Ancient Greek term *krinô*, meaning "to separate, to choose, cut, to decide, to judge" (Roitman 2009): "Crisis is at the basis of social and critical theory insofar as it signifies the dissonance between morality and progress, knowledge and interests, and the limits of intelligibility" (Roitman 2009).[1] Like the effect of crisis, Judith Butler adds that critique is "precisely a practice that not only suspends judgment …, but offers a new practice of values based on that very suspension" (Butler 2001).

The suspension of judgement, however, appears to be a point of contention when comparing Arendt's conception of crisis with that of Judith Butler's. Here we need to ask how exactly a judgement is suspended in critique: are the very forms of intelligibility in need of reformulating, as in requiring alternative ways of thinking, or is the capacity of making a judgement, using the same old forms of intelligibility, just momentarily suspended? Turning to Theodor W. Adorno, Butler explains that "the very operation of judgment serves to separate the critic from the social world at hand, a move which deratifies the results of its own operation" (Butler 2001). Furthermore, "[j]udgments operate as ways to subsume a particular under an already constituted category, whereas critique asks after the occlusive constitution of the field of categories themselves" (Butler 2001). Such a formulation of critique juxtaposes judgement-making in a binary opposition to critique, as if from some pure and non-judgemental position. It also suggests that critique involves a certain performative gesture of drawing a line or a distance between oneself as the critic and the social reality that is being evaluated. Butler, indeed, acknowledges that in this gesture there is a danger that the critic makes a claim to a more profound knowledge of the object. However, formulating the performance of a critical gesture as removed from judgement-making is misleading. I would contend that the drawing of a distance between the critic and the object should be understood as merely conceptual, a performative-reflective gesture as the critic cannot remove herself from her situated position and from the forms of intelligibility available to her.

Going back to Arendt, we will notice that she makes a distinction between *old* and *new* judgements, which could illuminate Butler's understanding of judgement. In contrast to Butler's disapproving view of judgements, Arendt does not dismiss them. In time of crisis, it is clear that, for Arendt, we are required to make "direct judgements", either in the form of "new or old answers" (Arendt 2006, 171). Old answers, in Arendt's language, are "preformed judgements" or "prejudices", which, if they constitute our response to the crisis in question, can lead to "a disaster" (Arendt 2006, 171):

> One of the reasons for the power and danger of prejudices lies in the fact that something of the past is always hidden within them. Upon closer examination, we realize that a genuine prejudice always conceals some previously formed judgement which originally had its own appropriate and legitimate experiential basis, and which evolved into a prejudice only because it was dragged through time without its ever being reexamined or revised. (Arendt 2005, 101)

We could argue that when Butler speaks of judgements, she has the old, preformed judgements in mind, which are tightly knit into the prevailing constellations of power. The "rush to 'judgement'", Butler (2001) maintains, impedes our critical capacities from exposing these constellations of power. In other words, judgement-making, for Butler, is nothing other than fitting "a particular" situation, event or occurrence into "an already constituted category". It is like using "old answers" in a new (critical, in our case) situation. What is especially peculiar in Butler's understanding of judgement, and the way she separates it from the "praxis" of critique, is the non-performative view of it. Even when we rush to judgements, this practice does not only entail using and (statically) repeating closed up sets of signifiers. In this gesture, there is also the unpredictability of performing this rushing to judgements, the potentiality of judgements being dislocated or misplaced in the very act of *rushing* to them. Formulation of judgements involves an act of decision-making, which implies a point of certain closure or certainty. What is suspended, thus, in a time of crisis, are not judgements or judgement-making, but the signifiers or interpretive categories that make up those judgements. The hierarchy or positioning among them is disrupted, dislocated, and the role of critique is to perceive and find these points of dislocation.

Roitman offers an apposite view when she formulates the role of critique as working through a paradox, that is, "through the commitment to

obstinately demonstrate the paradox of power, or the necessary exclusions (the Other, non-sovereigns) that expose the foundations of power to be contingent suppositions" (Roitman 2009). What is interesting in Roitman's exposition of the paradox is the way it illuminates the distinction between old and new judgements discussed earlier. To illustrate the concept of paradox, she cites an analytic philosopher of science and logic, W. V. Quine, stating that a paradox is an antinomy that "produces a self-contradiction by accepted ways of reasoning. It establishes that some tacit and trusted pattern of reasoning must be made explicit and henceforward be avoided or revised" (Quine 1966, 7). These self-contradictions in turn represent points of "crises in thought" (Quine 1966, 7) which "are seen to be the bases for critique" (Roitman 2009). Following from this, we can argue that it is our critical attitude that cuts through the accepted ways of reasoning or old judgements and which exposes the contradictions lying underneath. This, in turn, opens up "the formal possibility of crisis" which "drives dialectical methods typical to social science narrative" (Roitman 2009).

In his essay *What is Critique?*, Foucault (1997, 24–5) defines critique as "the art of not being governed like that and at that cost" (Foucault 1997, 29). Foucault (1997, 25) maintained that "critique only exists in relation to something other than itself". As such, it represents "a certain way of thinking, speaking and acting, a certain relationship to what exists, to what one knows, to what one does, a relationship to society" that is distinguished from all other types of critiquing—he called this "critical attitude as virtue in general" (Foucault 1997, 24–5). This formulation of critique adds another dimension to our understanding of crisis and critical subjectivity in that it defines the positionality of the critic in relations to existing structures and relations of power:

> [I]f governmentalization is indeed this movement through which individuals are subjugated in the reality of a social practice through mechanisms of power that adhere to a truth, well, then! I will say that critique is the movement by which the subject gives himself the right to question truth on its effects of power and questions power on its discourses of truth. Well, then!: critique will be the art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability. Critique would essentially insure the desubjugation of the subject in the context of what we would call, in a word, the politics of truth. (Foucault 1997, 32)

Critique can therefore also be understood in the practical sense as a movement, a sustained gesture that challenges and questions the "discourse

of truth" in confrontation with established authorities and normalities. It necessitates the awareness of one's own knowledge and its limitations—this nourishes a critical autonomy that allows the critic to decide what or who they will obey (Foucault 1997, 35–6). Such conception of critique stems from what Foucault viewed as Immanuel Kant's "two great critical traditions which divide modern philosophy" (Foucault 1997, 99). Foucault maintained that Kant operated in both of these traditions. He posited the two sides as two forms of the question Kant posed himself about his own actuality: "What is *Aufklärung*?" and "What is Revolution?" (Foucault 1997, 97–8). The first one, the "analytic of truth" as Foucault (1997, 99) termed it, is transcendental in that it is concerned with: (1) the search for formal structures that have universal value; (2) the goal of making a metaphysics possible (Foucault 1997, 125); and (3) developing the autonomy and the authority of knowledge through different forms of rationality and techniques. The other critical tradition is preoccupied with ruptures, upheavals in history, our actuality and "the present field of possible experiences" (Foucault 1997, 99–100). It is this second critical tradition that Foucault positioned his work in:

> The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression… This entails an obvious consequence: that criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. (Foucault 1997, 125)

To illustrate the points made, we can use the examples of the 2011 England riots and the Occupy Wall Street as two instances of such practical critique that took the form of a transgression and clearly expressed a critical attitude of "not being governed quite like that". The taking to the streets during the riots in London and other major cities in England during the summer of 2011 signified a moment of suspension of judgement and something that resembled a temporary state of anarchy. Compared to Occupy Wall Street, the methods and practices used were quite different. Whereas during the England riots, the main means of expression were violence and destruction of property, Occupy Wall Street was more geared towards the deliberative practice of questioning old judgements in the pursuit of new ones. The critical attitude in the riots remained in its transgressive stage and

failed to move over to a deliberative stage of critique, which uses the moment of suspension of old judgements as the basis for finding new sets of values and norms that govern our conduct.

While both marked a point of transgression and a critical attitude to the accepted ways of acting and governing, they both failed to have a more permanent effect on established structures of power under neoliberal governmentality. What therefore is needed for critical practices to have a more permanent effect in times of crisis? In her analysis of Immanuel Kant's understanding of critique, Kimberly Hutchings (1996, 26) points us to a useful distinction between two types of judgement: *determinate* and *reflective*. Determinate judgement is concerned with subsuming particular instances under a general rule, whereas reflective judgement signifies an exploration of a particular in which there is no given rule, since reflective judgement does not rely on anything outside itself and as such "legislates for itself" (Hutchings 1996, 23). Moreover, Hutchings reminds us that Kant's critique of reason had the purpose of avoiding "twin dangers", unfounded dogmatism on the one hand, and scepticism towards the ability of attaining certainty, on the other (Hutchings 1996, 12). The reflective type of critique can be related back to Foucault's view of critique as not being governed as such, where the critical practice signifies a performative gesture of suspending old forms of judgement. In order to challenge the dominant systems and rationalities of thought and practices, scepticism towards established forms of knowledge is a welcome faculty in times of social crisis. There comes a point in crisis, however, when determinate claims need to be set to ground the foundations of new systems of thinking. So, while on the one hand crisis marks a suspension of "accepted ways" of reasoning, critique as a faculty of judging, to have longer lasting consequences, eventually needs to cut through these at some point. The practice of critique in times of crisis thus necessitates a transition from reflective judgement to determining judgement. There is something decisive going on in this critical act of cutting through old systems of thinking, something that intermits the suspension provoked by the crisis.

If we follow Jacques Derrida, the *suspens-ion* is the very condition of a decision: "Without the opening of an absolutely undetermined possible, without the radical abeyance and suspense marking a *perhaps*, there would never be either event or decision" (Derrida 2005, 67). Especially in critical moments, "nothing takes place and nothing is ever decided without suspending the *perhaps* while keeping its living possibility in living memory" (Derrida 2005, 67). The notion of "judgement" is often associated with

rationality, reason, being rational, but when put against Derrida's theorising of "decision", that decision "cannot be deduced from a form of knowledge of which it would simply be the effect, conclusion, or explicitation" (Derrida 1995, 77). The rationalist conception of judgement becomes distorted; a decision, or a judgement for that matter, "structurally breaches knowledge" (Derrida 1995, 77). To explicate the point further, for Derrida:

> the decisive or deciding moment of responsibility supposes a leap by which an act takes off, ceasing in that instant to follow the consequence of what is – that is, of that which can be determined by science or consciousness - and thereby *frees itself* (this is what is called freedom), by the act of its act, of what is therefore heterogeneous to it, that is knowledge. *In sum, a decision is unconscious* – insane as that may seem, it involves the unconscious and nevertheless remains responsible. (Derrida 2005, 69)

A similar insight can be identified in Carl Schmitt's work where he theorises juristic decisions. Schmitt talks of "a moment of indifference" and "the circumstance that requires a decision" as "an independently determining moment" (Schmitt 1985, 30)—"the decision emanates from nothingness" (Schmitt 1985, 32). Schmitt's decisionism, however, is resolutely opposed by Derrida, who contra Schmitt maintains that the subjectivity of the subject cannot pretend to fully control the performing of a decision. The very conditions of suspension and undecidability make a decision proper—in other words, we could say there is nothing sovereign in/about a decision. In Schmitt's theory of exception and sovereignty, there is still this "classic, free, and wilful subject, therefore a subject to whom nothing can happen" (Derrida 2005, 68). This unconditional permanence of the subject's identity, even against the singularity of the "event for which he [the subject] believes to have taken and kept the initiative" (Derrida 2005, 68), is what Derrida thoroughly refutes. As Yusuke Miyazaki succinctly summarises: "… the decision is precisely an event that goes beyond the possibilities determined by my intension [*sic*.] or anticipation" (Miyazaki 2011, 150). If my decision simply followed what Derrida (1992, 25) calls the "subjectal axiomatic", "the egological assumption that pretends to subjectively control the fundamental eventuality" (Miyazaki 2011, 150), its operative uneventuality would not deserve the name "decision".

In making a decision, one takes a leap outside of oneself, of what constitutes one's subjectivity. Jack Reynolds (2004b, 84) sees this moment as

"an undecidable leap beyond all prior preparations" and "rational calculations" (Reynolds 2004a, 50). Being decisive also means being courageous, having the courage to take a decision. We could say a decision is not truly genuine if it is entirely based on rational calculating, the weighing of pros and cons. A decision "can never be wholly justified" (Reynolds 2004a, 50) and hence it invokes "that which is outside of the subject's control (Reynolds 2004b, 85). The moment of suspense is at the same time a moment of surprise:

> Certainly the decision makes the event, but it also neutralizes this happening that must surprise both the freedom and the will of every subject – surprise, in a word, the very subjectivity of the subject, affecting it wherever the subject is exposed, sensitive, receptive, vulnerable and fundamentally passive, before and beyond any decision – indeed, before any subjectivation or objectivation. (Derrida 2005, 68)

Such an understanding of decision- or judgement-making is clearly in contravention with the dominant liberal conception of the fully conscientious, autonomous/sovereign and rational decision-maker, which can have gratifying ramifications for the way we think decision-making in politics, especially in the current times of crisis. Let me end this part with Derrida's quote which will flow nicely into the following discussion of crisis as temporality: "not only must the person taking the decision not know everything… the decision, if there is to be one, must advance towards a future which is not known, which cannot be anticipated" (Derrida 2002, 231). To finalise this point, crisis is the marker that represents the field of the undecidable and only a critical practice of questioning authority and those governing can remodel the trajectory of reordering following a crisis. Judgement-making is an inseparable process of that, but it remains to be seen whether old answers are applied to newly resurfaced old problems, what Arendt was cautioning against, or a riskier practice of seeking new answers ensues. In the spirit of Horace's and Kant's call to *sapere aude*, "dare to know" (Hutchings 1996, 51), one's self-liberation can only be achieved through courage to use one's own critical faculties, to challenge and transgress the boundaries of accepted ways of thinking under the dominant governmental rationality.

This discussion demonstrates how a crisis in a given social system on its own does not necessarily, nor automatically, provoke resistance and pose a challenge to the dominant social order. The moment of suspension and undecidability that a crisis marks calls for a critical rethinking of the world

as we know it. It demands courage and audacity to critically interrogate old ways of thinking in order to respond to the urgency of a crisis. In my analysis, I threaded carefully between recognising the need for undecidable performative space and time in order for critical attitudes to the dominant order in crisis to mature, while at the same time emphasising that, due to the urgency of the crisis, the moment of undecidability needs to be interrupted at some point and an alternative systemic intelligibility constructed. It could be argued that the prolonged indulgence in this suspension by Occupy Wall Street was keeping the movement away from making critical decisions, when in fact the conditions of the situation urgently demanded the construction of an alternative systemic intelligibility. In the next section, I will clarify the strategic reasons for the viability of such a position. By identifying the ways in which a crisis is symbolically and discursively eventualised, I will expose the dynamics of the semantic struggle for power between competing political forces and demonstrate how the very use of crisis narrative can serve as a way for reaffirming the old systemic logic.

Crisis As an Event and Temporality

In this section, I will explore the question of what makes a crisis a marked eventuality in our imaginary and understanding of socio-political reality; how a crisis is different from other events; and what intelligible mechanisms enable the discursive formation of a crisis. The relation between the reflective/undecidable moment of suspension in a crisis and the moment of determination will be further explored to understand more fully the challenge for resistant practices to neoliberal hegemony. I will look at two different theorists who have theorised crisis and the notion of event in their work: (1) Michel Foucault's archaeological method will demonstrate how an event comes into being with his concept of eventualisation; and (2) Jacques Derrida's critique of the established narratives of the September 11 terrorist attacks will show how discursive eventualisation constructs a crisis and elucidate the dynamics of systemic logic. From the proposed trajectory of my analysis in this section, I will present the eventuality of an event in terms of the discursive formulation and the implications that it might have for the emergence of resistance. The example of the 2007–2008 financial crisis will be used to illustrate the practical application of the theoretical observations.

First of all, what distinguishes an event, a marked occurrence amongst many others, from a "non-event"? Is there a set of commonly agreed criteria which demarcates a crisis from the normality of daily social life? What are the characteristics that make a crisis so distinctly exhilarating and, at the same time, frightening? In order to understand how crisis becomes a *meaningful* temporal category (as opposed to a "non-event", an event that occurs but does not register as meaningful in the dominant collective imaginary), Foucault's notion of eventualisation (*événementialisation*) can be of help. By "this horrible word" (Foucault 1997, 59), Foucault understood "making visible a *singularity* at places where there is a temptation to invoke a historical constant, an immediate anthropological trait, or an obviousness which imposes itself uniformly on all" (Foucault 1991, 76). The purpose of this gesture of "a breach of self-evidence" (Foucault 1991, 76) is to expose the contingent and constructed underpinnings of things that appear obvious, normal, and self-evident. The methodology behind eventualisation is what Foucault calls the "procedure of causal multiplication". This procedure starts by "rediscovering the connections, encounters, supports, blockages, plays of forces, [and] strategies" which "at a given moment establish what subsequently counts as being self-evident, universal and necessary" (Foucault 1991, 76). In other words, eventualisation singles out a specific peculiarity out of apparent normality, both of which are constructed through discursive formation according to the principle of its articulation and the operators by "which the events are transcribed into statements" (Foucault 1972, 167). What I will be interested in this section is the "reverse" of what Foucault means by eventualisation, while the same archaeological practice is at work. Archaeology, in Foucault's terminology, is after all concerned with identifying discontinuities, ruptures, gaps, and sudden redistributions in the linear continuity of history (Foucault 1972, 169). Following from this, a crisis is one such discontinuity and the role of critical resistant subjectivities is to uncover the relations of power and knowledge that characterise its temporality.

In his discussion of the 11 September terrorist attacks with Giovanna Borradori, Derrida undertakes a similar enterprise of uncovering the selectivity and arbitrariness of an event as a discursive formation, while challenging the "apparent" immediacy of a marking event (Derrida in Borradori 2003, 86). Derrida maintains that the feeling of immediacy in an event is "less spontaneous than it appears" (Borradori 2003, 86). That is because the event is always already "conditioned, constituted, if not

actually constructed, circulated at any rate" (Borradori 2003, 86) by and through the channels of dominant structures of communication/representation. For an event to be marked, "something" needs to happen "for the first and last time" (Borradori 2003, 86). Derrida talks of "something" since the event, marked by and registered as a date, is that which we cannot grasp (fully) yet, something that we are trying to understand, to recognise and rationalise—in any case, it remains something that is "from here on in unforgettable: an ineffaceable event in the shared archive of a universal calendar, that is, a *supposedly* universal calendar" (Borradori 2003, 86). Ungraspable from the outset, yet still unforgettable, the event leaves an "impression" on us and we cannot think this impression without "all the affects, interpretations, and rhetoric that have at once reflected, communicated, and 'globalized' it" (Borradori 2003, 88). In addition to the impression that an event leaves on us, Derrida also identifies an experience of trauma in the unravelling of an event: "any event worthy of this name, even if it is a 'happy' event, has within it something that is traumatizing" (Borradori 2003, 97). This traumatic experience arises from the disturbance in the anticipated proceeding of the everyday which "inflicts a wound" in our being and sense of the world around us.

What Derrida found most problematic about the established conceptualisations of the 9/11 is the politicisation of this "major event" by the "predominant system" for geopolitical and strategic reasons, which was done through "an organized information machine (language, communication rhetoric, image, media, and so on)" (Borradori 2003, 88–9). In this way, "the impression" of 9/11, with its "affects, interpretations, and rhetoric", became globalised and established as an event with a "properly global effect" (Borradori 2003, 88). Derrida's problematisation of the 9/11 hegemonic representation demonstrates the discursive (the use of language and rhetoric following a particular politico-strategic rationality) utilisation of the affective (the impression left and trauma in/after the event) in line with particular geopolitical objectives. Furthermore, archaeological questioning of the 9/11's eventualisation as a major event challenges its "obviousness" and reveals the discursive (and affective) conditions for its formation.

What about occurrences that are not deemed worthy of being marked as an "event" (the occurrences that do not leave any impression behind or at least not on a significant enough scale to become unforgettable)? And how are some events more eventful than others? First of all, Derrida cautions us about the dominant registering of

events as significant occurrences, somehow more important than others that are for some reason left out. Whatever way the timeframe of analytical focus is set, talking about impactful events brings with it many exclusions: "it excludes whatever does not belong to the public, political, historical realms", Derrida (Borradori 2003, 74) notes. By implication, anything that goes beyond the gaze of the observer is also excluded, anything that "has its own rhythm", as Derrida puts it. Furthermore, Derrida argues that an event is "what comes and, in coming, comes to surprise me, to surprise and to suspend comprehension" (Borradori 2003, 89). Some occurrences surprise us, manage to surprise us, and others do not. In the age of an over-saturation with information and images, at least in those places of the globe which are inter-connected through the internet, smart phones, and other technologies, it is not surprising that some events go unnoticed, whereas others, with a more domineering publicity apparatus, get more prominent coverage.

Those occurrences which do not have "the visible outline, the theatrical form, or the official title of what people call *events*", the occurrences "which could be, or must have been, talked about" (Borradori 2003, 74) pass us by without being noticed. The generation of the theatrical effect is thus crucial for the eventuality of an event; without it, an event does not enter the mode of being appropriated, comprehended, recognised, described, determined, interpreted (Borradori 2003, 89), and is not called an event altogether. These non-eventualised occurrences that Derrida talks about happen in the shadows of registered events, "coups de théâtre"; they are either:

> … nonevents (for example the massive immobility in Eastern Europe or in Latin America, that which does not budge or gets worse in South Africa, etc.) *or* things that *come to pass without passing* onto the stage, without going through the filter of information or the codes of political discourse, without appearing under the title of "event". (Borradori 2003, 75)

Derrida's distinction between events and non-events[2] exposes the selective and political nature of eventualisation which comes to represent what we know as recorded human history from the viewpoint of the West. In addition, for there to be an event, "it must never be something that is predicted or planned, or even really decided upon", but something that causes surprise, has exposure and is unanticipatable (Derrida 2007, 441).

So while an event has to come as if out of the blue, which is its objective dimension, there is also a subjective element that involves an occurrence being perceived and registered by the dominant codes of political discourse and intelligibility. Applying this conceptualisation of an event to a crisis, similar eventualisation is at play. The 2008 financial crisis exhibited two out of the three key characteristics of what Derrida identifies as an event. The criterion of the unanticipatable in the latest financial crisis can be said to be unfulfilled as a number of critical economists have predicted the imminent end of the flagrant financial engineering and speculation that shook the global markets (see, e.g., Baker 2002; Beams 2004, 2007; Uco 2005; Foster and Magdoff 2009). Nonetheless, the financial crisis did come as a surprise to most of the general public and gained public exposure across the globe. The next difficulty that arises in the examination of its eventualisation is with determining the beginning of the financial crisis as an event. Who, what authority, or what criteria can be said to determine its beginning: was it the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008? Or even before, the BNP Paribas decision and the resulting liquidity crunch in the summer of 2007? *The Guardian*'s economics editor Larry Elliott hints towards the validity of the latter:

> Back then, though, there were few who imagined that 9 August 2007 would prove to be such a milestone in financial history. The Guardian carried the story on page 29 because there seemed no reason to believe this was different from previous bouts of jitters in the markets. It took a few days to work out what the bankers had been up to, because the "masters of the universe" had their own esoteric language. Talk of mortgage-backed securities, credit default swaps and over-the-counter derivatives was the equivalent of 12th century monks writing bibles in medieval Latin for peasants who only spoke English. Stripped of the jargon, it is now quite easy to see what happened. (Elliott 2012)

Or did the crisis really begin after the dominant surveillance authority over the international monetary and financial system, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), announced the beginning of a global recession in 2009? Bob Davis, senior editor at *The Wall Street Journal*, explains that depending on who the IMF's chief economist is at a given time determines the criteria for defining what marks a global recession. Only in 2009, apparently, did the IMF economists set down a more precise measurement for global recessions: a decline in real per-capita world GDP,

backed up by global macroeconomic indicators, such as industrial production, trade, capital flows, oil consumption, and unemployment (Davis 2009).

Regardless of the different interpretations and opinions about the starting point of the crisis, as there are so many, what is important to keep in mind when using the concept of crisis is the implied meaning in its conceptual structure, that a crisis is only "provisional, accidental" (Derrida 2002, 71) and thus a crisis is normally understood only as an exception, an exception to the normal order of things until the very moment the crisis erupts:

> It disturbs rules, laws, norms, but only *for a time*. One must suspect that this disorder affects what is essential (it is an essential accident!), but there must also be a reassuring belief in *rhythm*: "One can't do anything about it (you can't do anything about it!), but it's only a crisis. It's very serious but it will pass." (Derrida 2002, 71)

This is a key insight: a crisis is provisional and accidental, but only in relation to an order, an already existing order which for a moment at least, is perturbed by the unintelligibility of the crisis. Now, as I have already emphasised, the surprise of a crisis sets into motion the process of its eventualisation, in other words, a discursive and effective representation of the event by the dominant structures of meaning, and with respect to the latest financial crisis, these would be the global financial markets and institutions, governments, the experts. This is done through theatre-staging and use of rhetoric, Derrida argues. As in the puzzle above over the beginning of the financial crisis, it is worth interrogating who exactly is interested in representing the crisis, who is talking about it, and in view of what interests, "[b]y playing on what 'representations'" (Derrida 2002, 71). Derrida emphasises there is always at least one purpose behind the representation of crisis:

> to determine, so as to limit it, a more serious and more formless threat, one which is, in fact, faceless and normless. A monstrous threat but one that holds some desire in suspense: a threat to desire. By determining it as crisis, one tames it, domesticates it, neutralizes it – in short, one *economizes* it… [T]he unthinkable becomes the unknown to be known, one begins to give it form, one begins to inform, master, calculate, program. One cancels out a future. (Derrida 2002, 71)

It is in this sense that a crisis is unintelligible in relation to the dominant order, or neoliberal governmentality in our case. That order, following the surprise effect, will try to determine the crisis, limit its threat that the suspense of the crisis opens its way to. In doing so, it closes the field of experimental, unpredictable suspension that prompts alternative ways of representing the crisis and thus cancels the possibility of another future. This poses a challenge for imagining the possibility of resistance to neoliberalism and aims to block the construction of possible alternatives. The dominant discursive representation of the crisis at the time was that it was only a financial crisis, when in fact it could have also been constructed primarily as a crisis of free market capitalism. The operation of the hegemonic logic of neoliberal governmentality also means that the time frame for using the suspension of old ways of conduct as the mobilising factor for critique is limited. In this sense, the discussion from the previous section on crisis as the moment of critique comes full circle. At one instance a crisis represents a moment of suspension, of undecidability, of impossibility, but at another, this very suspension prompts our critical capacities to judge, to understand and to make a decision. As Derrida describes the binary situation:

> To be sure, decision is impossible here, but impossibility and powerlessness derive their critical sense only from the horizon of some awaited decision. *Krisis*: judgment, choice, decision. Crisis: a moment in which the *krisis* appears (is or is said to be) impossible, but in regard to an awaited *krisis*, to a necessary judgment, choice and decision between two terms. The crisis is not just any form of the incalculable; it is the incalculable as a *moment* of calculation, the undecidable that is still determined as the relation of a voluntary subject to a possible decision. (Derrida 2002, 71–2)

The very use of the term crisis presupposes the will, or a voluntarism, on the part of a subject to calculate the incalculable, to decide on the terrain of the undecidable. There would be no sense to speak of a crisis in a world where there is no "[c]ompetence, voluntarism, knowledge and know-how, mastery of a subject over present objects" (Derrida 2002, 72). This demonstrates the double nature of the discourse of crisis: in one sense it represents an accident to the dominant order, but in another it represents a strategic opportunity to control and programme a way out of it.

At the outset of a crisis, there is initially an "*essential* powerlessness or incompetence" that prevents us from "overcoming it for the moment", but after the disturbance "a powerful movement of auto-regulation of

world capitalism" sets in motion which induces "all the measures taken 'to get out of the crisis'" (Derrida 2002, 73). This auto-regulation, or the economy of the benefits of the crisis, as Derrida puts it, can explain the prolonged temporality of the latest financial crisis, which has over-stretched its conceptual condition of exceptionality. As the hegemonic logic of neo-liberal governmentality works to overcome the hurdles of momentary systemic disturbance and master the crisis, the window of opportunity for counter-resistance and the general dissemination of anti-systemic critique starts to close. This struggle between the extra-institutional resistance and the organisational logic of the dominant order merits its own discussion and will be expounded upon in Chap. 5.

If the crisis was still ongoing seven years in, what marked the eventual exit from it? When looking over the past dominant policy responses that have been used by governments and politicians to solve the financial crisis, they can be generally categorised as geared towards saving the banking system through public bank bailouts and as fiscally conservative in terms of limiting the governmental spending for the provision of public goods and services, for instance, through austerity measures to balance budget deficits and public spending, and neoliberal structural reforms to reshape societies along the market principles of competition. The duration of the current crisis stretched out this concept so far that it had gradually become normalised and, we could say, lost its original meaning along the way. As was demonstrated earlier with different interpretations as to when the crisis began, the very act of naming and announcing a crisis is politically conditioned and articulated in order to serve the interests of the financial power structures. The narrative of crisis was prolonged for as long as it took to reorder society in such a way as to restore confidence in the rule of the political and economic elites (Wolf 2014). Marx and Engels made a similar point when they established that the return of prosperity after a period of crisis erodes the conditions for the emergence of the proletariat as an independent countervailing political force. But before this point of restored perception of economic stability is reached, for example, through recovered economic growth and increasing employment figures, is there still not an opening for change on the subjective level? As I argued in Chap. 3, the liberalisation of the market activity provokes a counter-movement by those affected by the socially destructive policies of market liberalisation. Cannot the trauma that affects the ordinary people in a time of crisis act as an opening for the cultivation of critical and resisting subjectivities?

A time of crisis represents a wakeup call, and to echo Arendt, a time to ask questions, to question the existing order that is suddenly in crisis. This leads me to the next section where I will be interested in the potentiality of change stimulated by the traumatic experience that a crisis can provoke. As it became clear through the discussion of Foucault's eventualisation and Derrida's understanding of the event, crisis as a temporal category entails an element of surprise and unpredictability. It is an event that is not foreseen in advance, but which strikes as if out of the blue. It leaves a mark, an impression which has traumatic implications for the subjects witnessing it. There is a complex process at hand where the dominant modes of representation are trying to make sense of the crisis and articulate a "sensible" narrative that will fit back into the normal order of things. At the subjective level, there is an internal struggle between the elusive and untamed traumatic experience on the one hand and our attempts at rationalising the unexpected occurrence, which represents the ground of possibility for change and resistance. Unless we throw more light on this antagonism between the prickling trauma and possibility of resistance, we cannot fully understand if and how resistant subjectivities can be borne out of crisis.

Crisis As Trauma and the Possibility of Resistance

Going back to Derrida, an event "always inflicts a wound in the everyday course of history, in the ordinary repetition and anticipation of all experience" (Derrida in Borradori 2003, 96). I will explore more closely this infliction of the wound that an event such as a crisis leaves behind. As I have already mentioned, there is an element of surprise and the unexpected in the event of a crisis which distorts our anterior understanding of and coping with reality. Drawing upon the formulation of the occurrence of a crisis as an infliction of a wound, this section of the chapter will use the notion of trauma as an analytical device to understand the connection between the subjective level of experiencing a crisis and the social experience, while keeping in mind the underlying research question of this chapter, namely, how critical resistance emerges in a crisis.

In his book *The Lacanian Left*, Yannis Stavrakakis (2007, 69–70) describes the moment of crisis as a resurgence of the political: "[a] moment which takes the form of rupture, crisis, dislocation and leads to new attempts at discursive stabilisation, to new discursive constructions, ideologies, political discourses, social movements and practices." The political,

as for many other contemporary political theorists (Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Jean Luc-Nancy, Slavoj Žižek, Jacques Rancière amongst others), here represents a rupture or an intervention into the dominant political order. Stavrakakis likens the moment of the political to a *real* or the negative in psychoanalytical theory. The unrepresentability of the real dislocates our positive subjective and objective realities which are dominated by the *symbolic* field of configuration. The symbolic, or what we understand as our socio-political reality, tries to master this real, reduce it, neutralise it, calculate it and programme it into its dominant register of discursive construction of reality. From this angle, a crisis represents a moment of the political, disturbing our sense of identity and reality, whereas the symbolic signifies attempts at representing the unanticipated moment of crisis, similar to how I described Derrida's understanding of eventualisation of crisis earlier. Following a Žižekian re-reading of Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytic theory, Stavrakakis notes that two "distinct orders of the phenomena" are taking place in the dialectics of the political and socio-symbolic reality: one is the subjective level where our identities are destabilised by the real, the other is the objective level, with the existing social order being displaced and reconfigured (Stavrakakis 2007, 70). Following from this, two important questions need to be addressed in more depth for the purpose of this chapter: (1) the first is whether a traumatic experience is wholly destructive, leaving behind nothing but a destroyed subject(ivity) and narrative construction, or is trauma also a potential opening for the construction of something productive; (2) the second concerns the possibility of extrapolating the psychoanalysis of trauma to the level of society.

The word "trauma" comes from Greek, and it literally means a "wound". The etymology of the word originates from the verb *titrosko*, "to pierce" (Malabou 2012, 6). Catherine Malabou, whose approach is to combine the studies of the psyche and physiology in the discipline of neuropsychoanalysis, underlines that trauma can result both from a physical injury or a psychical one. Acknowledging the organic/neurological element of trauma is the key point of departure (or rather a shift) for Malabou from the "properly psychoanalytic concept of trauma", which finds its origin in Freudian psychoanalysis (Malabou 2012, 6). The latter maintains that the "incidence of an organic lesion is incompatible with the development of a neurosis" because it is only secondary to the true endogenous cause of psychic trouble, which arises as a result of "a conflict between the ego and the sexual drives which it repudiates" (Malabou

2012, 6). Malabou rejects the primary ascription of external events, such as train accidents and war conflicts, to a sexual causality in Freud and underlines that in exogenous causes of trauma "the same *impact of the event* is at work, the same *economy of the accident*, the same relation between the psyche and catastrophe" (Malabou 2012, 11). Slavojc Žižek has the same problem with Freud's understanding of trauma:

> [W]hen confronted with such cases, he succumbs to the temptation to look for meaning: he is not ready to accept the direct destructive power of external shocks—they can destroy the psyche of the victim (or, at least, wound it in an irremediable way) without resonating with any inner traumatic truth. (Žižek 2011, 293)

Malabou and Žižek both agree that external shocks need not touch on some "pre-existing traumatic 'psychic reality'" (Žižek 2011, 293) to be the "efficient" cause of psychic trouble:

> [F]or Freud (and Lacan), every external trauma is "sublated," internalized, owing its impact to the way a pre-existing Real of "psychic reality" is aroused through it. Even the most violent intrusions of the external real … owe their traumatic effect to the resonance they find in perverse masochism, in the death drive, in unconscious guilt-feelings, and so on. Today, however, our socio-political reality itself imposes multiple versions of external intrusions, traumas, which are just that, brutal but meaningless interruptions that destroy the symbolic texture of the subject's identity. (Žižek 2011, 292)

The effects of trauma are radical and unforeseen, which adds to the intensity of a traumatic experience. Trauma disrupts the seemingly coherent narrative of our own subjectivity and provokes a crisis of our personal identity. Žižek names different types of traumatic interventions: from external physical violence, such as armed conflicts, street violence, and natural catastrophes, leaving damage to "the cerebral economy of the affects that hold together body and mind" (Malabou 2012, 9), to borrow Malabou's formulation, to "the destructive effects of socio-symbolic violence (such as social exclusion)" (Žižek 2011, 292). For the rest of the section, my main concern is with psychic disorganisation in situations of socio-symbolic or socio-political trauma.

As Malabou emphasises, "there is never a simple relation between the 'normal' interior of the psyche and the violent irruption of an unpredictable exterior" (Malabou 2012, 11). That is because socio-political trauma

"never occurs entirely by chance" and because every event "always derives, in one way or another, from an indivisible intimacy between the outside and the inside" (Malabou 2012, 11). The notion of trauma in this way offers a productive device to grasp the combined experience of the outside and the inside. After all, whether an experience is traumatic is determined by "the subjective interpretation of the events rather than its objective reality" (Quiros and Berger 2015, 152). Subjective experiences of systemic socio-political violence are often "not included in what is defined as trauma because the victims are typically oppressed groups and their voices are silenced by the universality of the White, middle-class, and heterosexual experience that dominates the treatment and research literature" (Quiros and Berger 2015, 152). So, whereas in the occurrence of a natural catastrophe there are commonly agreed upon criteria for determining the severity of its traumatic implications, systemic violence like poverty and social deprivation are not treated as seriously or urgently. The normality of socio-economic inequality and its traumatic implications for the oppressed groups can be explained by the interplay of material forces and political strategies discussed in the previous section that construct these social injustices as normal.

Having established the link between external events and their effects on the psyche of affected subjects, I will now explore the question of the severity of a traumatic experience on a subject's sense of self and the reality around them. Does a traumatic experience annihilate the whole of the before-existing subjectivity, or is there something that remains, "something on the order of a secret core of identity that resists the ordeal of trauma" (Malabou 2012, 69)? Quoting Freud, Malabou maintains that "no matter the extent of 'psychic modification,' the metamorphosis of identity is never total; or that every modification is, in fact, 'a change involving the same material and occurring in the same locality'" (Malabou 2012, 70). Following from this, trauma should be regarded as a trace which is imprinted on our psyche "like a heavy crypt" (Malabou 2012, 70). On the one hand, a traumatic experience produces a new subject, a stranger, but on the other hand:

> [w]hen Malabou insists that the subject who emerges after a traumatic wound is not a transformation of the old subject, but literally a new one, she is well aware that the identity of this new subject does not arise from a *tabula rasa*: many traces of the old subject's life-narrative survive, but they are totally restructured, torn out of their previous horizon of meaning and inscribed into a new context. (Žižek 2011, 308)

A post-traumatic subjectivity thus should not be viewed as an empty canvas that needs to be painted anew. A post-traumatic subject represents an embodiment of both the old sense of self and the new post-traumatic reality. To explain this paradox between the old and the new of the subject further, Malabou's concept of plasticity can be useful for comprehending the "flexibility" of our psyche/brain in a traumatic experience. For Malabou (2012, 58), plasticity is "a form's ability to be deformed without dissolving and thereby to persist throughout its various mutations, to resist modification, and to be always liable to emerge anew in its initial state". In the new post-traumatised subject, therefore, something of the old will always remain, which, for Malabou, demonstrates that there must be "a plastic relation, a supple link" between the creative and the destructive tendencies of neuronal plasticity (Malabou 2012, 69–70). The metamorphosis of identity in a traumatic experience is thus never total. External events, such as socio-political violence and the resulting trauma, have the power to alter the oppressed subject's conduct and emotions with serious repercussions, but there is always a remnant of the old subjectivity left after trauma. The plastic relation between the old and the new, the creative and destructive effects of trauma can in situations of socio-political violence instigate transformative change of identity. The question remains whether this change is amenable towards survivalist (self-)paralysis of the subject or self-reflected resistance against the conditions of socio-political oppression.

Echoing Žižek, can we not extrapolate the effects of trauma in the metamorphosis of identity onto the level of our socio-political reality to better understand moments of "radical historical breaks" (Žižek 2011, 308)? First, we need to acknowledge that for Lacanian psychoanalysis, reality is not "some kind of pre-social given" and "nothing more than a montage of the symbolic and the imaginary …, an articulation of signifiers which are invested with imaginary – fantasmatic – coherence and unity" (Stavrakakis 2007, 42). Reality is, therefore, a human construct endowed with discursive articulations and symbolic meaning—for this reason, when thinking about the implications of psychoanalytic insights for our society, we cannot and should not view the individual, the subject, as separate from what surrounds her, "the external". Stavrakakis situates the ontological moment of social construction in "encounters with the political, … the moment of social dislocation and subjective alienation and lack" (Stavrakakis 2007, 57):

[S]uch a rearticulation becomes possible through the contingent dislocation of a pre-existing discursive order, through a certain resurfacing of the traumatic real which shows the limits of the social; the moment of the political creates a lack in the discursive structure and only thus can it stimulate the *desire* for a new articulation. (Stavrakakis 2007, 59; emphasis my own)

In discourse analysis, this process can be translated into the language of a disarticulation and re-articulation of the traumatised subject's sense of identity and reality around them. If the trauma in the traumatised subject is a trace of the real in the subject's psyche, then attempts at reconstructing one's identity and a sense of reality should be viewed as a practice pertaining to the domain of the symbolic or discursive. However, disarticulation here needs to be understood not only as an active discursive strategy of dismantling a dominant socio-symbolic representation of reality, but also as a consequence of a traumatic experience, therefore as an effect of the real.

What interests me here is what kind of subject emerges from a traumatic experience as a consequence of a socio-political crisis. A destructive event, whether it be "of biological or sociopolitical origin", can provoke "a radical metamorphosis of identity", which represents an ever-present possibility of change (Malabou 2012, 213). "Today's violence consists in cutting the subject away from its accumulated memories" (Malabou 2012, 213), Malabou maintains, and, through destructive plasticity, our psyche proceeds to restructuring our sense of reality, reallocating it, all the while attempting to make it meaningful again, or at least comprehensible. This attempt at subjective restoration can be a productive process of subjectification, altering the subject's view of their identity, as well *possibly* reformulating the sense of their place in their local community. Why possibly? Because the *desire* to reformulate one's place in community after a posttraumatic restructuring of a subject's identity is not a self-evident and predestined trajectory. As I have said earlier, psychoanalysis stipulates that a lack stimulates a longing, a desire to replace this lack with something meaningful, only if just momentarily. Yet, how do we know that the subject in that situation of lack(ing) will desire to reconfigure the existing set of power relations in a way that is radically different? Would it not just be simpler for this post-traumatic subject to take recourse to the old ways and discursive articulations to deal with such a situation?

At this point we come back to the same question that I raised in the first section of this chapter on critique and crisis. It is difficult to determine

what is required for such a critical subjectivity to arise in the context of a socio-symbolic traumatic experience. When the traumatic experience is prolonged, the desire to resist the supposed cause of trauma can grow stronger. What happens more often though is that in the prolonged aftermath of socio-political trauma the new experience is not necessarily a fulfilling or transformative one in the positive sense, for example, when the subject finds themselves in a situation of constant stress and social hardship (Berger 2015). While the post-traumatic experience can be productive in the sense of building personal resilience to "a stressor event, traumatic exposure, or crisis in a constructive way" (Berger 2015, 13), this does not mean that the resilient subject will also be resisting against the structures of socio-political violence in order to transform them. Especially in times of crisis, what tends to prevail over the desire of the oppressed to resist the oppressors is their state of precariousness.

Isabell Lorey distinguishes between the socio-ontological dimension of biological life, which is *precariousness*, and *precarity*, "a category of order that denotes the effects of different political, social and legal compensations for a general precariousness" (Lorey 2011). Whereas the first dimension denotes a general condition of being human and socially dependent beings, the second introduces a segmentation of the general precariousness under conditions of inequality and a hierarchy of belonging (e.g. between those dependent on wage labour and the capitalist owners of production). Under the current dominant regime of (neo)liberal governmentality, the condition of precariousness is aggravated for all those hit hardest by neoliberal marketisation of society, as the precariat is more and more conditioned by the discipline of the governing power structures, be it through the state or market mechanisms. As we are increasingly subjected to socially insecure and precarious forms of employment, the question is whether "the uncertain, unpredictable condition of precarity can operate as an empirical object of thought and practice" (Neilson and Rossiter 2005). On this point, Lorey points us to a third dimension of the precarious, which entails the ambivalent dynamics of *governmental precarisation*:

> What distinguishes modern liberal forms of governmentality is that the governability of each and every individual of a population is always also made possible by the way that he or she governs *themself*. The art of governing, according to Foucault, consists in conducting conducts. The power of governing is not one that is executed solely repressively from above. Instead,

liberal governmental governing means actively operating on the conduct of others, the "possible actions"… The active participation of each individual in the reproduction of governing techniques, however, does not serve only subjugation. Self-conduct does not necessarily fulfill dominant discipline and subordination. In the ambivalence between subjugation and empowerment, self-government can always also enable immanent struggles over the manner of conducting. (Lorey 2011)

This is an important final point, which adds to my critical analysis of Foucault's genealogy of neoliberal governmentality in Chap. 3. Neoliberal governmentality should not be understood as exercising an omnipotent and totalising hegemony over the governed, which would extinguish all possibility of agency and counter-resistance. Despite the debilitating effects of fierce market competition and the trauma that socio-political violence can have on individuals, the shared experience of precarity can also serve as the basis for revolt and a re-articulation of our socio-political reality through alternative governmentalities.

This brings us to the completion of the analytical cycle between the different sections of this chapter. I started off with mapping out the etymological similarity between the concepts of crisis and critique, how the two interrelate and what political possibilities can arise when both are actualised. Through the analysis of Foucault, Butler, and Derrida, I threaded carefully between recognising the importance of the undecidable performative moment in the suspension of a crisis, which allows for the maturation and dissemination of critical attitudes to the dominant order, and emphasising that, due to the urgency of the crisis, the moment of undecidability needs to be interrupted at some point and an alternative systemic intelligibility constructed. This philosophical approach to understanding the crisis is missing in the corporate and economist conceptions of crisis that I reviewed at the beginning of the chapter. Questioning the very rationality of the way a business is conducted would mean imminent destabilisation of the institution's position in the market which is not in the interest of capital. The Marxist approach to understanding the relation between crisis and critique is more theoretically developed and encouraging. Dedicated and meticulous socio-economic critique of capitalism is what marks out Marxist theory from other more orthodox economic approaches and makes it relevant to this day. Its disregard of the political in understanding systemic crises of capitalism, however, made the Marxist approach inadequate for my inquiry.

I then proceeded to examining what makes a crisis a distinct temporal category. This entailed addressing two sub-questions: how a crisis is conceptually different from other events and what demarcates a crisis as an event apart from the ordinary temporality of time? Here, I turned to two authors in particular—Foucault and Derrida—and argued that, while the material forces and the systemic logic of the dominant order are at work, the crisis represents an opportunity, or an obstacle, in the discursive (re)configuration of power relations. Foucault's eventualisation elucidated the construction of an event through the mechanisms of knowledge and power discourses, while Derrida revealed the unravelling of the element of surprise in remarkable events, such as a crisis, and its capacity to leave a wounding impression on those involved. The second part of this chapter established that while a crisis marks an unanticipated moment of suspension in relation to the dominant order, it prompts our critical capacities of judgement to make sense of and manage the crisis. In this sense, a crisis represents both an opportunity and an obstacle to the emergence of resistance. The hegemonic logic of neoliberal governmentality means that the possibility for capitalising on the suspension of old ways of conduct as the mobilising factor for critique is limited.

This brings me to the third part of my analysis which interrogates the element of trauma in a crisis and the possibility of resistance to the dominant order. I was especially interested in thinking what the potential is in a crisis for the birth of critical practices and resistances. The effect of trauma on a subject can be so austere that it completely shakes up our sense of who we are and our relationship with the wider social environment. But, as I demonstrated through my analysis of neuronal plasticity, the restructuring of a subject's identity can take various unforeseen paths, so the generation of critical subjectivities in the aftermath of socio-political trauma is not guaranteed, despite opening up a possibility for it. When we take into account the ontological precariousness of subjects under neoliberal governmentality, the question whether the shaken subject will resort to new ways of dealing with reality or go back to the "old" ones remains open. This revealed the double effect of trauma on a subject: it can either act as a disabling or an enabling trigger for resistance, for desiring an alternative socio-symbolic articulation.

The three lines of analysis in tandem with one another provide an alternative and inter-disciplinary approach to understanding crisis when compared to the mainstream corporate and international studies conceptions. Drawing upon political theory, discourse analysis, and psychoanalysis, my

main aim was not to offer a solution to manage and control the crisis in a way that reverts back to business as usual. Instead my motivation was to understand how a crisis comes into being, how it is constructed, and whether socio-political trauma can transform subjects into resisting subjectivities. In Chap. 5, I will reconfigure the relationship between extrainstitutional radical politics and institutional politics by bridging the power/resistance conceptual binary in the mainstream political science and sociology. Does radical politics need to take place outside the established structures of power or is engagement with the system a prerequisite for the effectiveness of counter-hegemonic resistance? Or perhaps this dilemma for radical political projects is misleadingly formulated all together. What if the ontology of resistance is such that one cannot escape being involved in the questions and relations of power, leaving the engagement with existing power structures as an inevitable part of radical politics? These are some of the research questions that will inform my analysis in Chap. 5.

Notes

1. Similar recognition of the shared ontology between crisis and critique and the importance of this relationship for social theory can be found in the works of authors, such as Seyla Benhabib (1986); Jürgen Habermas (1990, 2001) and Rodrigo Cordero (2014). Other authors maintain that the analytical utility of the concept of crisis has become either weakened or obsolete in the age of postmodernity; see, for example, Ulrich Beck and Cristoph Lau (2005), Jean Baudrillard (1993, 1994) and Bruno Latour (2004).
2. Derrida contrasts these "nonevents" with registered "great moments", in the timeframe between 1964 and 1984, as set by his interviewer, such as the May 1968 events, the moon landing, and the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia.

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Politics and Resistance As Power

Resistance is one of the most revered words in the vocabulary of radical thinkers, from Vladimir Lenin, Jean-Paul Sartre and Frantz Fanon, who identified resistant practices and subjectivities as inseparable from the potential violence that the attainment of political goals might demand, to figures such as Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, having inspired the Indian and South-African non-violent anti-colonial struggles, and Martin Luther King in the American civil rights movement. Yet, as Howard Caygill (2013) notes in his most recent book, despite being "one of the most important and enduring expressions of twentieth-century political imagination and action" (Caygill 2013, 6), resistance as a concept remains largely under-theorised. Resistance designates the courage, as well as the perseverance and resolve, to fight against established authorities in perpetrating social injustice and oppression. In critical and radical politics literature, the established social structures are often equated with power, whether it is religious or secular. When the position of resistance is taken, our position automatically perceived as a positive one, while that of the opponent as negative. The power we are resisting is thus characterised as negative and our resistance as a positive endeavour. This normative and moral "friend/enemy" distinction plays a key role in mystifying resistance as a noble and powerful idea in revolutionary politics and radical political movements. One of the key aims of this chapter will be to reconceptualise resistance in relation to power and the established political order.

Moreover, the conceptual binary between resistance and conventional politics has been further reified by treating resistance as a singular and extra-institutional phenomenon both in academia and in political practice. This has been the case both in mainstream political science, where the focus is still predominantly on the institutions and procedures of formal politics, and in sociology, where the aims and operations of social movements are restricted to the sphere of civil society.[1] This has meant that not enough attention has been given to studying how resistance and institutional politics interrelate at the ontological level. It is through political theory and philosophy that I aim to illuminate this gap in the literature by redefining the relationship between politics and resistance through the notion of power. A key obstacle in this endeavour has been the way power has been portrayed in both mainstream and critical literature. Power has been mostly understood in negative terms as a repressive act exercising by fully conscientious and powerful subjects over others. Such a conception of power has neglected the many nuanced ways in which power is actualised in democratic politics and social movements.

Then there is a related question pertaining to political strategy of whether radical politics should pursue its objectives outside the established political structures, or whether it should also extend its counter-hegemonic struggle into the arena of established structures of power. This question has long plagued the field of radical left politics and has caused debilitating divisions between different factions, in turn limiting the scope of possibility for progressive change. To tackle these challenges and limitations, what I propose to do in this chapter is to rethink the relationship between institutional politics and extra-institutional resistance through the notion of power. The main aim of this chapter will be to bridge the conceptual gap between conventional politics and the radical politics of resistance, which pervades both mainstream political science, as well as the practice of many protest movements on the radical left. Especially with regards to the latter and with view of the post-2011 protest movements, radical left politics and social movements need to abandon the limited view of power as a repressive force, which should not be reckoned with. The radical left needs to step outside the comfortable position of political purity and engage with state institutions, if it is to effect any long-term historical change to the current political economic order. To this end, I will argue against the treatment of institutional politics and resistant practices (protest, social movements, radical politics) as two separate phenomena and objects of study. Resistance will not be understood as the opposite and in externality

to the notion of politics, but as a structural part of it. Therefore, resistance will not be viewed as anti-political, despite its antagonistic relationship with institutional politics.

Reconceptualising the notion of power will play a key role here to deconstruct the conventional binary opposition between the politics and resistance and to demonstrate their shared ontology. My aim will be to move away from the negative normative content assigned to the concept of power in traditional approaches and to illustrate the interplay between the different manifestations of power, collapsing the binary between "power over" (as negative) and "power to" (as positive). By drawing upon Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Walter Benjamin amongst others, I will present a post-structuralist approach to studying power, which will challenge the liberal conception of political agency that presupposes the presence of an autonomous sovereign subject with a clear intention of exercising power over someone else. This will allow me to move the analytical focus away from the descriptive work of identifying who or what institutions hold power and instead centre my analysis on the conceptual relationship between power, resistance, and politics. I will also show how power, through the dynamism of its manifestations, either in the form of institutional politics or extra-institutional resistance, can be a useful analytical device for radical left politics in constructing a counter-hegemonic challenge to neoliberal governmentality.

Reconceptualising the Notion of Power

The beginnings of the modern study of power can be found in political philosophy, with writers such as Niccolò Machiavelli (1903; Holler 2009, 343–5) and Thomas Hobbes (1651, 53–4) amongst some of the prominent names, but the concept itself does not undergo any paradigmatic theoretical modifications until the second half of the twentieth century. The most well-known and used definition of power was put forward by Max Weber (1978, 53): "the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests" (Weber 1978, 53). Robert A. Dahl (2005, 330), who in 1961 lamented the lack of analytical scrutiny to "make widely used notions of power or influence more precise", used Weber's definition of power and applied it to a set of observable situations where power imbalances could be directly observed in relations between given subjects A and B. Keeping with the behaviouralist

pluralist methodology, Dahl restricted his analysis of power only to what he saw as "observable" and "open" conflicts in institutionalised voting procedures and settings. Later, after coming under criticism from his fellow (neo)pluralists (Bachrach and Baratz 1962), Dahl broadened the application of his definition of power to "the wider economic and educational context which shapes people's ability to articulate their interests" (Haugaard 2002, 7). Building upon Dahl's work and Bachrach and Baratz's two-dimensional view of power, Steven Lukes (2005) proposed a three-dimensional framework ("three faces of power"), which extended the study of power outside the framework of institutions to the whole of society, also accounting for conflicts, which were not directly observable by empirical analysis. All three dimensions together make up what is known as the "three faces of power" debate in political science.

Despite this renewed interest into the theoretical elaboration of the concept of power in political science and sociology, the definition of power had still not changed much in terms of understanding its ontology. It was still principally classical, understood as a relational exertion of influence on another subject in order to achieve a concrete aim. Moreover, the exercise of power was primarily understood in negative terms, as "power over" as opposed to "power to", putting too much emphasis on the view of power as exercising disproportionate influence or coercion over another, less powerful subject. The classical conception of power thus presupposes the existence of powerful subjects who are sovereign over their actions and are in possession of power (see Brown 2008). This limited intentionalist understanding of power is further exemplified by Lukes' distinction between an individual's subjective interests (shaped by dominant structures of power) and objective interests (what the subject's real interests are), privileging the negative view of power as a relation between a powerful subject's exercise of power (A) over the ideologically manipulated (B). Only with the publication of Michel Foucault's work and that of Hannah Arendt, the notion of power is desubjectified and its study refocused on the potentiality and actuality of power.

Peter Digeser (1992, 977–8) recognised the novelty of Foucault's theory of power and attempted to integrate it into the existing debate in mainstream political science by formulating it as "the fourth face of power". The main purpose of Digeser's engagement with Foucault was to translate his radically different vocabulary and make it speak to political scientists in more familiar terms. Besides the inevitable methodological problems that Digeser's project entails in adding Foucault's conception of

power into an existing debate that is already flawed in terms of how it conceptualises power, Digeser remains devoted to preserving an intentionalist account of agency and exercising power, and even suggests that "a notion of agency that exceeds power" might be necessary to account for "certain kinds of success that it may have" (Digeser 1992, 1003). In this sense, Digeser's contribution does not depart from the analytical assumptions already set by his predecessors in the faces of power debate. Despite the serious and critical engagement with Foucault's understanding of resistance, Digeser fails to explore its ontological relation to power, further reifying the binary of opposites between the two concepts.

In what follows, I will first analyse and contrast Arendt's and Foucault's understanding of politics and power, and then, through the use of Foucault's concept of counter-conduct, expose the aporetic structure of politics/resistance. I will argue that, although politics and resistance are two opposing modalities, they share the same ontology of power. The concept of counter-conduct will enable me to uncover the conducting power common to both formal political structures, as well as its supposed opposites, resistant counter-forces. This will dispel the conventional perception of resistance as located at a remove from relations of power, rule, and domination. The critical analysis of Jacques Derrida's and Walter Benjamin's concepts of law-making violence and counter-violence, Jacques Rancière's distinction between the police order and politics, and Antonio Gramsci's understanding of political passion and pragmatism will further demonstrate that we cannot ignore the shared ontology of conducting power in institutionalised politics as well as in mass protest movements. Throughout my analysis, backed up by historical and contemporary examples of political parties and movements, I will argue for the necessity of institutionalising protest movements in progressive radical politics, if the left is to achieve effective political change, while keeping in mind the dangers that such a political position brings with it.

The Relationship Between Politics and Power: Arendt and Foucault

In her never completed book *Introduction into Politics*, Arendt defines politics as "the coexistence and association of *different* men" (Arendt 2005, 93). Arendt rejects the claim that humans are somehow essentially political beings, that their political nature comes from within, by which she was critiquing the individualistic focus on human beings as autonomous

sovereign entities in classical political philosophy as opposed to conceiving politics relationally, as something that happens *between* humans. For there to be politics, the plurality of differences between humans and their coexistence through established relationships are its essential components (Arendt 2005, 94–5). For Arendt, politics is fundamentally about the physical interactions of human beings in public spaces, where unconstrained deliberation can take place between equals on matters of worldly concern. In another snub to the classical approach to understanding politics, Arendt does not look for politics in the study of governmental structures and bureaucracies, which she saw as potentially despotic in the event, where such rule widens the gap between the rulers and the ruled. In fact, Arendt objected to defining politics in the conventional sense of the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. She identified political agency in the material presence of bodies in spaces, where opinions and views can be contrasted and discussed. Only through acting and speaking together in public spaces is politics actualised, which, for Arendt, bears witness to the fragility and ephemerality of the political moment.

Without human interaction in public spaces, action and speech acts would have no witness and possibility of being registered and remembered. The importance of public spaces in Arendt's political theory cannot be properly grasped without taking account of the stark division she drew between the public and private spheres of life. This distinction between the public sphere, where political action and deliberation happen, and the private sphere, the economic realm of biological needs and consumption, is rooted in the ancient Greek differentiation of political and fulfilled life (*bios*) from bare life (*zoe*). It is on the basis of this distinction that Arendt underlines the need for public spaces, as opposed to politics taking place in the private:

> Following Aristotle, Arendt passionately asserts that the essence of politics is action. Laws and institutions, which to the liberal mind are the stuff of politics, for Arendt supply the framework for action. The activities of debate, deliberation, and participation in decision making come to occupy center stage. (Villa 1996, 4)

For Arendt, politics is not a thing of necessity, which by implication belongs to the private domain, but about freedom and the possibility of starting new beginnings. Politics is also not a foreclosed process with limited viable options to choose from, whether it be choosing between

only two political parties or limited outcomes ("there is no alternative" mentality); for her, politics is unpredictable and about infinite possibilities, which can only be realised in a political community, based on diversity and plurality of everyone. Action, therefore, holds a central position in Arendt's understanding of politics. It is with the coming together and interaction of people that the public realm comes into existence (Arendt 1958, 199).

Arendt's conception of politics is impossible define without putting the notion of power at its centre. For Arendt, the two are inextricably linked. In her words:

> What keeps people together after the fleeting moment of action has passed (what we today call "organization") and what, at the same time, they keep alive through remaining together is power. And whoever, for whatever reasons, isolates himself and does not partake in such being together, forfeits power and becomes impotent, no matter how great his strength and how valid his reasons. (Arendt 1958, 201)

For Arendt, power is always a potentiality to something, but because this potentiality depends on the contingency of human relations, it is not "an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity" (Arendt 1958, 200). Power "springs up between men when they act together and vanishes the moment they disperse" and like all potentialities it "can only be actualized but never fully materialized" (Arendt 1958, 200). What is material in the constitution of power, however, is the presence and being together of bodies without which we could not talk about politics.

Foucault's conception of politics, like Arendt's, is also difficult to discuss without closely addressing the notion of power at the same time. In one sense, Foucault shares a conventional understanding of politics when he likens it to "the art of the weaver" (Foucault 2009, 145). In this view, the essence of politics is to:

> join together, as the weaver joins the warp and the weft. The politician will bind the elements together, … he will bind together the virtues in their different forms, which are distinct from and sometimes opposed to each other; he will weave and bind together different contrasting temperaments, such as, for example, spirited and moderate men; and he will weave them together thanks to the shuttle of a shared common opinion. (Foucault 2009, 146)

However, in his more characteristic genealogical analysis of the phenomenon, Foucault maintains that politics did not use to designate a particular

domain or type of practice. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century West, the term was used negatively to name the politicians (*les politiques*), those "who share a particular way of thinking, a way of analyzing, reasoning, calculating, and conceiving of what a government must do and on what form of rationality it can rest" (Foucault 2009, 246). Only in the middle of the seventeenth century, a different understanding of politics emerges, which Foucault describes as "a domain or type of action" (Foucault 2009, 246):

> Politics ceases being a way of thinking or particular way of reasoning peculiar to some individuals. It really has become a domain, and one that is positively valued insofar as it is fully integrated at the level of institutions, practices, and ways of doing things within the system of sovereignty of the French absolute monarchy. (Foucault 2009, 246)

While still locked in the conciliatory relationship with the "absolute monarchy of the Church" (Foucault 2009, 247) in the seventeenth century, the expanding *raison d'État* carried the seeds for the reversal of the religious pastoral power. Through the emergence of political economy, statistics, biopolitics, and the management of the population, *raison d'État* transitions from signifying a relationship of the state to God, to "a relationship of the state to itself", and only later in the second half of the eighteenth century, to a relationship of the state to the population (Foucault 2009, 277–8). Through this turbulent trajectory and with the advent of the modern nation state, politics becomes associated with a specific art of government, or governmentality.

Like politics, *raison d'État* is also concerned with the "fundamental law of necessity", Foucault argues (Foucault 2009, 263). This necessity of governmental reason, which is conceptually akin to the notion of sovereignty, "goes beyond all natural law, positive law, and even the law of God's commandments" (Foucault 2009, 263). *Raison d'État*, therefore, cannot be equated with the rule of law and the legal system, as *raison d'État* "does not have to abide by the laws" because it is "exceptional" in relation to them. It only respects them "insofar as … it posits them as an element of its own game" (Foucault 2009, 262). Foucault makes a similar observation with regards to politics: "Politics … is not something that has to fall within a form of legality or a system of laws…, although at times, when it needs them, it uses laws as an instrument" (Foucault 2009, 263). Following from this, we can state that politics, for Foucault, is closely

related with governing or the governmental rationality, which in turn is predicated around the notion of necessity (Foucault 2009, 263). It is the necessity of the preservation of the state that is of central concern to politics.

When compared to Arendt's understanding of politics, Foucault's conception is more predicated on the notion of sovereignty, whether it be that of the monarch, the liberal state or the population, and government. As Foucault's understanding of *raison d'État* implies, in some circumstances authoritarian and arbitrary uses of power also fall under the modality of politics. For Arendt, on the other hand, violence is, almost in all cases, deemed to be an anti-political force and can thus not be described as one of the modalities of politics. This makes her conception of politics limiting because it fails to register as political the events of violent political upheaval or reversal. Arendt's understanding of politics, although conceptually nuanced and contingent due to the indeterminacy and unpredictability of political action, underlines a more positive aspect of politics as a practice, in which everyone needs to partake in—it encapsulates "the power of stabilization inherent in the faculty of making promises" (Arendt 1958, 243) and the creation of a public space, where deliberation and political action can take place. Foucault, on the other hand, takes down the antinomic barrier between resistance and politics and illustrates their interconnectedness and how they play out in relation to each other. As Digeser notes, Foucault offers little systematic discussion of the relationship between politics as traditionally understood and the analytics of power (Digeser 1992, 995–6). Drawing a comparison between classical political thought and Foucault, Digeser underlines the key conceptual difference:

> For Hobbes, the central problem of politics is how to provide order and (more importantly) authority in a world where a state of war of all against all is an ever-present possibility. In contrast, a Foucauldian politics seems to be one in which the central problem of modernity is how to provide enough space for difference in a world where the will to order and normalize is omnipresent. Hence a Foucauldian politics will celebrate such terms as resistance, unsettlement, and agonism as opposed to obligation, consolidation, or harmony. (Digeser 1992, 997–8)

Foucault's emphasis on resistance, dislocation, and antagonistic aspect of politics will be further underlined as the analysis proceeds to the nuanced understanding of power in the accounts of Foucault and Arendt. What

makes it topical to discuss Arendt and Foucault together is their innovative take on the notion of power and it is here that their different conceptions of politics become more intelligible when read jointly.

How to Think Power Differently

While Arendt studies power through its relationship with politics, Foucault proposes an alternative method. Instead of starting from the perspective of the exercise of power, his approach takes "forms of resistance against different forms of power as a starting point" (Foucault 1982, 210–1). This distinction in the methodological focus of the two authors' approaches will shed light on the different aspects and manifestations of power, which is why such a joint critical analysis can produce a more nuanced view of this elusive, yet ever-present phenomenon in human relations. In the lectures given at the Collège de France, Foucault constructs a genealogy of resistances to the pastoral power of the Church in the Middle Ages. By focusing on particular points of resistant practices and ways of (self-)governing, Foucault coins a new term "counter-conduct" to describe the resistances that challenged the dominant pastoral authority by the late Middle Ages and expressed a desire to be governed differently (Foucault 2009, 194–201). I will centre my analysis of Foucault's conception of power around this peculiar concept of counter-conduct through which, in my view, Foucault not only offers a genealogy of resistances in a particular historical epoch, but also provides us with a critical insight into resistance's relation with political power and how the two share a common ontology. Such a conceptual and analytical gesture forms a key part in overcoming the anti-political view of resistance in the conventional usage of the term. The approach Foucault uses in documenting these counter-conducts could be described as a "genealogy of reversals". Arendt's starting point is more classical—she turns to Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and accordingly draws clear lines between what she deems political and anti-political conduct. Her approach is to develop a conception of power in constant relation to her understanding of politics. It is inherently performative as it emphasises the potentiality and actualisation of deeds and words in public spaces—in this way, power is not understood in the conventional sense as a repressive force, despite its ontological relation with politics, but as a potential empowerment of political communities.

In his March lecture of 1979, Foucault states that "[t]he term itself, power, does no more than designate a [domain] of relations which are

entirely still to be analyzed, and what I have proposed to call governmentality, that is to say, the way in which one conducts the conduct of men, is no more than a proposed analytical grid for these relations of power" (Foucault 2008, 186). Foucault (1982, 216) acknowledges the fact that the term power has attained the status of "a mysterious substance" due to it not being interrogated enough. What the conventional scholars of power would focus on is describing the effects of power "without ever relating those effects either to causes or to a basic nature" of power (Foucault 1982, 216). What such a mystification of the term power leads to is "a kind of fatalism" (Foucault 1982, 216). He, thus, proceeds his analysis within the framework of two questions in order to work towards the demystification of the term and to uncover its origin, basic nature, and manifestations: (1) By what means is power exercised; and (2) "[w]hat happens when individuals exert (as they say) power over others" (Foucault 1982, 216)?

The classical structures of power, in the forms of the state, rule of law and institutional domination, have dominated the traditional approaches to studying power. Although Foucault also talks about the structures and mechanisms of power in his work, in his earlier work he was more interested in the relational aspect of power and how power conditions these very structures that the conventional approaches see as already constituted. For this reason, Foucault views power structures more in the sense of "the terminal forms power takes" (Foucault 1978, 92), where the state apparatus represents the "general design or institutional crystalization" of relations of power (Foucault 1978, 93). By reformulating power in this way, Foucault adds dynamic vitalism to the inter-relationality of power. Power is not fixed, as previously presumed, in "superstructural positions", but has a "directly productive role" (Foucault 1978, 94). For Foucault, power is not something you can possess either, an understanding which is common in the classical Dahlian conception, but consists of relationships between individuals or groups. Power also does not necessarily come from the top: "that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations", there is "no such duality" which would extend from the top down "to the very depths of the social body" (Foucault 1978, 94).

As Wendy Brown points out, Foucault is well known for insisting on the omnipresence of power, but this insistence should not be understood as "a claim that power equally and indiscriminately touches all elements of the social fabric or that power belongs equally to everyone" (Brown 2008, 67).

This is demonstrated by Foucault's notion of governmentality. Government, for Foucault, is "not merely a symptom that signals the extension of the analysis of power from the microphysical to the macropolitical or that corrects possible misunderstandings of an earlier use of the word power" (Burchell 1996, 20). It provides the framework for bringing together "a set of practices, strategies, governmental projects and modes of calculation, that operate on something called the state" (Jessop 2007, 37). To fully understand Foucault's concept of power then, it is not enough to only recognise the locality and instability of the constantly moving substrate of force relations (the microphysics of power), but also to situate them within the wider genealogy of "the historical constitution of different state forms in and through changing practices of government without assuming that the state has a universal or general essence" (Jessop 2007, 37). By approaching Foucault's conception of power in this way, the idea of governmentality serves "as a strategic codification of power relations", which provides a bridge between the microphysics of power and "the macro-necessity in power relations" (Jessop 2007, 39).

The key feature of power that is underlined by Foucault in addressing the "how of power" is not to looking to power itself, but at power relations. We do not need to look for a central and primary source of power, from which secondary manifestations of power emerge, but at the very dynamics of these manifestations. This is what makes Foucault's approach to the question of power paradigmatically different to the classical conception:

> [S]omething called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. Power exists only when it is put into action, even if, of course, it is integrated into a disparate field of possibilities brought to bear upon permanent structures. (Foucault 1982, 219)

To emphasise again, power is not a possession, but a potentiality through action. Power relations can also act as a restriction, a limitation to our capability of acting. For Foucault, the exercise of power:

> is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, it induces, it seduces, it makes easier or more difficult; in the extreme it constrains or forbids absolutely; it is nevertheless always a way of acting upon an acting subject or acting subjects by virtue of their acting or being capable of action. (Foucault 1982, 220)

This brings me to Arendt who also underlines the centrality of action in her understanding of power. Like Foucault, Arendt was not satisfied with the conventional understanding of power as necessarily negative in terms of constraint or violence. She was saddened at the state of political science in the 1960s when she realised that academic literature did not distinguish among "such keywords as 'power,' 'strength,' 'force,' 'authority,' and, finally, 'violence'" (Arendt 1969, 142). Behind what she saw as the apparent confusion was "a firm conviction" that these distinctions became insignificant in light of the seemingly "most crucial political issue" that preoccupied political science at the time—who rules whom? (Arendt 1969, 142):

> Power, strength, force, authority, violence—these are but words to indicate the means by which man rules over man; they are held to be synonyms because they have the same function. It is only after one ceases to reduce public affairs to the business of dominion that the original data in the realm of human affairs will appear, or rather, reappear, in their authentic diversity. (Arendt 1969, 142–3)

In her book *The Human Condition*, Arendt challenges the traditional understanding of power when she argues that "nothing in our history has been so short-lived as trust in power", and in the modern age, nothing "more common than the conviction that 'power corrupts'" (Arendt 1958, 203–4). Her innovative conceptualisation of power, closely knit around her understanding of politics, was clearly aimed at dissuading from taking a negative view of power. She successfully accomplishes that by constructing a performative account of the actualisation of power, which diminishes as soon as the materiality of bodies in spaces of appearance disperses. For Arendt, power is a potentiality which can only be kept alive by the exchange of "word and deed" (Arendt 1958, 200). It is on the basis of this relational aspect of power that Arendt distinguishes between collective power, power in concert, and strength, which, for Arendt, "unequivocally designates something in the singular, an individual entity" (Arendt 1969, 143). The collective power of the masses becomes evident in moments of great social upheaval, when the established power of ruling elites is suddenly compromised by the mobilisation of power in the anti-establishment popular forces. Such popular power, however, exists only so long as the political movements persist in public spaces and stay united under a common cause.

Here, Foucault's assertion that power does not travel vertically through the binary opposition between the rulers and ruled is further reinforced by Arendt's understanding of power. However, whereas Foucault's point was to challenge the classical understanding of power as emanating from a central source, the sovereign or the rulers, Arendt's contention with the notion of rule expresses not only how the actualisation of power is masked by the distinction between rulers and ruled, but extends into a rejection of rule itself. Basing her notion of politics on the idealised version of the Greek polis, Arendt believed that politics can only happen in a public space between equals. To be equal also meant to be free, and to be free "meant both not to be subject to the necessity of life or to the command of another *and* not to be in command oneself. It meant neither to rule nor to be ruled" (Arendt 1958, 32). In light of the horrors happening under totalitarian and authoritarian regimes in Arendt's time, Arendt was very much aware of how the notion of rule in the public realm can quickly turn into despotism (see Arendt 1954). The notions of rule, domination and mastery over others that also feature in more liberal political regimes is what Arendt was trying so hard to get rid of in her reconceptualisation of politics. I will come back to the paradox of rule later on when I will discuss Jacques Rancière's idea of radical equality in politics/democracy. For now, I would like to end the section of this chapter by underlining that the point where Arendt's and Foucault's understanding of power and politics diverge most starkly is on the question of rule or governing.

Although Arendt rejects the notion of rule in her conception of politics, she is more ambiguous when it comes to the question of government. In the *Human Condition*, she uses the term when speaking of different forms of government. She also discusses the role of government in modern political and economic theory, which sees the government as the necessary protector of the entrepreneurial spirit of businessmen and the continuing accumulation of wealth (Arendt 1958, 71–2). Modern economists, Arendt maintains, consider the whole sphere of government "at best… a 'necessary evil' and a 'reflection on human nature,' at worst a parasite on the otherwise healthy life of society" (Arendt 1958, 110). Arendt, however, suggests that the role of government should be the protection of intimacy of its citizens against the intrusion of mass society. By implication, Arendt also wanted to see the public realm protected, so that economic rationality of consumption and wealth accumulation would not overtake and trivialise the place where, for Arendt, politics happens. Despite Arendt's rejection of the

notion of rule in her conception of politics, she clearly sees some use for the government's place in modern political communities.

This contradiction is reflective of the position of many progressive social movements and radical political projects on the left, which view power negatively because they associate it exclusively with rule and domination in institutional politics. I argue that this position is limiting and self-defeating in the longer term if these groups are ever to effectively challenge neoliberal governmentality. Although power in the Arendtian sense does empower political communities and democratises the field of politics, where action and deliberation can lead to the prefiguration of alternative forms of social organisation, it fails to account for the key element in this project, which is government. To illuminate the mechanics of this contradiction, Foucault's concept of counter-conduct can help us overcome the conventional binary of power between politics and resistance and demonstrate how radical politics is always already implicated in the double-bind of power, which includes relations of rule and government.

Foucault proposes the term in his genealogy of resistances to the pastorate in the sixteenth and end of the seventeenth century, by which he wants to exploit the ambiguous meaning of the word "conduct" (*(se) conduire* in French). The term conduct can mean to lead others, but it can also signify "a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities" (Foucault 1982, 220–1). Conducting the conduct or actions of others and conducting yourself, therefore, fall within the same modality of governing. Foucault does not see government only in its narrower present day sense of "the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection"; for him, governing also means "to structure the possible field of actions of others" (Foucault 1982, 221). Like the double meaning of "*(se) conduire*" in French suggests, governing does not imply just to act upon the possibilities of action of other people, but also to act upon your own mode of conduct, to self-govern or self-rule. Counter-conduct, therefore, represents an aspect of (self-)governing in disaccord with the dominant models of what is deemed accepted or proper behaviour.

To illustrate the phenomenon, Foucault uses the example of revolts of conduct and counter-movements against the dominant conduct of the Catholic Church. According to Foucault, the objective of these revolts was to practise "a different form of conduct", "to escape direction by others and to define the way for each to conduct himself" (Foucault 2009, 195). Although Foucault maintains that, for him, counter-conducts are ontologically distinct from "political revolts against power exercised by a

form of sovereignty" and from "economic revolts against power" in their form and objective, I disagree here and contend that the specificity of revolts of conduct, even in their religious form, pertains in no ontologically or conceptually specific way to "the historical singularity of the pastorate" (Foucault 2009, 195–6). I understand that the reason for Foucault's delineation of counter-conducts as specific to revolts against the dominant Christian pastorate is to provide temporal-spatial clarity in his genealogical analysis. Yet, when instances of their manifestation are examined together with Foucault's contention that they are not separate or isolated from each other and other conflicts and problems, it becomes apparent counter-conducts can be treated as any type of resistance against an established authority.

At one point in his discussion of the concept of counter-conduct, Foucault raises the following question: "Just as there have been forms of resistance to power as the exercise of political sovereignty, and just as there have been other, equally intentional forms of resistance or refusal that were directed at power in the form of economic exploitation, have there not been forms of resistance to power as conducting?" (Foucault 2009, 195). This rhetorical question suggests that, like political and economic resistances that Foucault sees as ontologically distinct from counter-conducting practices, conducting power is also exercised in counter-conducts. In the following section, I will contend that all forms of resistance to established power are conducting in the sense of foreshadowing an alternative form of conduct or governing in their operation. What will concern me in particular is the transition and the interplay between extra-institutional resistance and established institutional forms of political power: How is counter-yet-conducting resistance political and why is the institutionalisation of counter-conduct a necessary operational component of radical politics?

Thinking the Relationship Between Counter-Conduct and Conducting Power Through Institutionalisation

The question of the interplay between counter-conduct and conducting power, and why the transmutation from one to the other is necessary, has been tackled by scholars and practitioners of radical politics in different ways. This question has been of particular concern to thinkers of radical politics and democracy, especially in the wake of the emergence

of post-2011 movements. Chantal Mouffe (2005, 2013) with her project of agonistic democracy maintains that social movements need to engage with the existing democratic institutions in order to radicalise and pluralise them further, if they are to be effective and succeed in articulating a counter-hegemonic alternative. In her study of the Occupy movement, Jodi Dean (2012) similarly argues that the spontaneity and ephemerality of the Occupy experience cannot develop into a revolution without constituting itself as a party. Organisation with a clear political vision, as opposed to the spontaneity of the masses, is thus crucial for a radical political project. It is in light of this observation of our times that Slavoj Žižek poses the question, what comes after the revolution, the morning after the popular uprising. It is the realisation and awareness that politically transformative moments need to be followed by "the prosaic work of social reconstruction" that sets apart "libertarian outbursts" from "true revolutionary upheavals" (Žižek 2009, 196). In other words, if counter-conducting resistances do not enter into a more organised and institutionalised form, their forceful energy is bound to dissipate in face of the mechanisations of the dominant order. All three thinkers, committed to a radicalisation of politics in one form or another, whether it be through radicalising existing liberal democratic institutions, or through the establishment of a new communist party in the coming of a revolution, agree on the importance of some form of representational organisation in counter-conducting resistances to avoid failure in attaining their aims. We can frame the above positions in terms of the vertical dimension of radical politics, where the emphasis in political struggles is on the (eventual) engagement with and taking over of the state.

The aforementioned position in radical political theory and practice is opposed by the other side in the debate, which is represented by the advocates of horizontal and autonomous ways of political organising. While proponents of autonomous political thought also strive for a radical overhaul of societal organisation, their aim is to go further in eradicating centralised systems of decision-making and hierarchical authority structures. Marina Sitrin and Dario Azzellini (2014, 24–5) underline horizontal social relations and practices in radical political projects as "a break with the logic of representation and vertical ways of organising". This does not mean that structures do not emerge in counter-conducting mass movements, they stress, but the structures that do emerge in general assemblies and other types of autonomous modes of operation are "non-representational" and "non-hierarchical" (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014, 25). Similarly,

Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt emphasise the need for the resisting multitude to banish sovereignty from politics since the "autonomy of the multitude and its capacities for economic, political, and social self-organisation take away any role for sovereignty" (Hardt and Negri 2004, 340). Nevertheless, they underline that the organised destruction of vertical centralised structures needs to be accompanied by "the constitution of new democratic institutional structures" (Hardt and Negri 2004, 354). The key point of contention with the above vertical position therefore is not that the autonomists reject the need for organisation and the role of institutions in political struggles, but in the ideological and practical rejection of representation in politics. Autonomists believe in the "self-administration" (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014, 40) and self-rule (Hardt and Negri 2004, 340) of counter-conducting resistances from a position of externality to the established representative structures of power. The latter are viewed as part of the old regime (or Empire), which needs to be abandoned in the collective pursuit of "new institutional moments" (Sitrin and Azzellini 2014, 70–1) and "a new project of democracy" (Hardt and Negri 2004, xvi–xvii).[2]

Although both positions strive for a radical transformation of the contemporary capitalist-liberal-democratic society, I argue that the autonomist position is fundamentally lacking in its understanding of rule and power and for this reason it is not able to grasp the dynamism between counter-conducts and conducting power in radical politics. While the critique of the tendency of contemporary (neo)liberal democracy towards oligarchy, the crisis of representation and the institutional accommodation of private capital interests in the current political party system are in line with my argumentation, the autonomist position on rejecting participation in and engagement with the state is problematic both theoretically and in terms of political strategy. Theoretically, it idealises autonomist struggles as an example of politics, which is immune to the hierarchical social relations of domination and is thus believed to transcend vertical structures of rule and organisation. As I will demonstrate below through my critical discussion of Antonio Gramsci and Jacques Rancière, the paradox of (self-)rule is an ever-present condition of political projects and cannot be done away with by simply imaging "a world beyond sovereignty, beyond authority, beyond every tyranny" (Hardt and Negri 2004, 354). The absolute democracy that Hardt and Negri are advocating for is but an idea to come, an idea which we may or may not attain. However, when moments of mass counter-conducts take place, the time for organised and

effective action is limited. This brings me to the question of political strategy. Strategically speaking, the autonomist position is in danger of forfeiting the opportunity of constructing a radical political alternative by limiting the scope of counter-conducts to spaces outside structures of power where binding decisions and laws are made. When looking at the legacy of the Occupy movement, which swept the world in 2011, we can identify the failure of the movement to institutionalise its activities along vertical lines of organisation as critical. Without this next step taking place, the mobilisation power of the counter-conducting movements dissipates, as the numbers of protesters start to dwindle. The power of a movement persists only for so long as it has its followers backing it, giving it support, especially in material terms as bodies coming together, as Arendt emphasised. To maintain the force of such a movement, it needs to undergo a process of institutionalisation; otherwise, the movement's following scatters away and its force diminishes.

When making this point, I need to be clear that I am not saying that movements, which do not enter the phase of institutionalisation, cannot have any demonstrable effect on the wider social consciousness in terms of what Antonio Gramsci called "cultural hegemony". Following Gramsci, any type of social relation can be described as an educational relationship, existing "throughout society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals" (Gramsci 1971, 350). An educational relationship is an active one in the sense that it represents an exchange of values, between the old and the new generation, absorbing each other's experiences and maturing through them (Gramsci 1971, 350). That relationship becomes political for Gramsci "through the activity of transforming and consciously directing other men" (Gramsci 1971, 360). This is the role of cultural hegemony, which can have transformative material effects and consequences, if it manages to construct what Gramsci calls a "historical bloc". Through the discussion of Benedetto Croce's conception of passion in politics, Gramsci acknowledges the necessity of the transition from the ephemerality of mass protest movements to their routinised form of institutions. In his reading of Croce, Gramsci also notes that passion cannot be organised permanently without becoming something else. Crocean "passion as a moment of politics" comes into difficulty when explaining the permanent formations of politics, such as political parties and state structures. Gramsci resolves this paradox of the ephemerality of political passion by situating it within the terrain of economy:

> Politics becomes permanent action and gives birth to permanent organisa-
> tions precisely in so far as it identifies itself with economics. But it is also
> distinct from it, which is why one may speak separately of economics and
> politics, and speak of "political passion" as of an immediate impulse to
> action which is born on the "permanent and organic" terrain of economic
> life but which transcends it, bringing into play emotions and aspirations in
> whose incandescent atmosphere even calculations involving the individual
> human life itself obey different laws from those of individual profit, etc.
> (Gramsci 1971, 139–40)

The economics that Gramsci has in mind entail pragmatism and ratio-
nalising calculations, which are opposed to the more "irrational" nature of
political passion. Yet the terrain of economic life is both "permanent and
organic", the fluctuations of which offer a fertile ground for the genera-
tion of emotions and aspirations. We could say that, for Gramsci, it is the
socio-economic structures that exemplify the institutionalisation of the
political passion, and it is through these structures that the ephemerality
of counter-conducting resistance transitions into a more permanent
organisation of institutions. By building a coalition of social forces behind
an alternative counter-hegemonic project, a new historical bloc, with its
concomitant social and economic structures and ideology, can emerge.

So, in the case of the Occupy movement, its gravest (strategical) weak-
ness was the unwillingness to engage with the system, to infiltrate the
already existing set of dominant political structures, where the formal and
binding decisions are made. Of course, it is easy for me to make this blunt
assertion in retrospect. At the time, everything associated with the main-
stream and dominant system would have been viewed as being compro-
mised by it and as thwarting the purity of the emerging protest movement
that purported to represent the disenfranchised. With the luxury of hind-
sight, perhaps, it can now be said that this very concern with their authentic
purity and distancing from what was seen as corrupt and pejorative, namely
power and politics, was the very reason for its inevitable dispersion. What
the Occupy movement failed to see is that by opening critical questions of
the systemic social injustices and by resisting the dominant forms of poli-
tics, they were already actively engaged in shifting the coordinates of power
relations. The next vital step would need to take responsibility and enter
institutional politics by forming a new political coalition that could have
acted as a challenger to the discredited political party establishment. This
way the political passion, to use the Crocean formulation, that the Occupy
movement generated, would have had the possibility of being sustained.

Jacques Rancière's pivotal distinction between *police* and *politics* offers another way for thinking the relationship between institutional politics and radical political moments. He defines the order of *police* as what we would generally understand under the term of politics: "the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution" (Rancière 1999, 28). The prime function of the police, for Rancière, is not so much concerned with the control of bodies in a political community, but more with determining who appears as visible within this very order, and who does not, as well as what grievances are legible by the police and which ones are not. The police, therefore, represents the configuration of the perceptible and the sayable (Rancière 1999, 29). Now, *politics*, on the other hand, is reserved for "an extremely determined activity antagonistic to policing" (Rancière 1999, 29). According to Rancière, whatever or whoever does not fit into the police configuration of the perceptible are "the part of those who have no part" (Rancière 1999, 30). Politics is then precisely that activity, which reconfigures one's place in the police configuration of the perceptible/sayable, the activity that "makes visible what had no business being seen" and the activity that "makes understood as discourse what was once only heard as noise" (Rancière 1999, 30).

Many authors who have taken up Rancière's distinction between the police and politics have privileged the latter as the site of radical equality and the basis of radical politics, while ignoring the more complex relationship that Rancière theorised between the two (Chambers 2013, 68). As Samuel Chambers notes, most accounts of Rancière's understanding of politics in the English-speaking political theory focus too much on the agonistic aspect of his political theory, while forgetting the more mundane and orderly part which characterises the order of the police, without which politics, the "rare and beautiful political moments" (Chambers 2013, 69), would have no sense. Considering the general misunderstanding about his politics/police distinction, Rancière writes:

> This distinction has often been taken as a new version of well-known oppositions: spontaneity and organization, or instituting act and instituted order. The response thus made is that such pure acts are doomed either to remain in their splendid isolation, or to disappear in the instituted order and forthwith to inscribe the nostalgia of the instituting act. (Rancière 2010, 205)

For Rancière, the police and politics do not represent "an opposition between two modes of life", but refer "instead to two distributions of the sensible, to two ways of framing a sensory space, of seeing or not seeing common objects in it" (Rancière 2010, 92). Although one might see Rancière's conception of politics as purist, he himself argued when coining the concept of police that he understands the term in a "broader sense that is also 'neutral', nonpejorative" (Rancière 1999, 29). Moreover, the police is not restricted to the structures and mechanisms of the state apparatus, as it is often believed—the police "stems as much from the assumed spontaneity of social relations as from the rigidity of state functions" (Rancière 1999, 29). The relationship between police and politics and the difference between the two pertains to a meeting of two different logics (Rancière 1999, 32). This, for Rancière, signifies the appearance of a political moment—when the egalitarian logic of politics and the police logic confront each other. Rancière further explicates the relation between the two logics:

> The distinction between politics and police takes effect in a reality that always retains a part of indistinction. It is a way of thinking through the mixture. There is no world of pure politics that exists apart from a world of mixture. There is one distribution and a re-distribution. (Rancière 2010, 207)

Rancière's account of police and politics can be helpful for illustrating the simultaneous processes taking place when there is a confrontation of different police and egalitarian logics meeting in moments of political conflict and social upheaval. It rejects the simple binary that establishes an ontological divide between policing and politics and that demonises the first while romanticising the latter. However, Rancière's approach to understanding politics has two important limitations in the context of conceiving a radical democratic project: (1) he does not account for power in his conceptualisation of the relation between police and politics (see Rancière 1999, 32); and (2) as a result of failing to account for the complex nature of power, his conception of politics takes on a pure form, a conceptualisation that he tries to avoid in the first place. These two limitations can be explained by Rancière's cynical understanding of rule, or *arkhê*:

> What makes possible the *metexis* proper to politics is a break with all the logics that allocate parts according to the exercise of the *arkhê*. The 'liberty'

of the people, which constitutes the axiom of democracy, has as its real content a break with the axiom of domination, that is, any sort of correlation between a capacity for ruling and a capacity for being ruled. (Rancière 2010, 32)

In Rancière's political theory, politics, or democracy, is precisely about disrupting any rule or power of the self and breaking "the circularity of the *arkhê*" (Rancière 2010, 53). However, as Alain Badiou remarks, Rancière never really tells us what comes to replace the circularity of the *arkhê* "in the order of real politics" (Badiou 2005, 110). The egalitarian logic, or logic of equality, which is the main axiom of Rancière's idea of politics and democracy, Badiou argues, is "held together under a pure empty mark of mastery, whose vertical absence provides the foundation for the horizontal bond", the *demos*, which in Rancière's theory represents nothing other than "the idea of a shared mastery", without being in a position of mastery (Badiou 2005, 110). Rancière (2010, 54) defends such a formulation of the foundation of the political as *dissensual* in structure rather than *aporetic* (which is Derrida's position; we will come to that later). Yet, in making this justificatory gesture, Rancière still does not fully come to terms with the aporia of (self-)rule, of conduct and counter-conduct. Furthermore, Rancière's suspicion of rule in the traditional understanding of politics extends more broadly to the conceptualisation of political philosophy, which he sees as an oxymoron: "the anodyne expression 'political philosophy' is the violent encounter between philosophy and the exception to the law of *arkhê* proper to politics, not to mention philosophy's own effort to restitute politics under the auspices of this law" (Rancière 2010, 40). As a result, Rancière's critique of "a return to a 'pure' form of politics" (Rancière 2010, 27–8), which he identifies in Aristotelian texts and their interpretations, for example that of Hannah Arendt, comes across as arbitrary when he allows himself to conduct an "interrogation into what is 'proper' to politics" (Rancière 2010, 27). He will tell us what politics must not be and what it should be, but he does not say what politics is in the established and already existing order of parliamentary democracy and institutional politics, and how to incorporate the element of conducting power/governing/rule in a radical vision of disruptive politics.

By failing to account for the double-bind nature of power in his police/politics distinction, I argue that Rancière forgoes a crucial part in his theorisation of radical politics—explaining what takes place after the disruptive

reconfiguration of the police order takes place. The notion of power is key here because it manages to keep in view the connection between politics and police, which Rancière explicitly refuses to do. For this reason, Foucault's notion of counter-conduct is crucial for our analysis as it incorporates the reinvented way of thinking about governing within the concept of governmentality. Despite maintaining that police and politics are heterogeneous to each other, Rancière still maintains that the first is "always bounds up with the latter" (Rancière 1999, 31). The very interplay between the two different logics remains under-theorised in Rancière's work. In his theory of radical politics, Rancière follows in the footsteps of autonomist thinkers and excludes the notion of rule from his analysis. While the distinction between politics and the police is helpful in distinguishing the governing aspect of politics from the ephemeral disruptive moments, the relation between the two and what is common to both logics needs to be explored further. By turning to Jacques Derrida and Walter Benjamin, I will explain further the interaction between counter-conduct and conducting power through the authors' focus on the violence of law as the nodal point between established institutional politics and extra-institutional resistance.

Interplay Between Politics and Resistance As a Vicious Cycle

Jacques Derrida's essay "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundations of Authority'" and Walter Benjamin's "Critique of Violence", which Derrida draws upon, can further illuminate the structural commonality between counter-conduct and conduct, highlighting the constitutive character of the first and the constituent form of the latter. The two essays provide a particularly fruitful route to proceed with the analysis since they do not position the two forces as binary opposites, but as interrelated and part of the same ontology. The violence of law is what joins institutional politics and radical political moments together. Derrida begins the inquiry by addressing the conventional phrase in English, "to enforce law", which alludes to the force that accompanies the law (Derrida 1992, 5). This force of law, or "mythic violence", as Derrida also calls it, can take two forms: (1) the constituent law-preserving violence, the aim of which is to maintain, reiterate, confirm, and reinstate itself in order to conserve the order of the things; and (2) the constitutive law-making violence, which through its performative nature captures the moment law originates, founds, and

inaugurates itself (Derrida 1992, 13). What Derrida observes in the interplay between the forms of mythical violence is not merely a transition, which is actually not a transition, or at least not a marked and discernible crossing from one stage to another, but "a more intrinsic structure" at play (Derrida 1992, 13). In the performativity of counter-conduct, there is also conducting power and within conducting power a performative potentiality for counter-conduct. This antagonism between the two modalities of the same structure, seemingly juxtaposed against each other, but still one and the same, can be explored by reading the following words by Derrida in a passage on the performative ontology of language and what he calls "the mystical":

> Here a silence is walled up in the violent structure of the founding act. Walled up, walled in because silence is not exterior to language. It is in this sense that I would be tempted to interpret, beyond simple commentary, what Montaigne and Pascal call the mystical foundation of authority. One can always turn what I am doing or saying here back onto – or against – the very thing that I am saying is happening thus at the origin of every institution. (Derrida 1992, 14)

The aporetic structure of the constitutive and constituent forms of mythical violence is "mystical" in the sense that it evades our interpretative and rationalising capabilities. Its force is at times "uninterpretable or indecipherable", but it is "certainly legible, indeed intelligible since it is not alien to law" (Derrida 1992, 35–6). Derrida further explains the aporia in the following passage:

> But it is, in *droit*, what suspends *droit*. It interrupts the established *droit* to found another. This moment of suspense, this *épokhè*, this founding or revolutionary moment of law is, in law, an instance of non-law. But it is also the whole history of law. *This moment always takes place and never takes place in a presence*. It is the moment in which the foundation of law remains suspended in the void or over the abyss, suspended by a pure performative act that would not have to answer to or before anyone. The supposed subject of this pure performative would no longer be before the law, or rather he would be before a law not yet determined, before the law as before a law not yet existing, a law yet to come, *encore devant et devant venir*. (Derrida 1992, 36)

It is in the sense of a performative act, which Derrida describes above, that we can understand the structuredness of (counter-)conducts. There is

no need for ontologically separating the two as they both share the same dynamic performative force, once to conserve, once to interrupt and found anew. In *The History of Sexuality*, as pinpointed by the editor (Senellart in Foucault 2009, 217) of Foucault's 1977–1978 lecture notes at the Collège de France, Foucault utters the famous words, "Where there is power, there is resistance", and continues: "and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power" (Foucault 1978, 95). Resistances are neither only "passive" or reactionary, nor are they simply "a promise that is of necessity betrayed"; rather, they "are the odd term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite" (Foucault 1978, 96). To further accentuate the ontological relatedness of politics and resistance/conduct and counter-conduct, one should read Foucault's words from his manuscript pages, cited in one of the footnotes in the chapter on counter-conduct: "The analysis of governmentality … implies that 'everything is political.' … Politics is nothing more and nothing less than that which is born with resistance to governmentality, the first revolt, the first confrontation" (Foucault 2009, 217).

Up until now, I have looked at different ways of conceptualising the aporetic relationship between conducting power and revolts of conduct, highlighting "the active sense of the word 'conduct'" (Foucault 2009, 201) in counter-conducting individuals or groups, acting "in the very general field of politics or in the very general field of power relations" (Foucault 2009, 202). There is, however, another aspect of counter-conduct, which is active in a sense that is not positive or constructive. In his 1 March 1978 Collège de France lecture, Foucault elaborates:

> There is also the theme of the nullification of the world of the law, to destroy [for] which one must first destroy the law, that is to say, break every law. One must respond to every law established by the world, or by the powers of the world, by violating it, systematically breaking the law and, in effect, overthrowing the reign of the one who created the world. …The Western and Eastern Christian pastorate developed against everything that, retrospectively, might be called disorder. So we can say that there was an immediate and founding correlation between conduct and counter-conduct. (Foucault 2009, 195–6)

Counter-conduct, therefore, is not always constitutive of some positive alternative order of things, of some "better" form of conduct. This is not to say that from its destructiveness something positive and more structured

cannot emerge, which would lead the trajectory to a new constituent framework. This modality of resistance is also captured in Derrida's formulation of the force of law as divine violence. Derrida describes it as "the annihilating violence of destructive law" and opposes it to the human law-making violence (Derrida 1992, 31). Divine violence is actualised as if coming out of the blue—it is "revolutionary, historical, anti-state, anti-juridical" (Derrida 1992, 55). Furthermore, divine violence "does not lend itself to any human determination, to any knowledge or decidable 'certainty' on our part. It is never known in itself, 'as such,' but only in its 'effects' and its effects are 'incomparable,' they do not lend themselves to any conceptual generalization" (Derrida 1992, 56).

Both the mythic, human law-making violence and divine violence contain an element of "the undecidable", Derrida continues, which is "the violent condition of knowledge or action" (Derrida 1992, 56). While Foucault generally conceptualises counter-conduct "in the form of strategies and tactics" (Foucault 2009, 216), which convey a rational and calculating modality of resistance, the negative side of counter-conduct is more ruthless and unforeseen as it disrupts the dominant political order. The unpredictable character and the (initial) inability to make this political force intelligible also finds resonance with the way Arendt understands the term "force". Arendt emphasises how the term is used in everyday speech "as a synonym for violence, especially if violence serves as a means of coercion" (Arendt 1969, 143). She believes that the term should be reserved for the "forces of nature" or the "force of circumstances" to denote "the energy released by physical or social movements" (Arendt 1969, 143–4). The mystical character surrounding divine violence can be further demystified through Arendt's understanding of the unpredictability and uncertainty a course of action takes. Arendt speaks here of the double incapacity: one is the incapacity "to undo what has been done", which is "matched by an almost equally complete incapacity to foretell the consequences of any deed or even to have reliable knowledge of its motives" (Arendt 1958, 233). A sequence of actions is a process, which is "never exhausted in a single deed, but on the contrary can grow while its consequences multiply" (Arendt 1958, 233). From this, we can see that "action has no end" (Arendt 1958, 233), hence our inability to predict with certainty the outcome of our actions. In light of this insight, we can demystify the "mystical" or "divine" character of destructive violence of law, the force of revolutions, and so on. Our inability to rationalise the unforeseen, and thus the unrationalisable, accounts for the seemingly "out-of-the-blue"

and unexpected qualities of divine violence. For this reason, Arendt proclaims that "men" are unable to bear "the burden of irreversibility and unpredictability, from which the action process draws its very strength" (Arendt 1958, 233):

> That this is impossible, men have always known. They have known that he who acts never quite knows what he is doing, that he always becomes "guilty" of consequences he never intended or even foresaw, that no matter how disastrous and unexpected the consequences of his deed he can never undo it, that the process he starts is never consummated unequivocally in one single deed or event, and that its very meaning never discloses itself to the actor but only to the backward glance of the historian who himself does not act. (Arendt 1958, 233)

To remedy the irreversibility and unpredictability of the action process is not to turn to "another and possibly higher faculty", Arendt contends. Conversely, Benjamin is of the view that the end to this perpetual and ruthless oscillation between conduct and revolts of conduct can only come "if the existence of violence outside the law, as pure immediate violence, is assured" (Benjamin 1996, 252); a Messiah of some kind or sort that would deliver "the sign and seal /…/ of sacred dispatch" (Benjamin 1996, 252). For Benjamin, this force is unequivocally of divine character; in actuality it is "revolutionary violence, the highest manifestation of unalloyed violence by man" (Benjamin 1996, 252). Whether this divinity of the revolutionary force is truly transcendental or just a mystical cover for intensified resistances of conduct, it is "neither equally possible nor equally urgent for man to decide when pure violence was effected in a determined case" (Benjamin in Derrida 1992, 55), since it cannot be "recognizable as such with certainty, unless it be in incomparable effects" (Benjamin 1996, 252). Arendt, on the other hand, thinks that the remedy is actually one of the potentialities of action itself:

> The possible redemption from the predicament of irreversibility … is the faculty of forgiving. The remedy for unpredictability, for the chaotic uncertainty of the future, is contained in the faculty to make and keep promises. The two faculties belong together in so far as one of them, forgiving, serves to undo the deeds of the past, whose "sins" hang like Damocles' sword over every new generation; and the other, binding oneself through promises, serves to set up in the ocean of uncertainty, which the future is by definition, islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone durability of

any kind, would be possible in the relationships between men. (Arendt 1958, 236–7)

Binding oneself through promises, or the making of contracts and laws in other words, is Arendt's proposed solution to the "two-fold darkness of human affairs" (Arendt 1958, 244), the inability of humans to be self-reliant and the impossibility to master the course of one's actions. Arendt maintains that if we did not rely on "contracts and treaties" in political communities, the only alternative would be "a mastery which relies on domination of one's self and rule over others" (Arendt 1958, 244). Here Arendt emphasises the role of law (not rule of law) in providing some certainty and predictability in the ocean of uncertainty that characterises human affairs. However, where the danger lies in law-making, Arendt warns, is when it is "misused to cover the whole ground of the future and to map out a path secured in all directions" (Arendt 1958, 244), in other words, when the over-juridicalisation and the depoliticisation of decision-making attempt to foreclose the possibility for politics in advance.

The same danger of law becoming an end in itself, rather than a means for achieving a higher end, is also raised by Benjamin, Derrida, and Foucault. At one point or another, the circumstances of human affairs require, or even demand, the "binding oneself through promises", the institutionalisation of radical politics; yet in this process the danger is that the new politics falls, yet again, into the destined trap of decay (Benjamin 1996, 251). It is in this sense that Derrida and Benjamin talk about the "decay of parliaments", an observation that strikes a chord with the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy:

> The parliaments live in forgetfulness of the violence from which they are born. This amnesic denegation is not a psychological weakness, it is their *statut* and their structure. From this point on, instead of coming to decisions commensurable or proportional to this violence and worthy (*würdig*) of it, they practice the hypocritical politics of *compromise*. The concept of compromise, the denegation of open violence, the recourse to dissimulated violence belong to the spirit of violence, to the "mentality of violence" (*Mentalität der Gewalt*) that goes so far as to accept coercion of the adversary to avoid the worst, at the same time saying to itself with the sigh of the parliamentarian that this certainly isn't ideal, that, no doubt, this would have been better otherwise but that, precisely, one couldn't do otherwise. Parliamentarism, then, is in violence and the renunciation of the ideal. (Derrida 1992, 47–8)

In the passage through institutions, the once revolutionary and charismatic presence of radical politics reaches a point where parliamentary institutions forget the originary violence from which they were born: "When the consciousness of the latent presence of violence in a legal institution disappears, the institution falls into decay" (Benjamin 1996, 244). The over-stratification of parliamentary politics represents for Benjamin and Derrida the foreclosure of the undecidablility and openness of politics in pursuit of the ideal. No less pertinent is their point about capitulation and compromise in the face of the adversary, foreclosing again the open field of possibility in politics. Similar to Derrida's critique of the decay of parliaments, we can also understand the decay of the pastorate that Foucault talks about, brought about by its "extremely rigorous and dense institutionalization" and "extreme complication of pastoral techniques and procedures" (Foucault 2009, 202–3).

Moreover, the "amnesic denegation" (Derrida 1992, 47) of the decaying institutions is not due to "a psychological weakness", says Derrida, but it pertains to their "*statut*" and "structure". In other words, the cycle of law-making violence and counter-violence, of conducts and counter-conducts—revolutionary violence going through the institutionalisation process until it reaches the point of amnesia and declines into decay in face of a new counter-movement—keeps revolving until it is interrupted and suspended by the force (or divine violence) of what Benjamin calls "a new historical epoch" (Benjamin 1996, 252). The cyclicalness of this movement suggests that the stratification of conducts inevitably leads to their dense institutionalisation and amnesic denegation of its primary aims. Robert Michels described this paradox, which the counter-conducting movements inevitably find themselves in, as "the iron law of oligarchy" (Michels 1962, 342). In order to capitalise on their numerical strength, Michels emphasised, political movements needed to organise and strategically coordinate their actions. However, as soon as they overcome the hurdle of disorganisation and undergo a process of institutionalisation, they face the danger of over-stratification and of losing sight of their original aims (Michels 1962, 61). The principle of organisation is, thus, on the one hand a prerequisite for the success of counter-conducting resistances, while on the other, it threatens their demise.

Antonio Gramsci makes a similar observation in his analysis of political parties in periods of "organic crisis" (Gramsci 1971, 210). These arise because the social classes become detached from the leadership and structures of the traditional parties. As a result, vacuums of new political

possibilities are opened up and Gramsci here cautions against "violent solutions" and "the activities of unknown forces, represented by charismatic 'men of destiny'" (Gramsci 1971, 210). He describes these crises as "situations of conflict between represented and representatives", which are not only limited to state structures, but can also be found in the world of business and "high finance", the Church and "all bodies relatively independent of the fluctuations of public opinion" (Gramsci 1971, 210). Although these crises can take place at different levels and in different geographical settings, what they have in common is a "crisis of authority" or a "crisis of hegemony" (Gramsci 1971, 210). As Gramsci explains, the reason for the crises of political structures is their lack of organisational flexibility: the lack of the "party's capacity to react against force of habit, against the tendency to become mummified and anachronistic" (Gramsci 1971, 211):

> The bureaucracy is the most dangerously hidebound and conservative force; if it ends up by constituting a compact body, which stands on its own and feels itself independent of the mass of members, the party ends up by becoming anachronist and at moments of acute crisis it is voided of its social content and left as though suspended in mid-air. (Gramsci 1971, 211)

Gramsci, therefore, comes to the same conclusion as Benjamin and Derrida, as well as Foucault. The ossification of dominant conducting structures reignites counter-conducting individuals and groups into action. At the same time, the notion of counter-conduct reminds us that these counter-conducting resistances share the same modality with established conducting structures in the sense that both forms are engaged in relations of power and both endeavour to hegemonise their position. Empirically, this can be observed in situations where revolutionary parties have emerged victorious out of violent political struggles, and after having spent a period of time in a position of power, the revolutionary parties have fallen into the same loop of structural stratification.

We could list many historical and more contemporary examples of this vicious cycle from different parts of the world, but as a point of illustration, the Mexican Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) serves as a point in case. Its beginnings were radical and go back to the late 1920s. It was established under the name the National Revolutionary Party and undertook the process of state development and integration in the post-revolutionary period. Its role was so dominant in the absence of organised

state structures that its national presence became equated with the state itself. Its absolute state dominance finally came to an end in the 2000 presidential elections (MacLeod 2004; Olney 2012). What makes the case of the Mexican PRI interesting for the understanding of the transition between ephemeral revolutionary movements and their institutionalisation is its ideological evolution and the concurrent fall in popular support, which had to do with the rampant corruption charges, electoral fraud, and arbitrary control of state institutions. From its socialist (or social-democratic) beginnings, it joined the general trend of the time and transformed into a centrist neoliberal political party by the late 1980s.

This trend also holds for many of the European social democratic parties in contemporary liberal democracies. While in Latin America, it was populist governmentality since the 1930s that through direct state intervention into the market economy and political power structures managed to find a relatively sustainable compromise between capitalism and popular government, in Europe, this role was carried out by social democracy and Keynesianism (and also fascism, see Berman 2006). With the rise in neoliberal governmentality after the late 1970s, social democratic parties gradually abandoned their signature popular policy objectives, such as full employment, wage increases, unionisation, and socialisation of consumption, which could only be achieved through regulating capitalism and using the nation state. In this process, we also see growing compromise and ideological proximity between the main right wing and left wing political forces, with democratic parliamentarism losing its function of confronting antagonistic visions of governing, as Derrida and Benjamin as observed. It is in this context, that we see a renewed rise in counter-conducting political movements after the 2008 financial crisis, challenging the old political order and prefiguring a new one. The vicious cycle between politics and resistance, conduct and counter-conduct, thus, continues apace.

While Rancière's theoretical contribution to thinking how we can break the "the circularity of the *arkhê*" through politics in the previous section should not be overlooked, we should also not be under any illusion that we can avoid the aporia of rule/power by simply setting the question aside. Only by recognising its inevitability and its constant presence in political projects and resistances of various scales and sizes can we at least hope to keep a dynamic relationship between the demos and the democratic structures vibrant and alive. As such, the aporia of rule is bound to haunt and dynamise the debates on the radical left, not just between the

advocates of autonomism and theorists of (counter-)hegemony, but more generally in terms of building an alternative governmentality that will fulfil the democratic needs of the people, while restructuring the role of the state in society/the economy in order to effectively challenge neoliberal governmentality.

This chapter endeavoured to redefine our understanding of the dynamics between institutional politics and radical politics of resistance through the concept of power. Instead of approaching the question from the point of conventional practices of parliamentary and state politics, my analysis used extra-institutional resistance as its main reference point to understand the emergence of institutionalised politics from counter-conducting resistances. As I have demonstrated through the discussion of Arendt's and Foucault's conception of politics, politics cannot be thought separately from power as some authors have suggested in the past. For politics to be understood in its complexity, both its institutional side and the ephemerality of political passion in resistances need to be taken into account together. If we fail to incorporate the notion of power into the study of politics, we are left with studying the formal political institutions without understanding the underlying ideological and discursive processes that uphold them, while underestimating the potential impact of resistant forces on the fringes of the established political order.

In taking up the challenge of examining the conceptual relationship between institutional and radical politics, I found Foucault's notion of counter-conduct especially apt for the task at hand. The semantic construction of the concept already suggests this double sidedness to the phenomena of power. Power is the very "material" that holds the opposing forces of institutional politics and resistance together. To further explore the interplay between counter-conducting resistance and conducting power in institutionalised politics, I have turned to different critical and post-structuralist thinkers, such as Derrida and Benjamin, Rancière and Gramsci. Foucault's exposition of the disruptive and theatrical nature of *coup d'État* in relation with the dominant governmental rationality, *raison d'État*, together with Derrida's theorisation of Benjamin's notion of the violence of law, illuminates the interplay between counter-conduct and conduct in relation to more classical notions in the domain of politics, such as the rule of law, the state, and revolution. Through a critical analysis of Rancière's distinction between politics and the police, I demonstrated that his understanding of politics is lacking for failing to account for the element of rule in politics, which only becomes visible when the notion of

power is brought into discussion. A similar shortcoming is identified in autonomist political thought where the question of (self-)rule is resolved through the proposition of an absolute (Hardt and Negri) and direct (Sitrin and Azzellini) democracy. Yet, as I have argued, such a position bypasses the ever-present paradox of representation in institutional politics, as well as the opportunity to transform the existing structures of established power by directly engaging in their processes.

With respect to the potentiality of resisting mass movements and together with Gramsci's insights on the formation of cultural hegemony and historical bloc, two important findings are underlined: (1) counter-conducting mass movements can have significant impact on dominant discourses and the way power relations are perceived in society; (2) however, for such movements to succeed more effectively in constructing a positive hegemonic alternative, a different way of governing/being governed, they need to organise and use pragmatic strategies to capitalise on the energy of ephemeral political passions. What the analysis in this chapter found over and over again is the need for organisation and institutionalisation of power: while bringing with it the danger of over-stratification and losing sight of its original political aims, resistance cannot overcome the obstacles of the ordinary and dominant order without engaging the existing political structures.

Chapter 6 will provide an opportunity to build upon these insights and investigate the practical implications of the theoretical findings developed until this point. I will use the examples of post-2011 protest movements and the appearance of new radical left parties in Southern Europe, such as the Slovenian United Left, Podemos, and SYRIZA, to demonstrate how these forces recognised the aporia of power in its double-bind nature through engaging with and taking over the statist forms of power. All of these political parties have potentialised their power both through their links with social movements, as well as through their participation in the established structures of power. The project of radicalising democracy was, therefore, pursued by giving a voice to the ordinary people on the one hand, while reframing the terms of the debate by constructing an alternative governmentality to the neoliberal political economic regime. Taking into account the theoretical observations made in this chapter, I will suggest that the challenge for the radical left will be to maintain a hybrid relationship between horizontal forms of organising (through social movements and direct action) and vertical structures (political parties and state institutions).

Notes

1. More recently, notable overtures have been made in the sociological study of social movements with calls to pay greater attention to the relationship between social movements and political parties (see, e.g., Goldstone 2003; Kriesi 2015). I will address this more concrete aspect of the relationship between resistance and institutional politics in Chap. 6.

2. The debate on the relationship between vertical and horizontal forms of radical politics can also be framed in terms of the opposition between the politics of hegemony on one side and horizontal multitude on the other. Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis (2014) see the first camp as represented by political theorists, such as Chantal Mouffe, Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek, and the latter by Antonio Negri, Michael Hardt, Richard Day, John Holloway, Saul Newman, and Manuel Castels.

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Challenging Neoliberal Governmentality: Social Movements and the New Radical Left

The aim of this chapter is to bring together theoretical observations from previous chapters and assess the challenges that anti-austerity movements and the new radical left parties are facing in their resistance to neoliberal governmentality. Having provided a political-economic account of the dynamics between (neo)liberalisation and counter-movements, as well as the conceptual illustration of the struggle between conducting power and counter-conducts, I will now take the post-2011 wave of protest movements as an illustration of the unravelling of these dynamics. By drawing upon social movements and the new radical left scholarly literature, I will first demonstrate how the protest movements emerged and mobilised against national political elites and neoliberal governments in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. As I have shown in Chaps. 2 and 3, the depoliticisation of liberal democratic politics and increasing marketisation of society are the two main trends of neoliberal governmentality. While the latter provides the material conditions for dissent (socio-economic inequality, unemployment, social insecurity), the first explains the alienation of citizens from participation in formal democratic institutions and the subsequent recourse to alternative channels of repoliticisation (protest, social movements, direct democracy). In response to the autonomist radical left's objection to power, I will insist on the need for radical politics to engage with the existing structures of power and address the question of

government in their strategy. Only in this way can the radical and progressive Left effectively transform the operative coordinates of neoliberal governmentality and avert the continuing impoverishment of the disenfranchised and the underprivileged. My political economy analysis of (neo) liberal restructuring of the economy in Chap. 3 has shown how important the role of the state has been in providing the conditions for the expansion and maintenance of neoliberal governmentality, and thus it is crucial for the radical left to give due consideration to these transformations. Yet, as the analysis of the dynamics between established conducting power and counter-conducts has shown in Chap. 5, there are certain pitfalls for the radical left that come with the institutionalisation of resistance and participation in institutional politics. As it has already been argued by some authors (see Mouffe 2015; Kioupkiolis 2016; Errejón and Mouffe 2016), the party-movement model of democratic politics could be a way to transcend the binary between institutional party politics and social movements. This hybrid model would provide the institutional vehicle for agonistic democracy, as analysed in Chap. 2, and the channelling of passions and democratic demands between the party structures and the membership base.

In this chapter, I will argue that the post-2011 wave of protests and the emergence of the new radical left parties in Southern Europe represent an alternative political response to the depoliticisation of representative politics, which comes as a result of the alignment of mainstream political parties around a neoliberal reform programme. The neoliberal politics of austerity and structural reforms have worsened the material conditions of many ordinary citizens through the cutting of wages, an increase in informal and part-time employment and deunionisation. While these circumstances point towards the socio-economic nature of the crisis, the waves of protest movement mobilisations erupting between 2009 and 2013 also exposed a crisis of liberal democratic institutions, which were unable or unwilling to respond to the legitimate concerns and demands of the protestors. Through the sustained development of reflexive critique during the public square occupations, the protest movements gradually transitioned from a moralist and individualising blame of the bankers and the greed of the financial services to a more systemic critique which linked unresponsive politics (mainstream political parties, governments, courts) with the way market economies operate and are regulated.

I will first provide the context for the emergence of resistance in post-crisis Europe by demonstrating how the persistence of neoliberal governmentality was to blame for the slow economic recovery and high social

costs of austerity and market structural reforms. I will then situate the emergence of the post-2011 wave of protests within the experience of antecedent movements. By comparing them to the Global Justice Movement (GJM) of the late 1990s and early 2000s, I will point out some key continuities and discontinuities, which will help me compare the methods used in these movements, the reasons for their emergence, and their limitations. My analysis will focus on the material conditions for their emergence, the institutionalisation of resistance, and the relationship between the movements and political parties. An overview of key problems and challenges facing anti-austerity protest movements and the recent emergence of new populist radical left parties will lead me to propose that there needs to be greater synergy between the two different fields of study. This methodological position is based on my more practical proposition for the adoption of a party-movement model in radical left politics. By using the case study of the 2012–2013 Slovenian protests and the appearance of the United Left party on the Slovenian political scene, I will analyse the dynamics between more horizontal ways of organising present in the protest movements and the more vertical structure of party politics. Together with the Spanish Podemos/Indignados, Greek SYRIZA/anti-austerity movement, I will argue that these protest movements and new radical left parties are subverting the two main trends of neoliberal governmentality: (1) they are transforming the face of democratic politics by disrupting the depoliticising tendency of centrist liberal politics; and (2) they are challenging the neoliberalisation of society through exposing the role of political institutions in maintaining neoliberal governmentality. But while these actions represent the first steps in a transformative and democratising counter-movement to neoliberalism, they also entail new obstacles: (1) the first concerns the difficulty that the implementation of the party-movement model of politics has proven to be for the new radical left parties; and (2) the second concerns the need for a different conception and transformation of the role of the state in challenging neoliberal governmentality. I will address these obstacles in the last part of this chapter.

Neoliberal Governmentality After the 2008 Financial Crisis

The inability of liberal governmentality to stabilise the economy without inflicting austere measures on the workers and the unemployed in the aftermath of the Great Depression led to the emergence of alternative

governmentalities, such as populism and social democracy, the intensification of the counter-movement, and growing popular support for unorthodox solutions. Where this shift did not happen amid the crisis due to the intransigence of ruling elites, the transition to democracy either did not take place or it collapsed under fascism or totalitarianism. Compared to this historical transformation of Western societies, the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis is different in several regards, notwithstanding the different contexts and structure of the world economy during both periods. In contrast to the 1930s, the ruling elites did not let the banking system go bust but bailed it out with public money, leading to a sovereign debt crisis in Europe. New regulatory frameworks and rules have been put in place to inject more predictability into the financial and banking system in the event of another financial crisis. These regulations, however, were still very much in line with the key principles of neoliberal governmentality, where the state can intervene only on the structural conditions of the economy with a view to reshaping society along the competitive market model. In marked contrast to the Great Depression, the Great Recession did not lead to a dramatic structural change at the level of governmentality. In fact, the market friendly structural reforms under neoliberal governmentality were given renewed impetus as a pretext for responding to the threat of financial and economic instability. We can demonstrate this by employing the operative dimensions of neoliberal governmentality (regulatory and operative actions) from Chap. 3. As shown in Chap. 3, the disembedding of the market economy from social relations and the recalibration of state governance to the market principles of competition and entrepreneurship fundamentally transform the objective of policy-making under neoliberal governmentality, where the primary aim is no longer the provision of general well-being for the population, but the adjustment of governing according to the needs of the market. The increasing marketisation of society, supported by the dominant elite-pluralist model of institutional politics, goes hand in hand with the process of depoliticisation, which shifts the decision-making power away from democratic institutions to independent and (para)legal bodies.

The neoliberal politics of austerity and structural reforms, which were adopted by most centre-right and centre-left governments in Europe after the financial crisis, aptly illustrate the two key operative dimensions of neoliberal governmentality. With the aim to balance the budgets and cut governmental spending in different policy areas, such as education, healthcare, social welfare, infrastructure, international cooperation and defence,

austerity is a prime example of the self-limitation principle under neoliberal governmentality. By following the principle of self-limitation, neoliberal governments purport to improve the economic efficiency of their operations, regardless of the effects this might have for the social cohesion and the natural environment. Another operative dimension of neoliberal governmentality is to act on the general conditions of society, so that it too is shaped by the dynamic of market competition. For this objective to be realised, austerity measures need to be coupled with governmental actions that will not only transform the state structures, but society as a whole. This is done through neoliberal structural reforms, such as the flexibilisation and deregulation of labour markets, the privatisation of pension schemes, and the introduction of business-friendly taxation. As the structural reforms make society run more like a competitive market, individuals and groups are encouraged to act as mini enterprises, constantly competing amongst each other and creatively working on their self-improvement. The private entrepreneurial initiative as the hallmark of a competitive market society thus takes over in steering economic and development policy, while the government is actively engaged in optimising the general conditions for this private entrepreneurship to take place.

A further example, which illustrates the globalising dimension of the neoliberal restructuring of society, are the comprehensive free trade agreements, such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which are more far-reaching in their attempt to disembed the market economy from social and environmental regulation than their predecessors. The objective of neoliberal governments behind this initiative is to take down the remaining administrative and regulatory barriers to free trade of goods and services, which would include the marketisation of public healthcare providers, education, infrastructure, and cultural services. At the moment, there are different types of protective regulation in place in these areas across the 28 members of the European Union (EU), so the adoption of the proposed trade agreements would mean a decisive step in further restructuring of societies according to the principles of market competition. Their adoption would also signify a further depoliticisation of decision-making on economic, social and trade-related matters by relegating any issues between multinational corporations and national governments to ad-hoc transnational juridical mechanisms, effectively bypassing the democratic regulatory mechanisms and undermining the ability of states to use protectionist

measures. Coupled with strict adherence to restrictive fiscal policy, these new free trade agreements would help open up venues for the expansion of market activity into areas, which were until now protected by the state.

The self-limitation principle, which acts as an operational straightjacket for state activity in the market economy, is further reinforced with the tightening of the Maastricht convergence criteria and the rules governing the Eurozone countries. The macroeconomic imbalances between the EU member states were therefore addressed through supply side economics (cutting taxes and further deregulation) and internal devaluation (austerity) through cutting spending and lowering wages, the end result of which is depressed domestic demand and further loss of democratic control over economic activity. Instead of using governmental action to intervene into the market economy and use public investment for the creation of jobs, the governments in Europe embarked on a path of further fiscal self-limitation and austerity in the belief that this would boost private investment and economic growth. Yet, the self-inflicted impotence of neoliberal governments only protracted the crisis, resulting in meagre economic growth, creation of poor and insecure jobs, and a renewed increase in household debt. The general policy orientation under neoliberal governmentality not only restricts the scope of national monetary and fiscal policy, but to stimulate private economic activity, governments also need to further relinquish sovereignty over their own resources and services via further liberalisation of economy, so that big multinational corporations can extend their operations of profit-seeking and establish themselves as the only wealth generators. The neoliberal readjustment trajectory of European economies in the wake of the Great Recession came at the cost of growing democratic deficit and socio-economic insecurity for the lower and the middle classes. In this context, we see the emergence of the post-2011 wave of protest movements that through the Polanyian lens of the double movement can be viewed as the first signs of a counter-movement emerging against neoliberal governmentality, the aim of which is to radicalise democracy.

Social Movements and Populism in Times of Austerity

As I have already mentioned in Chap. 4, the 2008 financial crisis did not immediately trigger resistance to established political elites and state institutions. The crisis was generally construed as financial in nature, resulting from the collapse of the US subprime mortgage market and then spreading

to other banking systems in the West. The declared intention of governments that they would do everything to minimise the damage and secure jobs and people's livelihoods was effectively communicated through the media and other dominant registers of representation, as Jacques Derrida would call them, pacifying potential resistance and popular anger. This account provides a convincing explanation for the period of relative social calm following the crisis. It was not until 2011, however, that a wave of protests and occupations sprang up in different parts of the world as part of the global Occupy movement, inspired by the Icelandic and Greek protests against their governments' handling of the financial crisis and the Arab Spring in North Africa and the Middle East. Alongside the Occupy movement, the Spanish Indignados, the Syntagma Square occupation in Greece, the Nuit Debout movement in France and the waves of protests across the Balkans between 2012 and 2015 all fall under the post-2011 wave of protest movements in Europe.

Despite the diverse local circumstances that provided the conditions for the eruption of these resistances around the globe, there was a common thread in protesters' demands across Europe: the collusion between public institutions and private economic interests, growing socio-economic inequality, and the failure of public institutions to manage the economic crisis in a way that would benefit ordinary people (della Porta 2015a). The post-2011 protests came at a time people's distrust of representative politics and established political forces hit new low as most European economies were going through a double-dip recession. In many countries, like in Slovenia, for example, protests erupted spontaneously as disorganised and sociologically heterogeneous masses of people assembled in public squares and streets to voice their opposition to austerity measures, corruption, and neoliberal reforms. In a defiantly antagonistic fashion, these movements drew a clear division between themselves, representing the ordinary people, and the elites, famously captured by the Occupy slogan, the 99% versus the 1%. Their shared critique of existing liberal democratic institutions and political elites was translated into calls to radicalise democracy and their fight for "real democracy". Despite the assumed novelty of the post-2011 protest movement in dominant media representations, when compared to the previous series of protests and counter-summits organised as part of the GJM, we can observe more clearly in what ways the post-2011 protest movements diverged from past practices and in which they shared common features.

Many scholars have drawn comparisons between the post-2011 protest movements and the GJM (Graeber 2013; Zamponi and Daphni 2014; della Porta 2015a; Gerbaudo 2017). The GJM emerged as part of the wider anti-/alter-globalisation movement, which gained worldwide visibility during the demonstrations against the 1999 World Trade Organisation (WTO) summit in Seattle. What the GJM and post-2011 wave of protests had in common was the rejection of established political and economic elites and a commitment to practising more direct and participatory forms of democracy. Yet, while the GJM directed its opposition towards the international institutions (such as the WTO, the IMF, World Bank, and NAFTA), criticising their lack of democratic accountability and close links with the transnational capitalist class, the post-2011 protest movements targeted the national elites. The shift from the transnational dimension of the GJM to the more localised and nationally based movements of the post-2011 wave of anti-austerity protests was a notable development that challenged a previously held assumption in the social movement literature of "an ineluctable trend in collective action" from the national to the transnational level of protest at the turn of the century (della Porta and Mattoni 2014, 3). Della Porta and Alice Mattoni point out that although the financial crisis was indeed singular and global, "its timing and dynamics varies across countries", which was also reflected in the way the protests "followed the geography of the economic crisis", appearing with "different strengths and at different times in different European countries" (della Porta and Mattoni 2014, 3). What the post-2011 protest movements show is a decisive return to the nation state both as a site of protest and a tool to contest the dominant political TINA narrative in the age of globalisation.

In terms of social composition and interests, another key difference can be noted between the GJM and post-2011 protest movements. While the GJM comprised "a network of networks of activism", joining together activists from mostly middle-class occupations who participated in different political and social associations and groups, the post-2011 wave of protests was predominantly composed of newcomers without previous political affiliations, "amongst them those who were hit hardest by austerity measures" (della Porta and Mattoni 2014, 8). Benjamin J. Silver and Şahan Şavas Karataşli (2015) specifically underline the role of new working-class formations in the recent wave of protests. The neoliberal structural reforms of the labour market, the outsourcing of manufacturing and post-Fordist modes of production, combined with the pursuit of austerity

measures, have propelled into movement grand-scale making, unmaking, and remaking of working classes and workers' movements. This has accelerated the destruction of established livelihoods more quickly than the creation of new ones, leaving behind "an enlarging mass of unemployed, underemployed, and precariously employed workers" (Silver and Karataşli 2015, 139). The mass presence of unemployed youth and the Polanyi-type of "struggles by established working classes defending ways of life and livelihood that are in the process of being 'unmade'" testifies to the importance of the political economic dimension of the post-2011 wave of protests (Silver and Karataşli 2015, 138).

Compared to the new social movements that emerged from "the pacification of class conflict, and even the *embourgeoisement* of the working class" after the mid-1960s, the post-2011 wave of protests reflect "the pauperization of the lower classes as well as the proletarization of the middle classes, with the growth of the excluded in some countries to about two-thirds of the population" (della Porta 2015a, 35). The structural changes that Western societies underwent under the rise of neoliberal governmentality, although in a variegated way (see Brenner et al. 2010a), reshaped the employer-employee relations in favour of capital. The 2008 financial crisis only exacerbated these social cleavages, which explains the more materialist nature of the post-2011 protest movements compared to the GJM and the new social movements. This development challenges another assumption that has underlain the sociology of social movements. Contrary to the predication that post-industrial societies in the West are no longer defined primarily by material issues but identity politics and cultural concerns (Inglehart 1997; Habermas 1996), the post-2011 protest movements bring material issues back on political agenda.

The fragmentation of once stable social categories, such as the working class and its institutional affiliations, has a direct effect on the chosen forms of collective organisation. In the post-2011 protest movements, horizontal and decentralised network structures replace more centralised organisational forms found in the trade unions and political parties. This is one aspect in which these movements are similar to the GJM. Della Porta ties this organisational shift to the development of neoliberal governmentality, which increases precariousness and social insecurity and reduces "availability of time and material resources to contribute to collective efforts" (della Porta 2015a, 158). As neoliberalism redefines the role of trade unions and other corporatist actors that had been the key building blocks of the social democratic model, the idea of a direct democracy becomes a

key empowering element in the emerging movements. The fragmented social basis under neoliberalism thus favours "more fluid and less structured forms of mobilization", such as occupations and camps in public spaces (della Porta 2015a, 158).

The horizontal forms of collective action did not only represent an opportunity to protest against the political elites and austerity measures, but also created a space for experimenting with participatory and deliberative forms of democracy (della Porta 2015b, 774). In light of the protesters' mistrust in established democratic institutions, which resonates with the wider public, especially in countries hit hardest by austerity measures and structural reforms, the adoption of horizontal ways of political organising is understandable. In this sense, the post-2011 anti-austerity movements, such as the Indignados in Spain, the Syntagma square occupation in Greece and Occupy Slovenia, were prefigurative in their objective: they were not just opposing the established political practices, but also prefiguring alternative ways of organising society (Razsa and Kurnik 2012; Graeber 2013).[1]

Yet, as della Porta notes, the horizontalist mode of collective action in the post-2011 protest movements carries with it some key weaknesses for challenging neoliberal governmentality. Although the protest movements empowered masses of disenfranchised ordinary citizens, their mobilising capacity was not always consistent. Della Porta assigns this fluctuation in mobilisation of protesters to the difficulty of maintaining prefigurative forms of democracy: "consensual decision making takes time, assemblies can be frustrating, participation goes in waves, material needs often win over solidarity and public commitment" (della Porta 2015a, 220). The protesters' distrust of vertical structures of more traditional organisations, such as trade unions and political parties, has also meant that coalition-building and organisational cooperation proved difficult. Moreover, as Paulo Gerbaudo (2017) points out, there was an obvious contradiction between two different conceptions of democracy in the post-2011 protest movements. The horizontal mode of direct and participatory democracy aligned more closely with the anarchist tradition, which was also present in the GJM, while the majoritarian discourse of the movements and emphasis on popular sovereignty revealed the populist undertones of the post-2011 protest movements (Gerbaudo 2017, 62–3). In Chap. 5, I have presented this contradiction as an aporia of rule in radical politics, between horizontal and vertical forms of politics, and argued against the autonomist/anarchist assumption that radical politics can escape relations

of power, rule, and government. Occupations in public squares are short-lived forms of organisation, which underlines the need for more pragmatism towards engaging with vertical forms of organising and coalition-building and other more traditional progressively oriented institutions.

In what represents a clear break with the horizontal and networked tradition of grassroots action in GJM, the post-2011 protest movements produced forms of political organisation that transcend the opposition between horizontal, social movements-based operations, and the vertical structures of classical political parties. By forming "party-movements", the offshoots of Indignados in Spain (forming Podemos), the Slovenian 2012–2013 protests (forming the United Left), and the anti-austerity movement in Greece (morphing with SYRIZA) managed to institutionalise the anti-establishment spirit of the post-2011 wave of protests and occupations. Herbert Kitschelt has used the term party-movements to analyse the transition of movements into parties, but he viewed party movements as transitional and comparatively rare phenomena (Kitschelt 2006). As my case study of the Slovenian United Left will show in this chapter, and comparative observations with regard to Podemos in Spain and SYRIZA in Greece, the party-movement was indeed a transitory tactical organisational strategy used by the protest movements cum political parties to stay true to their original aim of radicalising democracy by keeping close ties with anti-establishment protest movements. At the same time, they realised that to effect radical change in society and challenge neoliberal governmentality, they needed to garner wider popular support and win over the state institutions through established procedures of political competition. This demonstrates that the new protest movements did not purposefully evade the question of representation and rule, like past protest movements, which was a crucial move in the wider political context for achieving paradigmatic change.

The key ideological ingredient for this temporary organisational form to hold together the heterogeneous composition of the protest movements on the ground and the emerging class of new anti-establishment politicians was the populist anti-establishment rhetoric that attacked the established political elites for their mismanagement of the economy and not doing enough to tackle corruption, the disproportionate power of finance and banks, and the rising wealth inequality. As Polanyian theory of the double movement showed in Chap. 3, increasing economic integration of societies on the model of self-regulating markets prompts into

motion the emergence of a counter-movement for protection against market competition. The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis and the acceleration of neoliberal structural reforms created the conditions for such social dynamics, where populism characterises the growing popular and anti-establishment frustration with the responsible institutions at the national and EU level. In this context, we can understand the demand for populism in post-crisis Europe. The post-2011 protest movements and the rise in support for populist parties, on the other hand, supplied the means for channelling this growing populist mood. The emergence of the new radical left in Europe, where parts of the post-2011 protest movements in countries such as Spain, Greece, and Slovenia have undergone a transformation into political parties, played an important role in filling the political vacuum in the respective countries, which in other countries, such as Hungary, Poland and Austria, has been filled with right-wing populist responses.

In the following section, I will use the case of the 2012–2013 Slovenian protests and the emergence of a new political party on the left of Slovenian politics, *Združena levica* (the United Left), which offers an apt illustration of the shift in European radical left politics from horizontal ways of political organising to vertical structures. The existing scholarly literature already covers the cases of Podemos and SYRIZA, exploring the conditions for the emergence and the reinvigoration of these radical left parties in the context of the post-2011 protest movements and the rise in populism (Spourdalakis 2014; Stavrakakis 2014; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis 2014; Agnantopoulos and Lambiri 2015; de Prat 2015; Raffini et al. 2015; Jerez et al. 2015; Stavrakakis 2015; Mateo 2016; Kioupkiolis 2016; Aslanidis and Rovira Kaltwasser 2016; Katsambekis 2016). While there is some literature on the 2012–2013 Slovenian protests (Vezjak 2013; Musić 2013; Krašovec 2013; Kirn 2014), its scope is limited to the period before for the establishment of the United Left party. Due to its absence in the existing literature on European radical left politics, my empirical inquiry below will therefore focus on the Slovenian case. After the analysis of the conditions for the 2012–2013 wave of protests across Slovenia and the reasons for the shift of some parts of the protest movement towards electoral politics, this chapter will address the challenges that lie ahead for the Slovenian United Left, SYRIZA and Podemos in constructing an alternative to neoliberal governmentality in Europe.

From Movement to Party: The Case of the Slovenian United Left

Although often missing in the analysis of other high profile cases in Europe, the 2012–2013 Slovenian protests could easily be grouped together with other similar popular reactions that took place across Europe after the financial crisis, for example, the anti-austerity movements in Greece and Spain between 2011 and 2012, the 2012–2015 Romanian and the 2013–2015 Bulgarian protests, and the 2014 protests and occupations in Bosnia. They all share an anti-establishment and majoritarian orientation, with the movements made up of diverse groups of individuals, indignant towards the political and economic elites for the slow economic recovery and the fall in living standards following the 2008 financial crisis. Another feature that unites these six countries in their political experience is the elite-led transition from authoritarian regimes to representative democracy. With their own idiosyncratic nuances, the protests challenged the official narratives of successful transition and interrogated the role of the national political class in skewing the transition in favour of vested interests (Kraft 2015, 201–5).

The Slovenian protests that took place between November 2012 and the summer of 2013 were spurred by corruption charges against the mayor of Maribor, the second biggest Slovenian city, and later an anti-corruption commission report accusing the then Prime Minister Janez Janša of having broken the law by failing to disclose the nature of some of his assets. The subsequent protests grew in strength and pressurised the political parties towards a parliamentary vote of no confidence for Janša's government in February 2013. What makes the Slovenian case especially fitting for my analysis is the complex interaction between horizontal practices during the protests and the vertical structures that emerged from them. It is interesting analytically not only because it prompts a rethink of the binary between protest politics and established political party politics in democracies, but also for illuminating the marked shift in political strategy of radical left politics in post-crisis Europe.

In this section, I briefly outline the history of Slovenian activism and radical left politics since 2004, when Slovenia became a full member of the EU, including the Slovenian Occupy movement, the immediate precursor to the 2012–2013 protests. I categorise the main political moments on the Slovenian radical left according to their use of horizontal and/or vertical

forms of politics. I then proceed to analysing the organisation and composition of the 2012–2013 Slovenian protests and outline the reasons for change in political strategy of the main protest committees, one of which resulted in the creation of *Iniciativa za demokratični socializem* (the Initiative for Democratic Socialism [IDS]), which later became part of the United Left. In particular, I focus on the reasons for the shift in strategy of the new radical left from horizontal ways of political organising to vertical structures in Slovenian politics.

A Brief History of Slovenian Radical Left Before 2012

As two of the founding members of the IDS explained, without the "rather long prehistory to the Initiative [IDS]", where many of its "active members were already active in the student movement, various student organizations, newspapers, fights against plans to implement tuitions" (Korsika and Mesec 2014, 85), we cannot understand how the IDS as part of the United Left managed to capitalise on the anti-establishment spirit of the 2012–2013 protests and successfully vied for parliamentary seats in the 2014 early general election. Before the 2012–2013 protests, the IDS activists found themselves in horizontal networks of anarcho-syndicalist, autonomist movements and students groups on the margins of Slovenian politics. After independence, the Slovenian radical left became visible with the turn of the century during the alter-globalisation protests of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Razsa and Kurnik 2012). These waves of demonstrations were followed by mobilisations against the war in Iraq in 2003 and Slovenia's membership in NATO in 2004. In the mid-2000s during the first government of Janez Janša, continuing market reforms produced "changing landscape of the city and its outskirts, the loss of the public realm through privatisation, the authoritarian management of populations and practices and the reduction of diversity [sic] all for the logic of profit" (Kurnik and Beznec 2009, 45). Like in other countries of ex-Yugoslavia, activist groups for the protection of public spaces sprang up in opposition to neoliberal marketisation, the occupation of an abandoned bicycle factory Rog in Ljubljana being the most notable example (see Kurnik and Beznec 2009). There were also direct actions, assemblies, and activist networks organised in solidarity with minority and migrant activists during the 2000s "that shaped the unusually decentralized and minoritarian direct democracy", characteristic of the Slovenian radical left before 2012 (Razsa and Kurnik 2012, 240; also see Medica 2012). What unites these

initiatives and struggles is their staunchly anti-capitalist, anti-authoritarian, anti-statist, and anti-fascist ideological orientation. Despite their important role in offering a support network and empowerment strategies to the most vulnerable in Slovenian society, such as refugees, the Erased and migrant workers, the radical left's key weakness before 2012 was that they were small in scale and failed to make impact beyond the localised spaces of resistance.

Another opportunity for the radical left came at the height of the financial crisis in Slovenia when the Slovenian activists joined the 15 October Movement in 2011 and organised a number of protests across the country. The biggest one was in Ljubljana, numbering between 3000 and 5000 participants, "targeted the capitulation of public authorities against the dictates of financial markets, oligarchies and local tycoons" (Gibanje 15O 2012). In the spirit of Occupy movement, the protesters also addressed unequal wealth distribution and expressed their opposition to cuts to public services in a time when governments bailed out banks with public money. Using slogans like "No one represents us!", the movement was leaderless and premised in horizontal and networked practices of direction action and democracy. The protest ended in a public square in front of the Ljubljana Stock Exchange, where around 50 protesters set up a camp "Boj za!" ("*Fight for!*") and occupied the area for the next five months and a half. Occupy Slovenia, as it became known in international press, was an attempt to create a public space where participants could build "collective capacity to manage our own lives and reconstruct society from below" (Razsa and Kurnik 2012, 252). Through public assemblies and working groups on issues, such as poverty, the housing crisis and indebtedness, the occupiers engaged in prefigurative politics of constructing "stateless sociabilities and communities" that redefine the dominant structures and relations of power (Razsa and Kurnik 2012, 250). Some of the occupiers also participated in the occupation of the Faculty of Arts, University of Ljubljana, which lasted for two months from the end of November 2011 to January 2012. The occupation, led by the student movement Mi smo univerza (*We Are the University*), opened an autonomous space to debate important topics regrading higher education in Slovenia, including the social well-being of students and the teaching staff, the autonomy of the university, the neoliberalisation of education and research funding (Žurnal24 2012).

Occupy Slovenia ended in April 2012 due to internal conflicts in the camp and protest fatigue (RTVSLO 2012a). While the occupation provided

a space for sharing of experience, devising an intricate critique of the system, and learning in direct action and democracy, it was too minoritarian, individualist and enclosed within small activist and academic circles. To capture the populist mood of the time, it would have needed to be more flexible ideologically and willing to engage with existing, vertical structures of political power. This next step for the radical left in Slovenia did come later that year, but in circumstances that they themselves could not have foreseen.

The 2012–2013 Waves of Protest in Slovenia

Despite the importance of the activists' previous experience and organisational support, the protests themselves were first started by newcomers, ordinary people with no previous experience of political activism or institutional affiliation. As Kirn (2014, 116) points out, political apathy "has long characterized citizens' attitude to the structural problems that the region of Maribor has been encountering". The region of Maribor, along with the rest of Eastern Slovenia, has been experiencing two decades of economic stagnation and decline in the form of foreclosures, shutting down of key regional industries and outsourcing of jobs (Kirn 2014, 116). After the introduction of a new system of hundreds of radars to detect over speeding on Maribor's roads in 2013, the second biggest city in Slovenia, "more than 20,000 people were issued speeding tickets in only two weeks—in a city of 100,000 inhabitants" (Vezjak 2013). This had a clear material impact for the residents' household budgets, which propelled people's frustration with the mayor. The residents' indignation grew once it became known that the radar system was set up as a result of private–public partnership, which was perceived to benefit the mayor and businesses affiliated with him (Kirn 2014, 116). Although it may seem superficial, the speeding tickets represented "the symptomatic point where *the objective conditions of poverty were subjectivized*. It was at this moment that most citizens started feeling that something was rotten." (Kirn 2014, 116). Awaken from the apolitical slumber, the citizens traumatised by material deprivation and exploitation in one of the poorest regions of Slovenia, took to the streets to publicly express their anger with the local government.

The first in a series of protests that became known as "the All-Slovenian People's Uprising" happened in front of the Maribor City Town Hall on 2 November 2012. This protest and others that followed were primarily

organised through the use of social media, mostly through Facebook, blogs, and Twitter. The turnout at the first protest numbered only around 50 people, but the protest still received wide coverage in the national media. The second protest in Maribor then took place ten days later on 12 November 2012. About 400 or 500 protesters demonstrated in front of the town hall, this time carrying placards with the symbolic slogan "He's finished!" (in Slovenian, "*Gotof je!*"), calling for Maribor's mayor, Franc Kangler, to step down. The protesters also threw eggs at the façade of the town hall and burnt a speed camera when marching towards their final destination. The third protest march against the mayor of Maribor took place on 21 November 2012 when he was elected member of the upper chamber of the Slovenian parliament. Around 1000 people attended the march and blocked the electors and the mayor from using the exit route from the town hall. The police had to intervene to let the electors leave the building. The fourth protest in Maribor on 26 November 2012 was well attended, with around 10,000 people protesting. Because a part of the protest turned violent, the police intervened, and seven police officers were injured, and 31 protesters detained (RTVSLO 2012b; 24ur.com 2012). The best attended protest in Maribor was on 3 December 2012, with 20,000 protesters (RTVSLO 2012d).

It was not until the protests spread to the capital Ljubljana that the protests turned into a movement. While the first protests in Maribor were mostly organised through the social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, the first protest in Ljubljana was an opportunity for different civil initiatives, activists, intellectuals, students, trade unions, and other member of public to work together and increase the mobilising capacity of the uprising. The first protest in Ljubljana took place in front of the Slovenian parliament on the Republic Square on 27 November 2012, with some 1000 protesters attending. Protesters shouted slogans, such as "Slovenia is the center of European mafia!", "Come out of your barn, Europe's servants!", and "Janša, you're pinching our wallets!" (RTVSLO 2012c). While protests also took place in other towns, such as Kranj, Koper, Nova Gorica, Novo mesto, Velenje in Jesenice, they were smaller in numbers. The second protest in Ljubljana was only three days later when 10,000 people took to the streets. Nine more waves of protests followed between December 2012 and March 2013. The protest in Ljubljana on Slovenian Culture Day, 8 February 2013, was the biggest, with more than 20,000 people taking part, but other towns, especially in Eastern part of Slovenia also saw relatively high numbers—2500 people in Celje on 3 December

2012 and 2500 people in Murska Sobota on 7 December 2012 (RTVSLO 2012d, e, 2013a).

The protest movement was very diverse in composition and united different social groups and civil initiatives: from students, lecturers, and trade unions to precarious workers, pensioners, anarchists and socialists, and many ordinary people without previous political experience. The coordination of activities and protests took place through the movement's General Assembly, but also other newly formed coordination groups, such as the "All-Slovenian People's Uprising" Committee, Committee for Social Justice and Solidarity, the Coordination Committee of Slovenian Culture, the Committee for Direct Democracy, a group of young digital savvy students and academics called Today is a New Day, and the IDS. Alongside the protest committees, previously existing groups and movements, many of them on the radical left ideologically, such as the Federation for Anarchist Organisation, the Invisible Workers of the World, the Association of Free Trade Unions of Slovenia, the Workers and Punks' University, the student association Iskra, the Pirate Party, and the Party for Sustainable Development of Slovenia, were also important players in the movement (Gračner 2013). By February 2013, the different protest committees and groups started considering the next steps for the movement. What united these different, sometimes ideologically opposed groups was a common populist front against the political elites both on the right and left. As Gal Kirn notes, protest committees, however, had varied visions and perspectives of how to reach that end, spanning from the liberal moralist stance, insisting on the need of fresh new faces in Slovenian politics that would uphold the rule of law and tackle corruption, the nationalist-populist stance, emphasising the sovereignty and independence of the Slovenian nation, to the radical left position, seeking structural social transformation (Kirn 2013). Instead of only targeting the political parties in power, the protesters held the whole political class responsible for the corruption-ridden transition to a capitalist market economy, during which key industries were privatised and sold off to tycoons. As much as this was a powerful rallying cry for the protesters, it was also an effective strategic position taken by the protest coordinating committees. By taking this position of externality and of being above/beyond politics, they were able to maintain their political impartiality in the face of attacks, especially from the right-wing politicians and media at the time that the protests were being organised by opposition left-wing parties and trade unions. This strategy of maintaining (a)political purity was necessary for upholding the

legitimacy of their demands in the eyes of the public, which was strongly distrustful of politicians and political institutions.

However, the political efficacy of this populist strategy started to wear off after three parties left Janez Janša's coalition government and the parliament voted a motion of no confidence in Janez Janša's government in February 2013. The toppling of the government fulfilled one of the key demands of the movement. When opposition, mostly centre-left, parties agreed to form a one-year-long transition government under the leadership of Alenka Bratušek from the Positive Slovenia party, the protest movement started to lose momentum. There were also serious disagreements among the protest committees in the movement as to how to proceed. The divisions in the movement can be grouped into two positions: (1) some protesters and committees believed that the movement should continue to organise horizontally and stay active in local communities and civil society, while supervising politics from outside in civil society; whereas (2) others endorsed coalition building and engagement in electoral politics by establishing new political parties or partnering with existing ones. These two positions did not only pit the protest committees and participating groups against each other, but also caused cleavages within the groups themselves. Part of the radical left, organised around the IDS, took the second position and entered the phase of building institutional links with other ideologically similar protesters and groups. In the following section, I will elaborate what motivated the IDS to take this next step and its electoral trajectory to the parliamentary United Left party.

The Emergence of the IDS and the United Left

In contrast with other protest groups, the IDS organised around a clear ideological political slogan: to fight for a democratic and ecological socialism. It rejected the moralist explanation for the crisis influential in the movement that individual corrupt politicians were to blame and avoided the nationalist discourse of Slovenian victimhood. Instead, it grounded its critique in a Marxian analysis that tied the crisis in Slovenian politics with the crisis of capitalism. As one of the founding IDS members Rok Kogej explained, their answer to the crisis was the extension of democratic control beyond the periodic elections to the democratic management of universities, banks, and companies. With the state controlling about 50% of the economy, they believed Slovenia had good conditions for democratic socialism compared to other countries (RTVSLO 2013b). IDS was mostly

composed of Marxist academics and students, many of whom were previously active in the radical left struggles described earlier. Their intellectual energy and Marxist analysis is a product of cooperative research over many years as part of the Workers and Punk's University, an education project run as part of the Ljubljana Peace Institute. Aware of the limitations of existing centre-left parties in Europe, namely their depoliticisation and adoption of the neoliberal programme of market reforms, IDS opted for a party-movement model of political organisation to tackle both: (1) by maintaining and nourishing their roots in the protest movement and radical struggles, the party-movement model was intended to avoid the bureaucratisation and depoliticisation of its structures; and (2) by entering electoral politics, they could transform the role of the state and other structures that maintained neoliberal governmentality. As Primož Krašovec rightly points out, the price the IDS would have paid if it avoided the terrain of state politics would be too high, since this would mean "keeping with the rather powerless protest-form, while the main decisions regarding the state budget allocation, laws regulating labour relations, organization of social institutions, levels of taxation, etc. still remain in the hands of the parties of capital" (Krašovec 2013, 319).

Inspired by SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain, IDS formalised into a political party a year later after its formation and joined two other smaller and ideologically similar parties, the Democratic Labour Party (*Demokratična stranka dela*—DSD) and the Party for Eco-Socialism and Sustainable development of Slovenia (*Stranka za ekosocializem in trajnostni razvoj Slovenije*—TRS), to create a coalition party the United Left (*Združena levica*) on 1 March 2014. The tripartite structure of the new party was also composed of a fourth group, comprised of social movements and autonomous individuals. The party-movement organisational structure reaffirmed the party's rootedness in civil society and social movements and acted as a key point of differentiation from other classical parties that have become so distrusted by ordinary people. On their website, the IDS explained their decision to join the United Left in the following terms:

> On the basis of our achievements, and especially our failures and the limitations to our activist operations, we have increasingly come to the realisation that we need a more stable and organised form of operating. A decision was reached which acknowledged the need for operating within the centres of political power as well. We see the establishment of our party and our

candidacy at the European elections in May 2014 as the next steps on the path of a broader and more organised movement. (IDS 2015, my translation)

Having been established only three months before, the United Left did not manage to gain any of the eight seats up for grabs in the May 2014 European elections, but it did achieve 5.47% of the vote, which is above the 4% threshold to enter the lower chamber of the Slovenian parliament. This gave the party's collective leadership optimism in the run up to the July 2014 early parliamentary elections after Alenka Bratušek stepped down as prime minister. In the 2014 early parliamentary elections, the United Left won 5.97% of the vote, which translated into six seats in the 90-member Slovenian National Assembly. It gained this first parliamentary success on a clear manifesto for democratic socialism as an alternative to neoliberal politics of austerity and market reforms and by riding on the general dissatisfaction of Slovenian voters with the established mainstream political parties. Whether it can make better electoral gains by adopting a more ambiguous populist discourse (with regard to Podemos, see Kioupkiolis 2016) in the future, rather than a clearly Marxist one, remains to be seen as the United Left learns the ropes of parliamentary politics. I will say more about this in the next section.

Entering this new stage of its trajectory, from protesting in the streets during the 2012–2013 All-Slovenian Uprisings and forming a movement to establishing a political party and entering the Slovenian parliament, has introduced the radical left to a whole new logic that pertains to parliamentary national politics and bestowed upon them a new responsibility. It also tested the long-term viability of the party-movement organisation structures and decision-making processes in the context of political competition with other political parties. In the context of the protest movement and popular distrust in established political parties, the party-movement model was seen as the best way to addressing the depoliticising tendency of representative politics under neoliberal governmentality. The hybridity between the horizontal practices and vertical structures of organising under the party-movement model was seen as a vital umbilical cord that could prevent the institutionalised part of the movement from ossifying and alienating itself too much from its grassroots base. The process of institutionalisation of the protest movement was a necessary step in constructing a hegemonic alternative to the establishment's neoliberal reformist project. At the same time, there have been increasing splits within the

coalition between parts of IDS and TRS on one side, and the autonomous and social movements group, IDS and DSD. While in the parliament, the party acted as a united front, at the local level, there has not been much cooperation in running collective campaigns and recruiting new members. In fact, the coalition structure of the United Left made it impossible for new supporters to become members of the United Left. In order to do so, they would have to become a member of one of the three parties. There were also clear ideological differences between the different parts of the United Left and personal rivalries, which made the operation of the party difficult within the existing organisational structures. This has created a rift in the party-movement model, where one part of the party started to push for the centralisation of the organisational structures and a transformation into a classical party, whereas the other part believed the existing party-movement model should be kept and improved.

Similar tensions arose in SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain. As these parties continue their march through the institutions and eventually step into the field of "governing", compromises and a more pragmatism orientation become inevitable in the context of a proportional representation system. Especially when in government, as will become clear with the example of SYRIZA discussed in the next section, the radical left's fidelity to their original ideals of the movements is tested. I will address these common challenges that the new radical left faces in the next section.

The Challenges for the New Radical Left in Europe

In the last section of the chapter, I would like to address what I identify as two key challenges for the new radical left as it attempts to construct an alternative governmentality to neoliberalism. The first concerns the sustainability of the party-movement model that was adopted by the United Left, and also by SYRIZA and Podemos. From 2015 onwards, the model came under sustained pressure of the increased dynamism between two different logics, that of parliamentarism (verticality, bureaucratism, centralisation, depoliticisation) and that of social movements (horizontality, decentralisation, politicisation). The tension between the two logics seems to be exacerbated even more when the party-movement comes into government, as was demonstrated by the experience of SYRIZA in the summer of 2015. The second challenge involves the radical transformation of the state that is needed in order to bring about the long-term historical change to neoliberal governmentality. As my political economic analysis of

(neo)liberal governmentality in Chap. 3 has shown, without altering the self-limitation principle of the state in relation to the market activity, the policy scope and capacity of state institutions in liberal democracies will continue to be paralysed by the principles of free market economy. The two challenges are co- and inter-dependent in that the way they will be tackled will determine the effectiveness and success of radicalising democracy by the new radical left parties.

The Challenge of Maintaining the Party-Movement Hybrid Relationship

I will first reiterate the factors and the circumstances that contribute to the emergence of a party-movement model in the new radical left's struggle against neoliberal governmentality, and then address the challenges it faces. As Richard S. Katz and Peter Mair (1995) establish in their systematic analysis of the changing models of party organisation and party democracy, each model of party formation that is dominant at a given time has its own associated model of democracy.[2] They distinguish between four party models: (1) *the elite party model*—dominant in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which had restrictive suffrage requirements and excluded the propertyless; (2) *the mass party model*—with more organised membership and the introduction of universal suffrage through the activation and empowerment of the disenfranchised, dominant until after the Second World War; (3) the modern *catch-all party model*—which is characterised by the waning of ideological distinctiveness of political parties and the individual's association of party affiliation with one's social identity, becoming prominent in the age of mass communication and consumerist society in the second half of the twentieth century; and (4*) the cartel party model*—which signals a close alignment of established political parties around common political aims, where the democratic process is a means of achieving social stability rather than social change (Katz and Mair 1995, 9–22). As a result of the hegemonic rise to prominence of neoliberal governmentality through technocratic international institutions and the collapse of ideological divides between Western political systems from the 1990s onwards, the cartel-party model represents a growing interpenetration of political parties and the state and a tendency towards collusion between the mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties. Furthermore, the dominance of the cartel-party model also has an effect on how we perceive and understand democracy:

> With the development of the cartel party, the goals of politics become self-referential, professional, and technocratic, and what substantive interparty competition remains becomes focused on the efficient and effective management of the polity. Competition between cartel parties focuses less on differences in policy and more … on the provision of spectacle, image, and theater. Above all, with the emergence of cartel parties, the capacity for problem-solving in public life is manifested less and less in the competition of political parties. (Katz and Mair 2009, 755)

With the institutional moderation of class conflict and "the increasing homogeneity of experiences and expectations of the vast majority of citizens associated with the rise of mass society and the welfare state" (Katz and Mair 2009, 758), the political parties under the cartel-party model start to follow what I described in Chap. 5 as Robert Michels' iron law of oligarchy.

It is in the context of this post-democratic state of politics that the Indignados movement sprang up in Madrid, with their rejection of *la casta* (the caste), the Occupy movement in New York City with its denouncement of the 1%, and the Slovenian protesters issuing a general indictment of the whole political class. The counter-movement to the depoliticisation of politics under the cartelist political system signified a political response to the crisis of democracy. The protest movements successfully captured a new strategic opening, offered by the crisis of the political economic system, for constructing a critique of both the cartel-party model of representative politics and neoliberal governmentality. By politicising "certain issues that were previously seen as private grievances", these movements "created a climate, a state of perceptions, that opened the possibility for political change" (Errejón and Mouffe 2016, 71–2). This process of politicisation also entailed a cultural socialisation of the protesters, traumatised through the exploitation by neoliberal governmentality and through which new political identities were constructed. Although this politicisation by social movements did instil "ideas of change" into the "common sense" of the general public, the heterogeneous nature of these movements, "putting together very different grievances and discontents some with very weak links with each other", meant that they were either unable or unwilling to deal with the questions of vertical power and the state (Errejón and Mouffe 2016, 72–3). It is this task that Podemos, SYRIZA and the United Left, notwithstanding their differences, undertook by adopting a party-model of political organisation

in order to bring about paradigmatic change to neoliberal governmentality and radicalise democracy.

However, as the new radical left parties embark on this path of electoral politics and competition with other political parties within established liberal democratic procedures, they also face the challenge of over-stratification and over-professionalisation of its vertical ways of organising, which beset the cartel-styled parties when they aligned themselves around a neoliberal governmental reform programme. The oligarchisation of democracy and political structures under (neo)liberal governmentality are the very source of depoliticisation and conflict between the political elites and emerging counter-elites, which can result in a crisis of governmentality. If the critical weakness of the Indignados movement was its inability to "produce any vertical moment, or result in new political alternatives, leaderships or programmes" (Errejón and Mouffe 2016, 104), then the challenge for the hybrid party-movement type of politics, which Podemos, SYRIZA and the United Left all adopted in one way or another, will be coming from the opposite side of the institutional dilemma— that means they will need to avoid the trap of depoliticisation. In theory, the party-movement model appears as an optimal vehicle for the radicalisation of democracy, while providing a mechanism for avoiding the tendency of oligarchisation. Yet, maintaining the institutional arrangement of hybridity between the repoliticising dynamism of social movements and the depoliticising tendency of political party organisation when working within the established political structures has proven difficult.

In his analysis of Podemos' populist strategy in Spain, Kioupkiolis (2016) discusses a number of difficulties that have arisen in the short lifespan of Podemos when trying to negotiate the dynamics between its horizontalist and vertical ways of organising. In order to increase its electoral appeal with the broader segments of society, which reaches beyond the circles of progressive activists operating within the anti-austerity movement, the party structures of Podemos have tended towards the centralisation and hierarchisation of decision-making. Kioupkioulis (2016, 106) rightly points out that this "seems at odds with the 'horizontal' layer of egalitarian participation and the 15 M spirit", prompting some social activists to denounce Podemos for co-opting the radical spirit of the Indignados movement for its own agenda (Flesher Fominaya 2014). Cristina Flesher Fominaya (2007) identified the same tension between the autonomous movements and the institutional left in Madrid's alter-globalisation network, and it seems that this tension between horizontal

and vertical ways of organising is still present in the relationship between Podemos and the Indignados movement. While Kioupkiolis (2016, 111) understands the increasingly "plebiscitary relationship between the leader and his followers" inside Podemos as a tendency characteristic of its populist character and discourse, Íñigo Errejón, the political secretary of Podemos and an elected MP to the Spanish parliament, counters this characterisation. Although Errejón acknowledges that leadership entails "the risk of decisionism" and "of crystallisation into forms… that can be detrimental to democracy", he does not limit this characteristic only to a populist form of politics or vertical ways of organising but believes that no form of organisation is exempt from these risks and deficiencies (Errejón and Mouffe 2016, 110).

SYRIZA's close ties with the anti-austerity movement in Greece has also encountered a similar tension between the leadership of the party coalition and the membership base, which took a particularly dramatic turn after the 2015 referendum when the SYRIZA-led government agreed to the bailout terms negotiated with Greece's international creditors. As I already mentioned earlier, as the new radical left moves into the position of governing, the relationship between social movements and the party structures becomes even tenser. The move from being a protest party in opposition to a "government in waiting" meant that "certain organisational features that were considered as strengths", such as horizontalist engagement and collective decision-making procedures within social movements, were now seen as hindrances in an attempt to appeal to moderate voters (Agnantopoulos and Lambiri 2015, 7). This is in line with Herbert Kitschelt's pessimistic conclusion that party-movements only represent a transitory phenomenon on the path to electoral competition for power. According to Kitschelt, when party-movement's politicians encounter "a declining salience of the core movement issue that originally inspired the mobilization" or are incorporated in "government executives that are forces to take responsibility for a wide variety of salient political issues", they may be incentivised to abandon the party-movement model (Kitschelt 2006, 288).

In the summer of 2015, when SYRIZA reneged on its core pledge to end austerity in the face of international creditors and took responsibility for a wider variety of political issues, it became more like a classical political party. What many on the radical left saw as the betrayal of its radicalism could also be viewed as SYRIZA's closer alignment with other established political parties like PASOK and New Democracy, while using the

democratic process to achieve social stability rather than the promised social change. We could argue that by moving away from the party-movement model, SYRIZA became more like another cartel-party, to use Katz and Mair's categorisation. In the process of cartelisation, Katz and Mair suggest, parties that draw closer to the state are also more "likely to be drawing further away from society" (Katz and Mair 2009, 756). Here, however, we also need to stress that it matters how a party in government uses the state, meaning what type of governmentality guides the management of the economy and other social spheres. As long as a government is able to maintain the broad-based legitimacy of their programme in the eyes of the public and remain socially anchored, the new radical left can avoid cartelisation. I will elaborate on this point further in the next subsection. With regard to the Katz and Mair's more general point, the danger of cartelisation is something that the new radical left needs to keep in mind in order to avoid the faith of their centrist competitors. The loosening of the link between the party leadership and the membership base on the ground, not least the popular mandate given at the 2015 bailout referendum, signals a depoliticisation and a cartelisation of politics, what SYRIZA was trying to avoid in the first place with its objective of radicalising democracy.

The resolution of the tensions emanating from the party-movement model of the United Left offers another perspective on the challenge facing the new radical left. At the 2016 party congress, IDS was facing three different options: (1) to unite with TRS and DSD into a single political party; (2) to remain as a coalition of three parties; or (3) to leave the United Left coalition and continue as an independent political force. There was little support for the third option, so the division within the party became between the first and the second options. The proponents of the latter were arguing that the two other coalition parties were not socialist enough and for this reason more time was necessary to align their cooperation. Those advocating for the first option, which was also shared by TRS, argued that it was not organisationally and politically efficient to have three different local networks of structures, three different leaderships, and separate decision-making structures, which then required time-consuming coordination (Rogljič 2016). The passions between the two camps were flying so high that the congress came to a stalemate, ending with violent outbursts by some of the activists opposed to transforming the United Left into a single party. A year later, the IDS repeated the voted, this time electronically, with 50.3% of the membership taking part,

and around 80% of those voting supported the unification of TRS and IDS. In June 2017, the party-model of the United Left was dismantled and a new party was born, *the Left* (Levica).

The key lesson for the new radical left from the experience of the United Left is that improving organisational efficiency does not necessarily entail an abandonment of radical ideals. Limiting the party within the confines of ideological purity, which was one of the motivations behind the opposition to unifying the coalition into a single party, was an obstacle in broadening the party's appeal among different sectors of the population. As Chantal Mouffe has been arguing, together with Ernesto Laclau, the left needs to connect different struggles around one common political project in order to effectively channel the antagonisms and political passions through existing democratic structures, where they can challenge neoliberal hegemony. Especially in a time when neoliberal governmentality is facing a crisis, the new radical left needs to construct a new broad-based hegemony, which would provide the support and legitimacy for an alternative governmentality to neoliberalism.

The Challenge of Transforming the Principles of Neoliberal Governmentality and the Role of the State in Advanced Capitalism

The whole rationale behind the new radical left's project of radicalising democracy and engaging with the vertical structures of power has been to challenge neoliberal governmentality, which has led to the perceived collapse of left–right ideological divides and the resulting depoliticisation of representative politics in its quest to mould the state and society on the model of a competitive free market economy. The areas of policy-making that once fell under the purview of the democratic state, such as education, welfare, healthcare, creation of jobs, infrastructure, and energy, are now increasingly outside of direct state-led provision and subject to the principles of the market. This structural-ideological reality presents a great obstacle for the new radical left in post-crisis Europe, which requires transformative change, especially at the institutional and the wider cultural level of society. The two levels are interconnected and by focusing on the challenge of transforming the principles of neoliberal governmentality.[3]

The case of SYRIZA's capitulation to the bailout terms of the international creditors in the summer of 2015 offers a good illustration of the institutional difficulties in challenging neoliberal governmentality. In

their article, Apostolos Agnantopoulos and Dionysia Lambiri (2015) draw out four different scenarios that SYRIZA was facing as it stood up to the austerity measures and neoliberal structural reforms, dictated by the international creditors (i.e. the so-called *Troika*, involving the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund). The four alternative scenarios—capitulation, divorce, compromise, and transformation—correspond to the four different counter-neoliberalisation pathways that were set out by economic geographers Neil Brenner, Jamie Peck, and Nik Theodore (2010a, b): (1) zombie neoliberalisation; (2) disarticulated counter-liberalisation; (3) orchestrated counter-liberalisation; and (4) deep socialisation, respectively. After the 2015 referendum results on the bailout agreement, the SYRIZA-ANEL coalition government opted for capitulation. Faced with financial asphyxia, as described by Agnantopoulos and Lambiri's scenario, SYRIZA was "forced to endorse the logic of austerity and neoliberal structural reform *in toto*, with only minor, cosmetic changes" (Agnantopoulos and Lambiri 2015, 7). Consequently, the neoliberal policy agenda at the governmental and transnational level was preserved. In an alternative scenario, SYRIZA could have opted for divorce from the Eurozone and free itself of the restrictive fiscal and monetary policy regimes, which form part of the European *acquis communitaire*. A disarticulated counter-neoliberalisation, despite forging political alliances with other anti-austerity left-wing parties (*Die Linke* in Germany, *Front de Gauche* in France, Podemos in Spain and the United Left in Slovenia), was not feasible since SYRIZA lacked the crucial backing of powerful European national governments (Agnantopoulos and Lambiri 2015, 7–8). Moreover, an unfavourable and hostile macroeconomic environment would have made it difficult for SYRIZA to implement its manifesto of renationalisation and to pursue an active state-led economic policy without breaching the EU fiscal rules and competition law.

The difficulty of implementing the latter two strategies of counter-neoliberalisation demonstrate the power of institutional obstacles that SYRIZA, and the new radical left as a whole, face in the future. In the scenario of compromise or of systemic co-optation, although the emergence of the new radical left might temporarily destabilise neoliberal governmentality, it does not change "the fundamental logic upon which the EU is based" (Agnantopoulos and Lambiri 2015, 8). This is because they "lack the capacity to infiltrate the echelons of global political-economic power" (Brenner et al. 2010b, 341), which can only be achieved by

infiltrating "the inherited institutional frameworks of neoliberalization" at all institutional levels, local, national, and transnational (Brenner et al. 2010b, 342). A new counter-governmentality can only be constructed through coalition-building at different levels of society, incorporating social movements, civil society groups and trade unions on the one hand and left-wing governments, political parties and party-movements on the other. Without this deeper socialisation happening, which would re-embed economic activity, so to speak, back into the social and broader environmental framework and transform the (neo)liberal operating principle of state self-limitation, the new radical left would no longer represent isolated islands of resistance in a hostile institutional environment, which is geared against them from the very outset. Indeed, by infiltrating the governmental centres of institutionalised power, the new radical left and other left-wing parties can endeavour to replace the market-enabling regulatory and organising actions (austerity measures and neoliberal structural reforms) with:

> alternative, market-restraining agendas. These might include capital and exchange controls; debt forgiveness; progressive tax regimes; non-profit based, cooperatively run, deglobalized credit schemes; more systematic global redistribution; public works investments; and the decommodification and deglobalization of basic social needs such as shelter, water, transportation, health care, and utilities. (Brenner et al. 2010b, 342)

These measures would shift the self-limiting principle of neoliberal governmentality towards a more active, interventionist role of the state, which would protect the social and environmental well-being. In order to avoid the shift from the present market-dominated political regime to a popular democratic statist one succumbing to authoritarianism, the new radical left's commitment to radicalising democracy will provide the necessary buffer by building linkages between the different levels of government and civil society. At the transnational level, the needed infrastructure for connecting different social movements and statist forms of resistance might already be in the making with the establishment of Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25). DiEM25 is a pan-European political movement, launched by the former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, which believes that only through the democratisation of the EU structures can we avoid its disintegration and the rise of xenophobia and ethno-nationalism (DiEM25 2016). The problem with DiEM25, however, is

that it is a post-ideological project, bringing together the Greens, the radical left and liberals, and in danger becoming another activist run project that is far removed from the daily concerns of ordinary people in different EU member states.

We can better understand the current predicament in Europe, which the new radical left needs to address, through Karl Polanyi's theory of the great oscillation between the market-restraining/democratising movement and the liberal project of establishing a society modelled on the idea of a self-regulating market. As I have noted in Chap. 3, out of this double movement Polanyi anticipated the rise of a new form of society, which, depending upon the interpretation of his work, entails "either socialist planning or an institutional form of capitalism termed 'embedded liberalism'" (Dale 2010, 226). Similarly, from a more conservative standpoint, Joseph Schumpeter maintained there were firm empirical reasons "for believing that the capitalist order tends to destroy itself and that centralist socialism is… a likely heir" (Schumpeter 2010, 377). At the end of his address before the American Economic Association 1950, a few days before his death, Schumpeter concluded that "Marx was wrong in his diagnosis of the manner in which capitalist society would break down; [but] he was not wrong in the predication that it would break down eventually" (Schumpeter 2010, 431). The present-day context is still defined by the absence of a clearly articulated counter-governmentality, which could provide the ideological-structural alternative to neoliberal governmentality and free market capitalism. It is also in this context of the absence of "an autonomous socialist governmentality" that Foucault (2008, 92) situated the taking shape of neoliberalism, and based on the prognosis of the developing counter-movement in post-crisis Europe, we could say that this context continues to mark the persistence of neoliberal governmentality. With the rise of the new radical left and the counter-movement against neoliberal governmentality after the financial crisis, we are finally seeing organised and orchestrated attempts at different levels of society at defining such an alternative governmentality through the process of radical democratisation.

This chapter brought together key theoretical observations from previous chapters and synthesised them around the case of post-2011 wave of protests and the emergence of the new radical left parties in Europe. Having constructed a genealogical analysis of neoliberal governmentality in Chap. 3 and conceptualised the dynamics between institutionalised forms of political power and the ephemerality of extra-institutional

resistance in Chap. 5, the trajectory of the new radical left from being a protest movement to forming a political party aptly exemplifies the project of radical democracy in practice and attempts at challenging neoliberal governmentality. While the 2008 financial crisis represented an opportunity for neoliberal governmentality to reinforce its hegemonic grip in Europe through adopting a regulatory straitjacket of fiscal rules, it also opened up the space for the political contestation and critique of the political system, the very structures that sanctioned and enabled the neoliberalisation of society. As with any kind of governmentality, Foucault reminds us, the neoliberal response to the crisis was also met with resistance from counter-conducting movements, such as the Occupy and the *Indignados*, challenging the legitimacy of centre-right and centre-left governments in implementing socially damaging neoliberal reforms. The initial reaction of counter-conducting resistances was to reject the centralised structures of representative democracy and put horizontal practices of direct democracy in action. The Occupy movement and the *Indignados* were successful in mobilising the disgruntled masses of all ages and backgrounds, united in their shared precarity, and provided a platform for imagining and practising alternative ways of democratic decision-making and politics. Yet, the bodily power of resistance in the streets could only persist for so long in the face of everyday social obligations and personal needs. The decision by parts of the protest movements to organise their structures more formally and extend their struggle to the institutions of representative democracy demonstrated the next step in building a counter-movement to neoliberal governmentality.

After identifying several key limitations in the social movement theory and practice, I argued that the party-movement model could provide the solution for the depoliticisation of democratic politics in the current cartel-like political party system, and in addition serve as the vehicle for challenging neoliberal governmentality. Although the horizontalist modes of organising and decision-making in the GJM and the post-2011 austerity movements empowered masses of disenfranchised citizens, the social movements lacked the institutional capacity to bring about long-term paradigmatic change. This necessitated coalition-building with other more traditional vertical structures of power, such as trade unions and political parties, as well as active engagement with power invested in institutional politics. Based on the experience of operational weaknesses of previous movements and the maturation of a critical moment for the entry of new political forces into the delegitimised political system, new radical political

parties in Spain, Slovenia, and Greece emerged. With a populist message of a different kind of politics that represents the interests of the ordinary people and the promise of confronting the distrusted elites, Podemos and the United Left managed to enter the parliaments in their respective countries, with also SYRIZA taking power for the first time in Greece.

The entry into institutional politics, however, presents the new radical left with new challenges. Inexperienced in the workings of representative structures of power, the political groups who were once protesting against the political and economic elites in the public squares are now becoming part of the elite themselves, which demands a pragmatic manoeuvring between the expectations of the membership base and the reality of power distribution among different political forces in the parliaments. While the political strategy of seizing power moves the new radical left parties towards organisational centralisation, it also increases their efficiency in the electoral competition against other political parties. Only by taking control of governments, the new radical left can hope to transform and recalibrate the role of the state in policy-making and running of the economy, causing a paradigmatic shift in neoliberal governmentality towards a different mode of governing. On the other hand, a true radical shift away from the depoliticisation of neoliberal governmentality can only occur if the new mode of governing is coupled with the democratisation of decision-making at different levels of society. This demonstrates how the struggle against neoliberalism is in essence a struggle for reclaiming democracy.

NOTES

1. This aspect of collective action in social movements has been captured in different ways by social and political theorists: as anti-representational, anti-establishment, as self-organisation, prefigurative politics, autonomy, horizontality, the multitude, and other descriptors (e.g. Day 2005; Maeckelbergh 2011; Hardt and Negri 2012; Graeber 2013; Kioupkiolis and Katsambekis 2014). It has also been the subject in analyses of particular movements, such as the Gezi Park protests in Turkey, the Syntagma Square protests and the Indignados, the Occupy movement and others (see Özen 2015; Prentoulis and Thomassen 2013, 2014; Sitrin and Azzellini 2014).

2. Katz and Mair build their analysis on top of other models of party development (e.g. Otto Kirchheimer's (1966) catch-all party and Angel Panebianco's (1988) electoral-professional party). Katz and Mair criticise previous approaches for presupposing a linear development of party formation, where

the final stage ends in either stability or decay. Instead, they propose to view the development of parties as a dialectical process with reference not only to their relationship with civil society, but also with the state.

3. For contesting neoliberalism at the cultural level, neo-Gramscian work on hegemony and the common sense would be a productive venue of enquiry (Kenway 1990; Smart 1999 and 2002; Bieler and Morton 2004; Ruckert 2007; Daldal 2014; Kreps 2015). In a more recent publication, with regards to Podemos and the new radical left, Íñigo Errejón describes how a discursive populist strategy could be utilised to shift the coordinates of neoliberal hegemony and create a popular counter-hegemony (see Errejón and Mouffe 2016, 111–15).

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Conclusion

I began to write this book at a time when anti-austerity protests were erupting around Europe and the possibility of an alternative political vision to neoliberal governmentality started to be articulated in a more coherent and tangible way. The feeling shared with many like-minded people on the left, be they students, activists, professors, or political commentators, was that of hope. There was an inspiring revolutionary optimism in the air, accompanied by endless debates in public spaces that fostered imaginative deliberation on key questions about the shape of a future society and politics. I have argued that the first reaction to the neoliberal policy response and the financial crisis, up to 2012 in countries like Spain and Slovenia (and even earlier in Greece where social conditions deteriorated first), could be viewed as anti-establishment and prefigurative in nature. For example, as the Occupy Wall Street emerged in the Zuccotti Park in New York City, among those supportive of the movement, there was a widely shared perception that the protestors did not need to have clear political demands and that they did not need to articulate a clear alternative political programme. The view was that the occupations served the purpose of opening up possibilities for thinking, imagining, and practising alternative ways of organising, radically different from the established vertical structures of power. I have demonstrated in Chap. 4 that the effect of suspension in a crisis, together with the transgressive qualities of critique, contributed to this opening. There was a strong suspicion that

pervaded the Occupy movement, and initially also the movements in Spain, Greece, and Slovenia, that the protestors should not replicate the hierarchical structures of organisation, which became so emblematic of the dominant understanding of democracy. Representative politics were viewed as structures of domination, corruption, and repression, which blocked alternative political voices and ways of life that did not conform to the prescribed conduct of obedient and apathetic citizens. The protesters' aim, therefore, was to avoid hierarchical models of organisation at all costs. As a consequence, these movements also refused the need for elected leaders, who would represent and communicate the movements' demands to the media and the general public. Instead they opted for regular rotation of leadership roles and all-inclusive decision-making, in the form of either organisational committees or general assemblies, which took decisions on the basis of consensus. This was their vision of how a real democracy should function, a model that could have perhaps stood as an alternative to the alienating and stratified structures of representative democracy, or at least that was the hope at the time.

I have shown in this book that such horizontal and non-hierarchical model of organisation finds inspiration in the past experience of social movements (e.g. the Global Justice Movement), and in the theory of post-Marxist autonomism (e.g. Hardt and Negri 2000, 2004, 2009; Sitrin 2006, 2012, 2014; Sitrin and Azzellini 2014) and anarchism (Kurnik and Beznec 2009; Razsa and Kurnik 2012; Graeber 2013). The strategy of the Occupy movement was that of autonomous opposition and non-engagement with the existing political and economic structures of power. Any kind of attempt at cooperating with political and economic institutions was viewed as politically and ethically antithetical to the movement's spirit. In Chaps. 5 and 6, I have argued that this approach is inadequate in bringing long-term historical change to the political institutions, where decisions about laws in our society are made. Inspired by Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony and the concept of "the historic bloc", Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau point to an alternative route for social movements and the new radical left, which incorporates horizontal modes of organising, whilst arguing for complementary political engagement with existing structures of power (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Mouffe 2005, 2013; Laclau 2005, 2014). In order to construct a radical political project, they argue, an alternative discursive formation needs to be articulated by connecting different social struggles under a common counter-hegemonic project. In this respect, Laclau and Mouffe are also critical of the

traditional Leninist revolutionary model of attaining radical change. In her own writings, Mouffe expands upon this point through her critique of economic determinism that she identifies in classical Marxist theory. The latter stipulates that the internal contradictions of the capitalist and liberal bourgeois system will bring about their own collapse and pave the way for a socialist revolution. As an alternative to what she views as a reductionist and dogmatic strategy to "a more just society" in modern democratic societies, Mouffe believes that "deep democratic advances could be carried out through an immanent critique of existing institutions", without destroying the liberal democratic order and building another order anew (Mouffe 2013, 133).

Through her critique of the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy, Chantal Mouffe proposes an agonistic model of democracy, which better accounts for difference and antagonisms in society by channelling them through the existing liberal democratic institutions, where they can be articulated against other competing hegemonic narratives. As I have demonstrated in Chap. 2, the rationalism and individualism in liberal thought, which are blind to the ever-present antagonism in society and the possibility of constructing alternative collective political identities, make the aggregative and deliberative models of democracy inadequate to respond to the intensifying democratising drives in post-crisis Europe. The agonistic model of democracy recognises the constitutive role of power in constructing political subjectivities and the need for a counter-hegemonic articulation to challenge depoliticisation. Up to this point, I have agreed with Mouffe's project of radicalising democracy. However, there are two theoretical problems with important political implications that I think Mouffe leaves unaddressed in her analysis. First, if liberalism is to blame for rationalist and individualist tendencies in contemporary democratic politics, how can the purpose of a radical political project be the defence of the liberal "ethico-political principles" when Mouffe (2013, 134) herself recognises that neoliberalism has "profoundly transformed" the established political institutions and by implication the very ethico-political principles which guide them? What is missing in Mouffe's political theory is an analysis of the structural connection between liberalism—which she partly critiques, yet at the same time concedes that it cannot be dispensed with, if we are to build a more just society—and neoliberalism. Echoing Ellen Meiksins Wood, this would require maintaining a critical (sceptical) attitude towards liberal democracy, to the extent that liberal democratic institutions are viewed as one of the tools for

extending democracy and social justice, while being mindful of the dangers that such a political project brings for radical politics, namely depoliticisation and the exclusion of non-liberal hegemonic alternatives.

The second problem concerns the strategy in radical politics for building a counter-hegemonic alternative to neoliberalism. I will unwrap the problem first through re-addressing Mouffe's proposal and then exposing the points that remain unresolved. Mouffe argues that different movements in civil society need to work together with progressive political parties and trade unions in order to be able to take on the challenge to the neoliberal order (Mouffe 2013, 135). Although Mouffe recognises the element of power relations and structures in her conception of agonistic democracy, she does not elaborate sufficiently on the interplay between radical politics and existing political institutions, neglecting the caveats that this interaction presents. In her model of agonistic democracy, Mouffe underscores the hegemonic role that liberal democratic institutions themselves play in translating antagonisms in society into manageable agonisms, so that they can be rendered in a language and form that are comprehensible by the dominant (liberal) registers of meaning. What is left out in her project of radicalising democracy, however, is a theory of the extent to which this translation is needed, and where liberal democracy stands in relation to the manageable agonisms. In other words, if I use the example of anti-austerity movements and the new radical left parties, should social and political movements be completely subsumed by the liberal democratic institutions, to a point where they need to resemble established political parties, both in form and ideology, in order to be treated seriously? Or is an alternative model of democratic organisation possible that maintains a relation of hybridity between social movement and political parties? Considering the two theoretical problems together, would not the radicalisation of democracy therefore entail the overcoming of liberal democracy as the dominant political state formation in Western societies?

These shortcomings that remain inadequately explored and theorised in both more mainstream approaches to the study of the post-democratic order (Hay 2007; Stoker 2006; Crouch 2011) and post-structuralist approaches (Mouffe 2013; Rancière 2010) have been the focal point of this book. In political party studies, and political science more generally, the analysis is still predominantly focused on institutional politics, while treating social movements and protests as a second thought to the established democratic processes. In social movement literature, on the other hand, the focus has been on the protest arena of political action, emphasising the

role of protest movements in achieving social change, but in externality to electoral politics. As I have argued in Chap. 6, the challenge for radical left politics is to explore the interaction between these two fields and phenomena of political action. Moreover, if capturing state power is one of the key conditions for challenging neoliberalism, then a structural analysis of the relationship between liberalism and neoliberalism is also required in order to understand the transformed role of the state in this process and the institutional limitations that radical struggles face. With regards to the latter, the existing political science and theory literature does not adequately target the ideological involvement of liberalism in what has been identified as the post-democratic transformation of politics. And, while Mouffe provides us with a critical observation that the tension between liberalism and democracy is irresolvable, and as such, it is bound to manifest itself in an intensification of antagonistic outbursts, a critical analysis of neoliberalism and its relationship with liberalism is still missing. To this end, a political economy analysis was needed, which would provide a better understanding of the structural relationship between liberalism and neoliberalism. The starting premise for this inquiry was that liberalism and liberal democracy are not neutral and innocent legacies and institutions that have been attacked by neoliberalism or capitalism but played an active role in the rise to dominance of neoliberal governmentality.

This working thesis pushed my analysis in Chap. 3 towards adopting a political economy approach to understanding liberal democracy, which does not consider the domain of the political (liberal democracy) as separate from the economic domain (the market economy), but as co-constitutive. By drawing upon Michel Foucault and Karl Polanyi, I wanted to construct an approach that underlines the role of institutions and ideas in configuring the relationship between the state, civil society, and markets. Through critical engagement with Foucault's genealogical analysis of liberal governmentality, I have refashioned liberalism as a governmental rationality that not only shaped the functioning of the state (political liberalism), but also remoulded the relationship between the state and the market economy (economic liberalism). Political liberalism and economic liberalism are too often treated separately in academic literature and this approach remedies this analytical weakness. Polanyi's theory of the double movement, on the other hand, has shifted our attention to the role of social forces in either supporting market liberalisation or opposing it, through the formation of a counter-movement. What is particularly insightful in Foucault's analysis for understanding the relationship between

liberal democracy and neoliberalism today is the way the self-limitation principle of the state under liberal governmentality is maintained in neoliberalism as contemporary governance structures adopt market principles as the axiom of their operational field. The neoliberal state no longer represents the protective barrier between society and capitalist economic processes; instead, it intervenes into the processes of private and social life in a way so as to enable "a general regulation of society by the market" (Foucault 2008, 145). The role of the state under neoliberal governmentality has, therefore, not been shrinking and become irrelevant in the age of globalisation, as it is commonly suggested in political science and international relations literature. Rather, the opposite has been the case: the operation of the state has become rationalised in line with market principles, while gradually shedding its moral and democratic responsibility for the protection of citizens against market forces.

As a consequence of extended (neo)liberalisation and a reversal of democratic control in Western democracies, liberal democracy as the dominant ideological-structural regime has come increasingly under strain from the counter-movement of social forces that want to reclaim the state in order to radicalise democracy. By placing the crisis of liberal democratic politics within the genealogical analysis of (neo)liberal governmentality, we can better comprehend the complicity of liberalism and liberal democratic institutions in the hegemonisation of neoliberalism. In turn, this approach can inform the political strategy of radical left politics when it comes to considering their engagement with political institutions. It dissuades from taking on the view of the state as a neutral mechanism for the construction of an alternative counter-hegemonic narrative (Mouffe's view), as well as the Leninist-Marxist view, which sees the state as a monolithic apparatus of the capitalist bourgeoisie. Instead, this approach can help us re-examine the strategy of radical left politics and take heed of the obstacles the counter-hegemonic struggles face both inside and outside institutional politics.

As I have shown in Chap. 5, we should not romanticise and purify counter-hegemonic movements and political parties. No matter whether the political forces in question are on the left or the right of the ideological spectrum, in the interplay between politics and resistance both conductive power and counter-conducts are inevitably engaged in matrices of power and (self-)rule. In democratic political theory, this brings us to the perennial aporia of democracy, namely of the relation between the ruling and the ruled, elites and the masses, representatives and the represented. The

trajectory of the new radical left from the post-2011 protest movements to electoral politics demonstrates the strategic rethinking of vertical forms of political organisation and the ways of achieving radical change. From occupying a minoritarian position that had animated radical social movements before the post-2011 protests to a majoritarian and populist one, the new radical left has entered a phase of political maturation by adopting a more pragmatic approach. The state is no longer seen negatively as a source of evil, but a tool that can be used in enacting radical social change and defending the radical left's core constituencies. This change in strategy also marks a shift in radical left's conception of democracy, from one that emphasises direct and participatory democracy through horizontal forms of deliberation and decision-making, often placed in opposition to the state and other established forms of democracy, to a representative one that is statist and that appeals to the whole of the people.

The 2008 financial crisis was instrumental in this development of the radical left and the acceleration of finding alternative ways of challenging neoliberal governmentality. This is why crisis was a pertinent concept to use to make sense of the current predicament that we find ourselves in. As demonstrated in Chap. 4, it is first important that we understand why a crisis is such a rare yet resurging occurrence, why it causes surprise and appears accidental to the dominant order. By understanding its annunciatory moment and discursively symbolic formation, our judgement-making capacities are already trying to make sense of it, calculate it, manage it and eventually solve it. As Derrida and Foucault have demonstrated through their understanding of eventualisation, in the very announcement of a crisis or an event happening, there is already a manoeuvre by the dominant regimes of truth to conceal what the crisis is exposing through the cracks of the supposed state of normality. However, the very fact that a crisis catches us by surprise as an accident to the dominant order opens up a possibility for questioning and critiquing what has been until then unquestionable and taken for granted. The very suspension of old knowledge and judgements, which suddenly appear inadequate in determining the undeterminable nature of a crisis, urges us to find new answers and make new judgements. Crisis as an analytical framework demonstrated it can elucidate both the contextual environment within which resistance occurs, as well as the conceptual requisites needed for the creation of a favourable context for resistant subjectivities to emerge. My question of inquiry also probed whether the experience of trauma in a crisis can stimulate the desire to be and become a critical, resisting subjectivity at the

psychological level. And following my analysis of Catherine Malabou's notion of neuronal plasticity, I demonstrated that external events, such as the socio-political violence of the latest economic crisis in Europe, can damage and traumatise our sense of ourselves and reality around us to the extent that trauma can be more disabling towards fostering a resisting subjectivity to this violence rather than enabling. However, the path of restructuring the sense of the self and social reality after trauma is in no way determined in advance and, thus, can provide the ground for fostering a desire for resistance.

By intervening in contemporary democratic and political theory, social movement and political party literature, the book aimed to provide a more robust understanding of resistance in radical left politics so that it can effectively respond to the contemporary crisis of liberal democracy. My motivation behind the book was, therefore, deeply political, the same way that I think political theory carries important political and ideological implications for our understanding of politics and society. In principle, I wanted to make three different theoretical contributions to the study of politics: (1) to broaden the understanding of politics in mainstream political science by providing a more nuanced conception of power and, in this way, illuminate the relationship between extra-institutional resistance and institutional politics; (2) to demonstrate the political and theoretical implications of positing resistance outside the field of established structures of power in radical political theory; and (3) to provide a wider political economy framework for understanding the structural reasons for the emergence of extra-institutional political struggles and the future obstacles facing the new radical left.

I would like to end this chapter with a reflection on what insights this book has to offer for future research in political studies of advanced democracies. The trajectory of European politics in recent years presents pressing challenges for the radical left and political theory. I would like to raise some questions in particular with regard to two of them: the continuing difficulty of the left in dismantling the neoliberal consensus around austerity measures and structural reforms, as well as the rise of right-wing populism and authoritarian forms of government. In order to effectively challenge and reverse the adopted neoliberal structural reforms and austerity measures, the new radical left needs to win power across Europe. Depending on the type of the electoral system, it may need to form coalitions with other established or new political parties, which might entail a watering down of some of its key programmatic proposals. These questions might

receive more qualified answers in comparative politics, for instance, by looking at the difference between majoritarian and proportional electoral systems. The literature on the new radical left in Europe has already shifted its attention from studying populism as a discursive strategy to broaden the popular appeal for radical political change to assessing the policy implications of ideological change once populist parties enter government.

For the new radical left, a still bigger challenge will be to construct an alternative governmentality that has broad-based popular democratic support and that will supplant neoliberal governmentality. The counter-movement against free market capitalism also produces right-wing populist movements and parties, which have been more successful in appealing to the concerns of the voters. In countries like Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Austria, right-wing populists and the radical right have managed to win enough electoral support to form governments. If the new radical left does not construct an alternative governmentality to neoliberalism, then the right-wing populists will. Whether the alternative emerges from the right or left, the current trend shows a slow-down and reshaping of the processes of globalisation and the return back to the nation state. Radicalisation of democracy inevitably also entails a move away from the depoliticised minimalist state characteristic of liberal democracy towards a more popular democratic form of the state that does not shy away from intervening into the market economy in order to protect the needs of the people. The contemporary crisis of liberal democracy might therefore potentially entail the introduction of a popular government that will oversee the transition to new forms of mixed economy in Europe. Yet, what the exact ideological nature of this political regime will be will depend on what political forces construct it. The future research in democratic and political theory should continue to offer theoretical elucidation around these pressing questions and try to influence the terms of the debate in other concerned disciplines.

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[1] Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.